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ABSTRACT
In the wake of high and rising oil prices since 
2003, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) have seen dynamic economic 
development, enhancing their role in the global 
economy as investors and trade partners. Real GDP 
growth has been buoyant, with non-oil activity 
expanding faster than oil GDP. Macroeconomic 
developments have also been characterised by 
large  ﬁ   scal and current account surpluses as a 
result of rising oil revenues, notwithstanding 
ﬁ   scal expansion and rapid import growth. The 
most signiﬁ   cant macroeconomic challenge 
faced by GCC countries is rising inﬂ  ation in an 
environment in which the contribution of monetary 
policy to containing inﬂ   ationary pressure is 
constrained by the exchange rate regimes. The 
overall favourable macroeconomic backdrop 
of recent years has provided GCC countries 
with an opportunity to tackle long-standing 
structural challenges, such as the diversiﬁ  cation
of oil-centred economies and reform of the 
labour markets. In a global context, apart from 
developing into a pole of global economic growth, 
GCC countries – together with other oil-exporting 
countries – have become a major net supplier of 
capital in global markets, second only to East 
Asia. As a result, they have become part of the 
international policy debate on global imbalances. 
Furthermore, GCC countries are home to some of 
the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds, which 
raises several ﬁ  nancial stability issues. Their role 
as trade partners has also increased, with the 
European Union being the only major region in 
the world maintaining a signiﬁ   cant surplus in 
bilateral trade with the GCC. GCC countries are 
also key players in global energy markets in terms 
of production, exports and the availability of spare 
capacity. Their role is likely to become even more 
pivotal in the future as they command vast oil and 
gas reserves and beneﬁ  t from relatively low costs 
in exploiting oil reserves.
Key words: Gulf Cooperation Council, global 
imbalances, sovereign wealth funds, ﬁ  nancial 
stability, oil markets
JEL: F40, F30, F14, E60, N15, O53, Q40 5
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The economies of the member states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC)  1 have attracted 
increasing attention over recent years. In the 
wake of high and rising oil prices since 2003, 
they have developed into a pole of global 
economic growth. They have also become 
more important as global investors and trade 
partners, and play a crucial role in global energy 
markets. Furthermore, together with other major 
oil-exporting countries, they have become part 
of the international policy debate on global 
imbalances.
Against this background, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the Deutsche Bundesbank 
organised a Eurosystem high-level seminar with 
the central banks and monetary agencies of the 
GCC member states. This seminar took place on 
12 March 2008 in Mainz, Germany and should 
be seen in the light of the Eurosystem’s policy 
of developing relations with central banks in 
other regions of the world, most of which also 
have experience of regional cooperation.
This Occasional Paper presents the analytical 
background documentation that was prepared 
for the seminar and served as the basis for 
discussion. The seminar’s agenda focused on 
economic structures and developments in the 
GCC countries and on relevant aspects from a 
global perspective, in particular, with regard to 
current issues in money and ﬁ  nance, as well as 
energy and trade. Therefore, this paper is divided 
into three parts. Part 1 “Economic structures and 
developments in the GCC countries” reviews 
key structural issues and economic developments 
in GCC countries over recent years. Parts 2 and 3 
focus on the role of the GCC countries in the 
global economy. Part 2 “Oil revenue recycling 
and implications for ﬁ  nancial stability” analyses 
the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows of GCC countries, their role 
in the context of global imbalances and special 
issues related to sovereign wealth funds. Part 3 
“Energy and trade” reviews the role of GCC 
countries in global energy markets and 
international trade. The information in this paper 
is based on that available as at February 2008, 
given the date of the seminar for which the 
contributions were prepared.2 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United  1 
Arab Emirates (UAE).
In the executive summary, reference is made to some more  2 
recent macroeconomic data that has become available in the IMF 
World Economic Outlook of April 2008 and the IMF Regional 
Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia of May 
2008.6
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES AND DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE GCC COUNTRIES
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
share a number of speciﬁ  c structural economic 
features, while also displaying some signiﬁ  cant 
differences. Key common features are: a high 
dependency on hydrocarbons as expressed 
in the share of oil (and gas) revenues in total 
ﬁ   scal and export revenues and the share of 
the hydrocarbon sector in GDP; a young and 
rapidly growing national labour force; and 
the heavy reliance on expatriate labour in 
the private sector. These features also pose 
common structural policy challenges to GCC 
economies, notably economic diversiﬁ  cation 
to reduce the dependency on the hydrocarbon 
sector and to develop the private non-oil sector. 
Both are necessary to create employment 
opportunities for young nationals, given that the 
hydrocarbon sector is not labour-intensive and 
further increasing public sector employment 
is not sustainable. In order to enhance the 
employability of nationals, efforts to reduce 
the educational mismatch between nationals’ 
qualiﬁ  cations and private sector needs are key.
GCC member states are moving towards 
economic diversiﬁ   cation at a different pace 
and in different directions, with Bahrain and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) being most 
advanced in the process. This is also driven by 
the fact that hydrocarbon reserves are projected 
to be depleted in some countries (Bahrain and 
Oman) relatively soon, while they will last 
in others for a considerable period of time. 
Economic diversiﬁ  cation needs to be supported 
by structural reforms, in particular, privatisation 
and market liberalisation, areas in which most 
GCC countries have made signiﬁ  cant progress 
over recent years.
Recent macroeconomic developments provide 
a favourable backdrop for implementing 
reforms and addressing the structural 
challenges, in particular, as they have provided 
GCC economies with the ﬁ  nancial means to 
do so.
In the wake of high oil prices, annual real GDP 
growth has been buoyant at around 7% on 
average for the GCC countries as a whole for 
the past ﬁ  ve years, making the region a pole of 
global economic growth. Non-oil GDP growth 
has been impressive and has even exceeded oil 
GDP growth in most countries, even though the 
dynamics of the non-oil sector remain largely 
driven by government expenditure, which in 
turn depends on oil revenues. The nominal GDP 
of GCC economies has more than doubled since 
2001, adding an economy the size of Sweden 
to the GCC in terms of aggregate output. 
GCC countries have accumulated large ﬁ  scal 
and current account surpluses in recent years. 
Budget surpluses are the result of rising public 
revenues and have masked ﬁ  scal  expansion. 
Public expenditure has increased signiﬁ  cantly, 
with a focus on developing the physical and 
social infrastructure required for private sector 
development. 
Inﬂ  ationary pressure has emerged in all GCC 
countries in response to strong domestic demand 
accompanied by dynamic monetary and credit 
growth. Average inﬂ   ation in GCC countries 
increased to above 6% in 2007, with signiﬁ  cant 
differences between GCC member states. The 
increase in headline CPI inﬂ  ation, which may 
not reﬂ  ect the full extent of inﬂ  ationary pressure 
on account of shortcomings in the CPI baskets 
in some countries, was particularly pronounced 
in Qatar and the UAE. In these two countries, 
where, in particular, developments in the real 
estate sector have fuelled inﬂ  ation, anchoring 
inﬂ  ation expectations and avoiding a rent-wage-
price spiral appear to be challenges. 
The contribution of monetary policy to containing 
inﬂ   ationary pressure has been very limited 
in view of the exchange rate pegs to the US 
dollar, as interest rates broadly follow US rates 
in an environment of free capital movements. 
The policy challenge for central banks in GCC 
countries to curb inﬂ  ation appears to have further 
increased following the rising cyclical divergence 
between the GCC and US economies. Most GCC 
countries have resorted to administrative and 
prudential measures to curb inﬂ  ation. 7
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY In view of the prevailing exchange rate regimes, 
ﬁ   scal policy is the key macroeconomic tool 
to control inﬂ   ation. At the same time, GCC 
countries face domestic pressures to increase 
public expenditure in view of expectations to 
share windfall revenues of recent years with 
wider parts of the population and development 
needs in areas such as infrastructure. 
Governments in GCC countries have also been 
called upon internationally to raise spending in 
the context of the debate on global imbalances. 
Thus, the policy challenge is to balance the ﬁ  scal 
stance between cyclical and intergenerational 
considerations and the need for spending on 
physical and social infrastructure, taking account 
of bottlenecks and the absorptive capacity of the 
economies. 
OIL REVENUE RECYCLING AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
GCC economies have been experiencing 
substantial revenue increases in the wake of the 
prolonged and marked hike in oil prices of this 
decade. There are indications that about half 
of the GCC region’s oil revenues are currently 
absorbed through the trade channel, with the 
imports to exports ratio having picked up in 
comparison to the 1970s. The other half of GCC 
countries’ petrodollar inﬂ   ows are invested in 
ﬁ   nancial assets, resulting in a sizeable build-
up of traditional foreign exchange reserves 
and, increasingly, stabilisation and savings 
funds, which are also referred to as sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs). As only about half of 
these  ﬁ   nancial resources can be tracked with 
the help of international statistics, a large part 
of investment activities by the GCC countries 
remains opaque to international ﬁ  nancial market 
participants. Based on the available evidence, 
however, two tentative conclusions can be 
drawn. First, diversiﬁ   cation in asset classes, 
countries and currencies seems to play an 
important role for GCC economies. Second, the 
United States has nonetheless continued to be a 
main recipient of oil-related ﬁ  nancial funds.
In view of the remarkable increase in its 
combined current account surplus during the 
recent episode of rising oil prices, approaching 
USD 200 billion per annum in recent years, the 
GCC region has emerged as a major net supplier 
of capital on a global scale, second only to East 
Asian countries. As a result, GCC economies 
form part of the international community’s four-
pronged approach, aimed at avoiding a sudden 
and disorderly unwinding of global imbalances. 
However, the related policy plans, above all 
the acceleration of domestic absorption, will 
probably have only a limited effect on global 
imbalances. Given the structure of the GCC 
region’s external trade, the absorption channel 
is much more likely to beneﬁ   t the European 
Union and Asia than the country with the 
world’s largest current account deﬁ  cit, namely 
the United States. Enhancing exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility, a recommendation usually made with 
reference to China rather than the GCC region, 
might also support the adjustment process to 
a limited extent only, even though a gradual 
nominal appreciation of the GCC countries’ 
currencies against the US dollar might be in 
their own interest given the region’s domestic 
macroeconomic conditions. In particular, it 
could contribute to dissolving inﬂ  ationary 
pressures resulting from domestic absorption of 
high and rising oil revenues.
As a consequence of the sheer size of ﬁ  nancial 
petrodollar recycling, oil-exporting countries 
in general and GCC countries in particular 
have emerged as new big players in world 
ﬁ  nancial markets. As such, they are alleged to 
exert some inﬂ  uence on asset prices, especially 
on US long-term interest rates, emerging 
market yields and the US dollar exchange rate. 
However, empirical studies fail to identify a 
signiﬁ  cant impact for oil revenue investments, 
in part owing to data constraints, but also 
because the relatively broad diversiﬁ  cation of 
investment portfolios reduces the inﬂ  uence 
on individual asset markets. Moreover, the 
strength of the impact is likely to vary with the 
size of the respective market. On a more general 
scale, the effects of petrodollar recycling on 
global ﬁ  nancial stability may be summarised 
as positive, mainly because the longer-term 
orientation and the presumed reluctance of 
GCC countries to engage excessively in highly-8
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leveraged positions contribute to diversifying 
the global investor base and its asset allocation. 
However, in adverse situations, the overall 
size of oil-related ﬂ  ows, as well as the very 
limited knowledge market participants have 
about petrodollar investments, may give rise 
to market rumours and, possibly, ﬁ  nancial 
instability.
In recent years, SWFs from both oil-exporting 
and other countries have proliferated and have 
increased in scale and diversity of activity. The 
GCC is home to some of the world’s largest 
SWFs, and the entire GCC region is estimated 
to have assets in the range of USD 1-1½ trillion
under sovereign management. Not least 
because of their opacity, SWFs have raised 
fears of politically or strategically motivated 
investments, which – although hypothetical 
at the current juncture – might ultimately 
fuel protectionism. Instead, however, the 
proliferation of SWFs should be viewed in 
the context of a general trend towards deeper 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation. In this respect, it is 
essential that the international community 
abstain from measures that unduly restrict the 
free movement of capital on a global basis – all 
the more so as empirical evidence and country 
experience suggest that concentrating state-
backed investment within an oil fund might 
prove to be beneﬁ  cial for the domestic economy, 
provided that promoting ﬁ   scal discipline is 
one of the fund’s dominant characteristics. 
On the other hand, in the light of the very 
limited knowledge market participants have 
about SWFs, a certain wariness regarding their 
activities is likely to persist. Thus, enhancing 
transparency in respect of the management and 
operation of these funds, along the lines of the 
work done, for example by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), would be welcome.
ENERGY AND TRADE
GCC countries are major players in global oil 
markets in terms of current production and the 
availability of spare capacity. As they hold 
about 40% of global oil reserves, they are 
likely to remain pivotal in providing the world 
economy with oil in the future. To this end, 
they are raising investment spending on oil 
exploration and the development of new oil 
ﬁ  elds, as they beneﬁ  t from comparatively low 
costs in exploiting oil reserves, notwithstanding 
the lower quality of GCC countries’ crude oil. In 
addition, GCC countries are active in mitigating 
oil reﬁ  nery capacity bottlenecks. 
Global oil demand is being driven mainly 
by growth in emerging market economies, 
including oil producers and thus GCC countries 
themselves. Moreover, in Europe, as well as 
in the United States, the depletion of reserves 
will increase oil import dependency, despite 
stagnating oil consumption in the case of 
Europe. This will raise the importance of 
external providers, including GCC oil producing 
countries, in meeting domestic demand. Other 
sources of energy, including substitutes for crude 
oil, such as oil sand, synthetic oil and biofuels, 
as well as progress in raising energy efﬁ  ciency 
may dampen global demand for crude oil, in 
particular, in an environment of elevated oil 
prices. However, without major technological 
breakthroughs in energy production and/or 
energy savings, crude oil and oil derivatives will 
continue to play the dominant role in meeting 
rising global energy demand in the foreseeable 
future. As for natural gas, its production is 
projected to increase both globally and in the 
GCC region, but it is expected that large parts 
of the GCC gas production will be used to meet 
rising domestic energy needs.
Trade by GCC countries has risen substantially 
in recent years, driven by higher oil prices, with 
exports and imports differing substantially in 
terms of the structure of goods traded and the 
geographical pattern of trade. While the bulk 
of GCC countries’ exports consist of oil and 
oil derivatives, their imports are dominated by 
machinery and mechanical appliances, vehicles 
and parts, electrical machinery and equipment. 
The EU is the main trading partner of the GCC 
countries, as most of their imports originate in 
Europe. By contrast, exports by GCC countries – 
mainly consisting of oil and oil derivatives – are 9
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY strongly oriented towards Japan and emerging 
Asia, while Europe’s oil imports originate 
mainly from oil producing countries in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and North 
Africa and only to a smaller degree (24% in 2006) 
from the Middle East, including GCC countries. 
As a result, the EU is the only major region in 
the world to have a trade surplus with the GCC 
countries as a group. 
GCC countries have made substantial 
investments to establish themselves as a regional 
trade hub. While the physical infrastructure has 
been upgraded, further progress is needed in the 
area of trade facilitation. In terms of institutional 
trade links and integration, all GCC countries 
have now become members of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). Moreover, Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) are currently being 
negotiated with several countries and regions, 
including with the EU, which might further 
contribute to the GCC countries’ integration 
into the world economy. At the same time, 
intra-GCC trade is still limited, but is expected 
to expand with further progress in diversifying 
GCC economies and regional integration.10
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1  ECONOMIC STRUCTURES AND 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GCC COUNTRIES3
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Part 1 reviews key structural features of the 
economies of the six member states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) and macroeconomic 
developments over recent years. In doing so, 
it identiﬁ  es a number of policy issues faced by 
decision-makers in GCC countries.
Notwithstanding some differences between 
GCC countries with regard to hydrocarbon 
(oil and gas) dependence and economic 
diversiﬁ   cation, GCC member states together 
with some neighbouring countries represent the 
most hydrocarbon-centred economic region in 
the world. In the wake of high oil prices, GCC 
countries over recent years have experienced 
favourable macroeconomic developments. Real 
GDP growth has been buoyant, with non-oil 
GDP growing even faster than oil GDP. Dynamic 
economic development has led to inﬂ  ationary 
pressure, although this differs between GCC 
member states, and may not be fully reﬂ  ected 
in CPI ﬁ   gures. In view of the long-standing 
exchange rate pegs to the US dollar, there is 
little room for monetary policy to counteract 
inﬂ   ationary pressure. Under these exchange 
rate regimes, ﬁ  scal policy plays a particularly 
important role in ensuring macroeconomic 
stability. GCC countries have accumulated large 
current account and ﬁ  scal surpluses, and the use 
of higher oil revenues overall appears to have 
been prudent.
The generally favourable macroeconomic 
backdrop of recent years offers an opportunity 
for GCC countries to tackle some structural 
issues speciﬁ   c to many highly oil-dependent 
countries in general and the GCC economies in 
particular. These include the diversiﬁ  cation of 
the oil-centred economies and the development 
of the private non-oil sector. Both are key for 
absorbing the young and rapidly growing 
national labour force into the economy, against 
the background of a continued high reliance on 
expatriate labour in GCC economies. 
Part 1 of this paper takes stock of the 
developments and policy issues described 
above. It is structured as follows: Section 1.2 
highlights key structural features of GCC 
economies; Section 1.3 reviews economic 
developments and policies; and Section 1.4 
concludes.4
1.2  KEY STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF GCC 
ECONOMIES
1.2.1 SIZE OF COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES
GCC member states differ signiﬁ  cantly  in 
terms of population and aggregate output, 
while differences in terms of GDP per capita 
are somewhat less pronounced. In terms of 
population and nominal GDP, Saudi Arabia is 
by far the largest of the six countries, comprising 
about 24 million inhabitants (about two thirds of 
the GCC’s total population) and accounting for 
around half of the total GDP of GCC countries. 
The other ﬁ   ve countries are considerably 
smaller. The second largest country both in 
terms of population and nominal GDP is the 
UAE, with ﬁ  ve million inhabitants and a share 
of around a quarter of the total GDP of GCC 
countries (Chart 1).
GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity 
terms) is highest in Qatar and the UAE at USD 
36,600 and 34,100, respectively, and lowest 
in Saudi Arabia (USD 16,500) and Oman
(USD 18,500). Average GDP per capita in GCC 
countries stands at USD 19,800 and thus at 63% 
of the euro area average, with Qatar’s and the 
UAE’s per capita income exceeding the euro 
area average (Chart 2). The dispersion of GDP 
per capita is somewhat lower than within the 
euro area: Saudi Arabia’s income per capita is 
around 45% of Qatar’s, while Portugal’s GDP 
By Michael Sturm and Jan Strasky (ECB). 3 
The macroeconomic analysis in Part 1 is mainly based on IMF  4 
WEO data of October 2007 in view of limited data availability.11
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per capita (the lowest in the euro area in 2006) is 
equivalent to 28% of Luxemburg’s (the highest 
in the euro area).
The high oil prices of recent years have 
signiﬁ   cantly increased GCC member states’ 
nominal GDP and GDP per capita. In 2001, the 
combined GDP of the six GCC countries was 
USD 332 billion and thus comparable to that of 
Australia. In 2006, the nominal GDP reached 
USD 712 billion, which is comparable to that 
of Canada. This increase of more than 100% or 
USD 380 billion in absolute terms implies that, 
within ﬁ  ve years, an economy the size of Sweden 
was added to the GCC in terms of aggregate 
output. Saudi Arabia and the UAE accounted for 
the bulk of this increase with USD 166 billion 
and USD 95 billion, respectively, over these ﬁ  ve 
years in absolute terms (Chart 3).
In GCC countries, like in other oil-exporting 
countries, it is useful to look at increases in 
nominal GDP in addition to real GDP growth 
in order to gauge the underlying economic 
dynamics, given that higher oil prices are 
reﬂ  ected in nominal GDP growth ﬁ  gures, while 
only higher oil production increases real GDP. 
However, nominal GDP increases resulting 
from higher oil prices – assuming that they are 
not short-lived – represent “real” income, and 
are not just an expression of inﬂ  ationary price 
increases. In particular, nominal oil revenue is 
the basis for government expenditure, which is a 
key driver of economic activity in GCC countries 
(see sub-section 1.3.1 for a more detailed account 
of economic growth in the GCC).
Between 2001 and 2006, GDP per capita for 
the GCC as a whole increased by 30%, with 
Bahrain and Qatar experiencing the strongest 
increases at 42% and 37%, respectively (in PPP 
terms). At the same time, population growth 
in the GCC was signiﬁ  cant at 3% on average 
per annum between 2001 and 2006. This 
Chart 1 Population and GDP of GCC 
countries

























Sources: IMF, ECB staff calculations.
Note: Data are for 2006.




















Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi
Arabia
UAE




Note: Data are for 2006.12
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population growth reﬂ  ects both high birthrates 
and the inﬂ  ow of expatriate labour in the wake 
of the recent economic boom. Labour inﬂ  ows 
were particularly pronounced in the UAE, the 
population of which has grown at 6% per annum 
since 2001 and in Qatar and Kuwait at around 
5.6% per annum. By comparison, in 2006 the 
population of the EU27 grew by 0.4%, of which 
0.3% was accounted for by net migration ﬂ  ows 
and only 0.1% by natural growth.
1.2.2 THE ROLE OF OIL AND GAS
IN THE ECONOMY
Saudi Arabia is – alongside Russia – the world’s 
largest oil producer, with an average production 
of 8.75 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2007,5 
and by far the largest net oil exporter. Kuwait 
and the UAE are also among the top ten world 
net oil exporters.6 Saudi Arabia holds more than 
one ﬁ  fth of global oil reserves and accounts 
for more than half of all oil reserves in GCC 
countries. Although possessing relatively little 
oil, Qatar commands the third largest natural 
gas reserves worldwide after Russia and Iran 
and has in recent years rapidly increased gas 
production. Oil and gas resources in Bahrain 
and Oman are considerably lower.
Expressed in per capita terms, the differences 
between GCC countries with regard to both oil 
and gas production and reserves are pronounced 
(Chart 4). Qatar stands out as the country with 
by far the highest reserves and production, 
reﬂ  ecting its large gas reserves in combination 
with a relatively small population (800,000, of 
which less than 20% are nationals  7), while the 
UAE and Kuwait also have relatively high 
production levels (and thus revenue) and hold 
large reserves per capita. Saudi Arabia’s 
production and reserves per capita are smaller 
International Energy Agency (IEA) data, which may slightly  5 
differ from BP data used in Part 3, but this does not affect the 
ranking of countries in terms of their importance.
See also ECB (2007b) on key structural features and economic  6 
developments in oil-exporting countries.
See Table 3 in sub-section 1.2.4 for the share of expatriates/ 7 
nationals in the workforce and population of GCC countries. Per 
capita production and reserves are even higher if only nationals –
who ultimately are the “owners” of reserves – are taken into 
account, in particular, in countries where the share of nationals in 
the total population is low, for example in Qatar and the UAE.













Chart 4 GCC countries’ oil and gas 
production and reserves per capita in 2006
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despite the large numbers in absolute terms, 
reﬂ   ecting the country’s larger population. 
Finally, resources are relatively tight in Bahrain 
and Oman, where at current production levels, 
oil will run out within the next two decades. By 
contrast, oil reserves are projected to last more 
than 100 years in Kuwait and the UAE. With 
14% of global gas reserves, Qatar’s reserves 
will last for several centuries at current 
production levels, while Kuwait, the UAE, and 
Saudi Arabia may also still produce gas in the 
22nd century (Chart 5).8 
The  ﬂ   ip side of the GCC countries’ rich 
endowment with natural resources and their 
important role in global energy supply is that their 
economies are hydrocarbon-dependent (mainly 
on oil). The oil dependency of GCC countries 
is reﬂ  ected in the share of oil (and gas) revenues 
in total government revenues, the share of oil 
(and gas) exports in total exports and the share 
of the oil and gas sector in GDP. On average, oil 
revenues account for around 80% of government 
revenue and for around 70% of export revenue 
in the GCC, while the oil share in GDP stands 
at almost 50% (Table 1). The hydrocarbon 
dependency appears to be highest in Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, and lower in the UAE and Bahrain, 
pointing to more diversiﬁ   ed economies in the 
latter two countries (see next sub-section). 
The large contribution of oil to GCC countries’ 
government revenues, exports and GDP implies 
that oil price developments have been key 
determinants for the development of budget and 
current account balances and for nominal GDP 
over the past decades.
The oil sector is almost completely nationalised 
in most GCC countries with regard to upstream 
Given that depletion projections depend on various factors that  8 
are difﬁ  cult to predict, such as the future state of technology and 
prices, they should be regarded as highly tentative.
Chart 5 Projected depletion rates of GCC 
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Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007.
Table 1 The role of oil in GCC countries’ government revenues, exports and GDP
(percentage of total government revenues, exports and GDP)
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE GCC
Government revenues 76.1 77.6 86.1 69.5 89.1 76.1 79.1
Exports 64.9 86.7 79.1 73.2 87.0 44.4 72.6
GDP 26.0 59.8 49.4 61.9 54.1 37.3 48.1
Sources: IMF, ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Unweighted averages. Data are for 2006. Government revenues for Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman are projections and for Qatar are 
based on 2005 data.14
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activities (crude oil production), while there is 
more private foreign involvement in downstream 
activities (such as reﬁ  ning). The gross share of 
the government or national oil company in crude 
oil production in 2006 was estimated at 100% in 
Qatar, 97% in Saudi Arabia, 90% in Kuwait and 
54% in the UAE.9
1.2.3 ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION
The GCC countries’ strong orientation towards 
oil and gas implies that the diversiﬁ  cation of their 
economies is a key challenge.10 On the one hand, oil 
production has promoted economic development 
and raised living standards enormously in past 
decades, and GCC countries went from being 
essentially subsistence economies in the 1960s 
to wealthy countries as far back as 1980. At the 
same time, the strong reliance on oil has proven 
to be a liability. For example, when oil prices 
fell during the early to mid-1980s, income per 
capita declined considerably and in the following 
years stagnated – also owing to high population 
growth – until the oil price increase starting at 
the beginning of this decade again led to higher 
growth rates.
The need for diversiﬁ  cation is most pressing in 
those countries which face a depletion of oil 
reserves soon, which is the case for Bahrain and 
Oman (see previous sub-section). However, the 
need for diversiﬁ  cation is not only linked to the 
level of oil reserves. High population growth, a 
large number of young labour market entrants 
and rising unemployment among young 
nationals also call for diversiﬁ  cation efforts in 
all countries of the region.11 This is because the 
oil and gas industry offers only limited 
employment opportunities given that it is very 
capital intensive. The traditional tool employed 
by Gulf countries to absorb young nationals into 
the labour market – employing them in the 
public sector – has proven to have its limits and 
is not sustainable. Thus, the development of the 
private non-oil sector is crucial for easing labour 
market pressure (see also next sub-section on 
labour markets and 1.3.1) and for reducing the 
exposure of economic development to volatile 
international oil markets.
There are signiﬁ   cant differences between 
GCC countries with regard to both the degree 
of diversiﬁ   cation achieved so far and the 
direction of diversiﬁ  cation in terms of sectors. 
Overall,  Bahrain and the UAE appear to be 
most advanced in terms of reducing their 
dependency on oil. Chart 6 depicts the state 
of diversiﬁ  cation in the four most likely areas 
for generating income in the GCC countries, 
namely commodities, manufacturing, ﬁ  nance 
and tourism.
These diversiﬁ  cation results reveal the following 
differences between individual countries:
•  Bahrain has established itself as a ﬁ  nancial 
hub for the Gulf region and for the Arab 
world, particularly in Islamic banking. 
Tourism, in particular, of regional origin, 
transport and related services are other areas 
in which the country is well established. 
Bahrain is also home to a signiﬁ  cant 
producer of aluminium.
•  The UAE has similarly diversiﬁ  ed  into 
tourism, with a more international focus 
than Bahrain; into ﬁ  nance, for example with 
the Dubai International Financial Center 
(DIFC); and into transport, serving as a 
regional trading hub. This makes it the only 
other country apart from Bahrain with a 
relatively low level of oil dependency. 
Data from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006. No data  9 
are available for Bahrain and Oman, as they are not members 
of OPEC, but in these countries state companies also dominate 
crude oil production. The relatively low ﬁ   gure for the UAE 
is explained by the minority-shareholdings of international 
oil companies in state-dominated UAE companies. If all oil 
production by state-dominated companies (government or 
national oil company share >50%) were accounted for as public 
sector, the share of the government and national oil companies 
would be above 90%.
See, for example, Fasano and Iqbal (2003) and Malaeb (2006) on  10 
economic diversiﬁ  cation in the GCC.
Almost one third of the overall population of GCC member  11 
states is below the age of 15. Given the large share of expatriates 
in the total population of around 35 million, who often do not 
bring their families to GCC countries, the share of those under 
the age of 15 among nationals is considerably higher. This is 
particularly the case in Saudi Arabia and Oman, where the share 
of expatriates in the overall population is lower compared with 
the other GCC countries (Table 3).15
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• Kuwait remains highly dependent on 
commodities, while ﬁ  nance has developed 
recently.
• Oman, despite having diversiﬁ  ed  into 
manufacturing to a certain extent and started 
developing infrastructure for tourism, is one 





























Sources: ECB staff calculations on the basis of data from the AMF, the IMF, the World Tourism Organization, CIA World Factbook and 
national authorities.
Notes: The graph gives shares of the maximum of all six countries. The blue line refers to the GCC average. “Tourism” refers to tourist 
arrivals per capita of national population; “Commodities” refers to income from oil and gas per GDP; “Finance” refers to stock market 
capitalisation plus bank loans per GDP; “Manufacturing” refers to the share of manufacturing in GDP.16
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of the countries where the need for structural 
change away from production of oil and gas 
is most pressing. 
• Saudi Arabia, which is not focused 
completely on commodities, but generates 
around 10% of GDP in the manufacturing 
sector, is quite active in the construction 
sector and indeed aims to develop as the 
region’s backbone in manufacturing. Saudi 
Arabia also wants to further develop ﬁ  nance, 
e.g. with the planned establishment of the 
King Abdullah Financial District.
•  Qatar is most focused on hydrocarbon 
exploration, in particular, by developing 
large capacities for the extraction of 
natural gas. A switch from oil to gas as the 
main source of export revenues would not 
completely solve the problems related to the 
Gulf countries’ role as primary commodity 
exporters. However, this move would still 
reduce the effects of price volatility, as 
natural gas prices tend to be less volatile 
than spot prices on the oil market. Qatar has 
also advanced in tourism, in particular, as a 
host of conferences, fairs and events.
Key preconditions for economic diversiﬁ  cation 
are ensuring a favourable investment climate, 
open markets with transparent business practices 
and stable regulatory frameworks, which 
together make investment in non-oil sectors more 
attractive. Furthermore, an enhanced role of the 
private sector in those services which so far have 
been mainly provided by governments, such 
as water, electricity and health care would be 
conducive to diversiﬁ  cation, implying that GCC 
countries’ diversiﬁ  cation is intrinsically linked to 
privatisation. Indeed, GCC member states have 
passed privatisation laws and made progress on 
privatisation in recent years, for example, in the 
telecommunications sector. Finally, enhancing 
the employability of nationals, whose skills and 
qualiﬁ  cations often do not meet the requirements 
of private sector companies, is a key ingredient 
for more diversiﬁ   ed economies in the region 
(see also sub-section 1.2.4). 
In terms of business environment, the World 
Bank Doing Business indicators rank GCC 
countries at the top of Middle Eastern and 
North African countries, with Saudi Arabia 
in particular having improved its ranking over 
recent years (Table 2). In terms of governance, 
World Bank governance indicators also show 
that GCC countries do considerably better 
than their peers in the Mediterranean region 
and in other emerging markets in the broad 
neighbourhood of the EU, but lag behind the 
OECD countries (Chart 7).
However, the potential limits to diversiﬁ  cation 
also need to be acknowledged. In terms of 
manufacturing, the comparative advantage of 
Gulf countries, notably of countries like Saudi 
Table 2 Rankings on ease of doing business
MENA ranking World ranking World ranking World ranking
2008 2008 2007 2006
Saudi Arabia 1 23 38 35
Kuwait 2 40 46 40
Oman 3 49 55 52
U A E 46 87 76 8
Memorandum
Jordan 5 80 78 73
Tunisia 7 88 80 77
Algeria 10 125 116 123
Egypt 11 126 165 165
Sudan 16 143 154 161
Sources: MEES, “Doing Business 2008: How to Reform”, World Bank and IFC, September 2007.
Note: No ranking for Bahrain and Qatar.17
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Arabia and Kuwait, ultimately lies in the 
hydrocarbon sector. Attracting energy intensive 
industries (e.g. aluminium production, which 
already plays a signiﬁ  cant role in Bahrain and the 
UAE) and developing petro-chemical industries 
and downstream activities are therefore 
potentially promising options. For instance, 
investments in reﬁ   nery capacity could beneﬁ  t 
countries in the region and at the same time help 
stabilise global oil markets.12 While GCC 
countries have signiﬁ   cantly increased reﬁ  nery 
capacities over the last decade (UAE +148%, 
Saudi Arabia +24%, Kuwait +10%, compared 
with a global average of +13%), their share of 
global capacity nevertheless stands at only 4.1% 
(2006).13 By investing in reﬁ   nery capacity, as 
actually planned (e.g. Saudi Arabia intends to 
approximately double its reﬁ   nery capacity of 
2.1 mb/d over the next years and Kuwait is also 
planning a signiﬁ  cant expansion), countries in the 
region could move from being crude oil exporters 
to exporters of reﬁ  ned products, thereby helping 
to overcome capacity shortage at the global level 
and becoming exporters of products with higher 
value-added. Nevertheless, the contribution of 
these industries to job creation may be limited in 
view of their capital intensity.
Another question related to current 
diversiﬁ  cation efforts concerns ﬁ  nance, namely 
how many regional ﬁ  nancial centres the GCC 
can sustain. While Bahrain has developed as a 
successful ﬁ  nancial hub for the region since the 
1970s and Dubai has advanced in this regard, 
other countries in the GCC are also vying to 
establish themselves as ﬁ   nancial centres, e.g. 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia. It remains to be seen 
whether these ﬁ   nancial centres will develop 
in a complementary way, i.e. each of them 
focusing on speciﬁ  c  ﬁ   nancial activities and 
exploiting comparative advantages, or whether 
agglomeration effects will prevail and result in a 
concentration with one leading centre.
1.2.4 LABOUR MARKETS
GCC economies rely heavily on expatriate 
labour, with expatriates also representing a large 
share of the total population (Table 3). Labour 
markets are fragmented between nationals 
and expatriates. Typically, nationals of GCC 
countries provide the bulk of the labour force 
employed in the public sector, which tends to 
exhibit many rigidities, while expatriates are 
employed mainly in the private sector, which is 
highly ﬂ  exible. Expatriate employment is found 
in the whole spectrum of professional skills, 
Constraints on reﬁ  nery capacity, in particular, for heavy crude oil  12 
from the Gulf region, have constituted one of the factors driving 
up prices for light crude oil in recent years.
Data from BP (2007). 13 
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Sources: World Bank, ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Arithmetic average of six sub-indicators. Unweighted 
regional averages. The six governance indicators are measured in 
units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding 
to better governance outcomes.
Table 3 Expatriates in the GCC countries’ population and workforce
Share of expatriates as a 
percentage Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE GCC
Total workforce  59 81 33 89 47 90 56
Total population 34 53 19 83 21 80 31
Source: Gulf Talent 2006 estimates, based on CIA World Factbook and national sources.18
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ranging from high skill jobs – often ﬁ  lled by 
staff from Western countries – to low skill jobs 
which are ﬁ  lled, in particular, by workers from 
Asia and non-GCC Arab countries. Thus, GCC 
countries have access to labour at internationally 
competitive prices and the large share of 
expatriate workers implies a signiﬁ  cant overall 
ﬂ  exibility of labour markets, as the number of 
workers can be ﬂ   exibly adjusted in response 
to economic developments. The mobility of 
foreign employees between companies and 
sectors is impeded, however, by the sponsorship 
system for expatriate labour.14 
The high reliance on expatriate labour is mainly 
the result of the educational mismatch of the 
local population, which has prevented GCC 
nationals from working in most industries that 
require higher education, especially technical 
skills, and reluctance of nationals of GCC 
countries to accept lower paid jobs that require 
less professional skills.15 Indeed, GCC countries 
are peculiar with regard to labour migration 
insofar as a high share of the young adult 
population in a receiving country has been 
identiﬁ  ed as a factor having a negative effect on 
immigration.16 This does not seem to be the case 
in the GCC countries owing to the educational 
mismatch of young nationals.
Thus, improving education and vocational 
training for nationals is a key challenge and 
indeed  ﬁ   gures high on the agenda in GCC 
member states.17 While the level of education 
has been raised considerably over recent years, 
educational standards in the GCC countries lag 
behind the average for middle and high income 
countries (Chart 8). The sub-index for education 
compares unfavourably with the overall Human 
Development Index (HDI) for the GCC. It is 
lowest in Oman and the UAE, and lags behind 
the overall HDI, in particular, in the UAE. 
Improving education and professional skills is 
key to creating employment opportunities for a 
young and rapidly growing population. These 
efforts are complemented by a policy of 
regulation, which aims at the “nationalisation” 
of the labour force in GCC countries. For 
example, quotas for nationals and stricter work 
permit requirements for the employment of 
expatriates have increasingly been imposed in 
the private sector.18 In this context, it will be a 
In most GCC countries, expatriate workers need a sponsor  14 
(employer) to receive a work permit. Under the sponsorship 
system, workers are not allowed to change jobs without receiving 
the permission of the sponsor. If this permission is not granted, 
workers face the alternative of staying with the sponsor, leaving the 
country or working illegally. Bahrain liberalised the sponsorship 
system in 2006 and in other GCC countries a relaxation of the 
system has been implemented or is under discussion.
The educational mismatch is exempliﬁ  ed by Saudi Arabia, where  15 
around 70% of university students have graduated in humanities 
or Islamic studies.
See Hatton and Williamson (2002). They identify four main  16 
economic and demographic factors generating migration: 
(i) the gap in income per capita; (ii) economic development 
(some development leads to increased emigration, as poverty 
constraints are relaxed); (iii) young adult population (a: large 
share in receiving country discourages immigration; b: large 
share in sending country encourages emigration); and (iv) the 
social network (the stock of previous migrants from the sending 
country in the receiving country drives further migration). Labour 
migration to GCC countries appears to be broadly in line with 
these factors except for (iii, a), and to some extent (i), as the region 
also attracts qualiﬁ  ed expatriates from high-income countries.
For example, the 2007 budget of Saudi Arabia included  17 
provisions for the establishment of 2,000 new schools and four 
new universities. Another example is the establishment of the 
Al Maktoum foundation announced in May 2007 by the Emir of 
Dubai and Prime Minister of the UAE Mohammed bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum. This fund endowed with USD 10 billion aims at 
improving education levels in GCC and other Arab countries.
This contrasts with the prevailing trend of migration policy  18 
in EU Member States, see European Commission (2007). In 
recent years, EU Member States have moved towards tightening 
conditions for entry via family reuniﬁ   cation and asylum 
programmes (which dominate migration ﬂ  ows to the EU so far), 
while at the same time further opening up to economic-based 
migration, targeting workers in scarce supply at the local level, 
against the background of ageing populations.
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Source: UNDP 2007/2008 Human Development Report.
Note: Data are for 2005.19
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policy challenge to ensure that this process of 
“nationalisation” of the labour force in the 
private sector is not accompanied by a reduction 
in the ﬂ  exibility that currently prevails in GCC 
labour markets, given that national employees 
may enjoy greater bargaining power than the 
expatriates, which could give rise to institutional 
arrangements entailing a higher degree of wage 
rigidity and job protection. Furthermore, 
nationalisation policies need to be implemented 
ﬂ  exibly to avoid bottlenecks, in particular, in 
sectors requiring highly skilled labour, and so 
mitigate inﬂ   ationary pressure resulting from 
labour shortages.19
1.3  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
1.3.1 GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT
GCC countries have experienced strong real 
GDP growth since 2003 in the wake of high oil 
prices (Chart 9). For the GCC as a whole, real 
GDP increased by 6.8% per annum on average 
over the last ﬁ  ve years.20 Growth since 2003 was 
highest (per annum on average) in Qatar 
(11.6%), the UAE (9.4%), and Kuwait (9.1%) 
and more moderate in Oman (5%), Saudi Arabia 
(5.5%) and Bahrain (7%). For 2008 growth rates 
are projected to converge in a range from 4% to 
7%, with the exception of Qatar, where growth 
is expected to remain particularly buoyant. 
Nominal GDP growth, which – as pointed out in 
sub-section 1.2.1 – may be a useful additional 
indicator to gauge underlying economic 
developments in highly oil-centred economies, 
increased at almost 18% per annum on average 
since 2003. 
Export growth was the main driver of real GDP 
growth in 2003, peaking at over 11% in GCC 
countries on average following the rise in oil 
prices. Domestic demand, in particular, private 
consumption and ﬁ  xed capital formation have 
picked up strongly since 2004. Real private 
consumption increased at rates between 7.5% 
and 11% in each year since 2004. Real ﬁ  xed 
capital formation grew on average at 16.7% 
per annum in GCC countries as a whole over 
the last ﬁ   ve years, with annual ﬁ  gures  being 
highly volatile, reﬂ   ecting the fact that strong 
investment activity is driven by large public 
investment projects (see below). Strong 
investment activity is also reﬂ  ected in the share 
of gross ﬁ  xed capital formation in GDP, which 
increased from 20% in 2002 to 30% in 2007 on 
average for GCC countries. Real ﬁ  xed capital 
formation over the last ﬁ  ve years increased the 
strongest in Kuwait at almost 29% per annum, 
followed by Oman at 23.4% per annum, which 
points to strong investment in the latter country 
to foster diversiﬁ  cation in view of the dwindling 
hydrocarbon resources.
Government expenditure has been the key 
transmission mechanism for higher oil and gas 
revenues to translate into both higher investment 
and consumption (see also sub-section 1.3.3 
on  ﬁ   scal developments), with the exception 
of the UAE, where private sector investment 
plays a more signiﬁ  cant role than in other GCC 
countries. In particular, GCC governments 
have embarked on large investment projects to 
upgrade both physical and social infrastructure. 
An example of such ﬂ   exible implementation in the face of  19 
bottlenecks is Saudi Arabia’s decision in 2007 to reduce the 
obligatory quota for Saudi employees in the healthcare and 
construction sectors.
The 2007 ﬁ  gure included in the average is a projection from the  20 
IMF WEO of October 2007.
























Source: IMF (* projections).
Note: GCC average weighted by GDP in PPP terms.20
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The increase in private consumption – apart from 
being bolstered by conﬁ  dence inspired by high 
oil prices – is also inﬂ  uenced by government 
spending, e.g. via the increase in public sector 
wages, which is one way to respond to political 
and social pressures to share increased oil wealth 
with the broader (national) population (see also 
Box 1 on wage developments). 
GCC countries’ investment spending plans 
for the next ﬁ   ve years are worth at least
USD 800 billion, i.e. in excess of their current 
combined GDP of USD 791 billion (estimate 
for 2007). These include investment in the oil 
and gas sector, ﬁ  nanced mainly by national oil 
companies; infrastructure, often funded under 
public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements; 
and real estate development, ﬁ  nanced 
largely by the private sector. 75% of the
USD 800 billion is earmarked for investment in 
the non-hydrocarbon sector.21
Non-oil real GDP growth in GCC countries has 
accelerated and exceeded oil real GDP growth 
since 2003 (Chart 10). Over the past ﬁ  ve years, 
non-oil GDP growth per annum on average was 
higher in each of the six countries than during 
the ﬁ  ve preceeding years. Moreover, from 2003 
non-oil GDP grew faster per annum on average 
than oil GDP in ﬁ  ve of the six countries. The 
highest non-oil GDP growth was recorded in 
Qatar and the UAE at 13% and 11% per annum, 
respectively, while it was lowest in Saudi 
Arabia at 5.3%, the only country where non-
oil growth did not exceed oil GDP growth. The 
highest oil GDP growth occurred in Qatar and 
Kuwait at 11% and 8% per annum on average, 
respectively. From 2003, oil GDP contracted in 
Bahrain by 3.8% per annum on average and in 
Oman oil GDP stagnated, pointing to these two 
countries’ declining oil resources.22 
While accelerating and high real non-oil GDP 
growth can be seen as an indication of some 
progress in diversiﬁ  cation (see also sub-section 
1.2.3), caution is warranted in terms of drawing 
too strong conclusions. The high non-oil growth 
of recent years has been driven to a large extent 
by government expenditure, which has been 
fuelled by buoyant revenues as result of high oil 
prices. Thus, high non-oil growth has to be seen 
in the context of high oil prices, and it remains 
an open question as to whether and to what 
extent recently observed high levels of non-oil 
growth could be sustained if oil prices decreased 
and government expenditure retrenched. 
Ofﬁ  cial data on unemployment in GCC countries 
is scarce. Unemployment among expatriates can 
be assumed to be negligible as staying in a GCC 
country is generally linked to having a job. 
Among nationals, unemployment is a problem 
in some countries. The respective country ﬁ  gures 
(or estimates thereof) differ signiﬁ  cantly.23 In 
Bahrain and Oman, unemployment is estimated 
at 15% and 12-13%, respectively. In Saudi 
Arabia, unemployment stands at 12%, with the 
percentage of jobseekers in the age group 20-29 
as high as 25%. Unemployment has increased in 
recent years despite buoyant growth and about 
one million new jobs created in 2005-2006, as 
many of the new jobs were ﬁ  lled by expatriates 
(see also 1.2.4). Ofﬁ  cial  ﬁ  gures  put 
unemployment in Kuwait at close to 5%, with 
some estimates pointing to a rate twice as high. 
See IMF (2007f). 21 
In Bahrain, the decline is also the result of a change in 2004 to  22 
the arrangement with regard to the Abu Saafa oil ﬁ  eld shared 
with Saudi Arabia.
The ﬁ  gures indicated here are compiled from the IIF country  23 
reports for 2007.
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In the UAE and Qatar, at an estimated 3% and 
2%, respectively, joblessness is not considered a 
problem, even though underemployment (in the 
public sector) is an issue.
1.3.2 INFLATION, MONETARY AND EXCHANGE 
RATE POLICIES
Inﬂ  ation has increased over recent years in all 
GCC countries in the wake of higher oil prices, 
the ensuing buoyant economic growth and 
rising import prices. This has led to a rise in 
average inﬂ  ation in GCC countries from below 
1% in 2002 to over 4% in 2006 and 2007. 
However, while inﬂ  ation remained at relatively 
moderate levels in most countries owing to the 
dynamics of the economic expansion, inﬂ  ation 
rates in Qatar and the UAE have risen sharply 
since 2004 to around 10% (Chart 11).
Common factors driving up inﬂ  ation in GCC 
countries in recent years have been: (i) strong 
domestic demand accompanied by rapid money 
and credit growth; (ii) emerging bottlenecks in 
the economy caused by the economic boom, 
e.g. in the areas of construction and project 
management; and (iii) rising food prices and 
prices for raw materials (e.g. steel, cement), 
which have been a global phenomenon. Rising 
import prices as a result of the US dollar pegs 
of GCC countries have also contributed to the 
increase in inﬂ  ation, given that the US dollar has 
depreciated in recent years vis-à-vis most major 
currencies, including the euro and the pound 
sterling, the valuations of which are important 
for GCC countries’ import prices as Europe is 
an important source of imports. 
Differences in the inﬂ  ation performance of GCC 
countries are mainly explained by developments 
in the real estate sector. While the two countries 
with high inﬂ  ation in the GCC – Qatar and the 
UAE – also have the fastest growing economies 
in recent years, partly explaining the inﬂ  ation 
differentials, the main driver of price increases 
has been the boom in the real estate sector. 
Soaring real estate prices – for which there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence, but few systematic 
and comparable data – have driven up rent prices, 
which make up for the difference between Qatar 
and the UAE and the other four countries in terms 
of inﬂ   ation. For example, the average rent 
increase between November 2004 and November 
2006 was 83% in Doha/Qatar and 60% in Dubai, 
while the comparable ﬁ  gure for Riyadh was 21% 
and for Kuwait City 24%.24 
The surge in Qatar and UAE real estate prices 
and rents is linked inter alia to: (i) more liberal 
regulations regarding foreign ownership of 
real estate (with the most open regulations 
in the emirate of Dubai, while in most other 
GCC countries restrictions are pervasive); and
(ii) the large inﬂ  ow of expatriates. In Qatar, the 
implementation of many mega-projects within 
a short time span and on a limited territory has 
been a particular driver of real estate prices 
and inﬂ  ation. This was also linked to massive 
construction activity related to the 2006 
Asian Games hosted in Qatar, which attracted 
expatriate labour. The interaction of rent, wage 
and general price increases, in particular in Qatar 
and the UAE, appears to have the potential to set 
the stage for a wage-price spiral, which might 
make it difﬁ  cult to anchor inﬂ  ation expectations 
(see Box 1 on wage developments).
See GulfTalent (2006a). 24 
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Box 1
WAGE DEVELOPMENTS IN GCC COUNTRIES
GCC countries experienced signiﬁ  cant  and 
accelerating increases in private sector wages 
in the past three years.1 Wages increased on 
average by 7% in 2005, by 7.9% in 2006 and 
by 9% in 2007 (see Chart).
Qatar and the UAE have seen the highest wage 
increases in the private sector over the past 
three years, while in 2007 Oman also recorded 
a sharp hike in wages. In these three countries, 
wage increases recently reached double-
digit levels. Pay rises were highest in the 
construction, banking and hydrocarbon sector 
(reaching 11.1%, 9.8% and 9.7%, respectively 
in 2007). This mirrors the bottlenecks that 
have occurred in these sectors as a result of the 
buoyant economic activity in recent years as 
local companies expand (e.g. in the construction and hydrocarbon sector) or foreign companies 
enter the market (e.g. in the banking and ﬁ  nancial sector, see also sub-section 1.3.5). However, 
other sectors also experienced signiﬁ  cant pay rises. 
The following key drivers have been identiﬁ  ed for the broad-based wage increases in the private 
sector:
–   Rising  inﬂ  ation and, in particular, spiralling rents, have driven up the cost of living and 
forced employers to offer higher wages to retain or attract qualiﬁ  ed employees. The sharp 
rent increases have been the major factor behind the particularly high pay rises in Qatar and 
the UAE, where employees spend around one-third of their income on rents, while in Saudi 
Arabia rents account only for 19% of household spending. 
–    The depreciation of the US dollar has decreased the value of Gulf salaries in foreign currency 
terms. This has been the case, in particular, for highly qualiﬁ  ed expatriate staff. As a result, 
employers are reported to offer higher wages for employees from those countries whose 
home currencies have appreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar/Gulf currencies.
–    High economic growth in combination with higher wages and increased job opportunities 
in Asia, in particular, India have made it more difﬁ  cult to attract/retain staff from countries, 
which are a key source of labour supply in the Gulf. Asian expatriates are reported to have 
seen the highest pay rises recently. 
1  Information in this box is based on Gulf Talent (2005, 2006a,b, 2007), which conducts annual surveys on salaries among 18,000 
professionals in the six GCC countries. The surveys cover 12-month periods from August to August, i.e. 2007 means August 2006-
August 2007.
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Inﬂ  ationary pressure in GCC countries may not 
be fully reﬂ  ected in headline CPI ﬁ  gures. This is 
suggested by widespread administered prices 
and subsidies in most countries, e.g. for oil, gas, 
electricity, water and some food items. 
Furthermore, CPI baskets may not reﬂ  ect current 
consumption patterns (e.g. the weights in the 
CPI basket of Bahrain have not been updated 
since 1995) or are conﬁ  ned to nationals (e.g. in 
the UAE), who make up only a small part of the 
population and beneﬁ  t more from subsidies than 
the large expatriate population.25 Food, rents and 
housing-related costs, and transport and 
telecommunications are the biggest items in 
GCC countries’ CPI baskets (Table 4). The 
current pattern of price increases in GCC 
countries is exempliﬁ  ed by Saudi Arabia. In the 
ﬁ  rst ten months of 2007, CPI inﬂ  ation (cost of 
living index for all cities) increased to 4.6%. 
The main drivers of inﬂ  ation in this period were 
rents and housing-related costs (+10.5%), and 
foodstuff and beverages (+6.4%). Prices for 
transport and telecommunication rose by only 
0.9%. This probably reﬂ   ects the impact of 
energy subsidies. This was also visible in May 
2006, when Saudi Arabia lowered domestic fuel 
prices to alleviate the impact of the stock market 
correction on private households, which led to a 
fall in the headline CPI of 0.2% that month, 
while the CPI without the transportation and 
telecommunications component rose by 0.6%.
The substantial increases in the stock markets 
of GCC countries since 2003, which saw a 
correction in 2006 (see sub-section 1.3.5), as 
well as evidence of sharply rising real estate 
prices also point to underlying inﬂ  ationary 
pressures, which may not be reﬂ  ected in the CPI 
ﬁ  gures, but in asset price inﬂ  ation.
While ofﬁ  cial inﬂ  ation in the UAE in 2006 stood at 9.3%, private  25 
sector estimates (IIF, EIU) point to inﬂ  ation rates of 13-15%.
–  GCC countries have gradually liberalised the sponsorship system for expatriate employees 
(see also sub-section 1.2.4), which limited the mobility of staff between sectors and 
companies and thus was a tool for employers to retain employees. The gradual removal of 
restrictions made it easier for staff to seek better jobs and higher wages. The recent spike in 
wages in Oman is partially explained by the liberalisation of the sponsorship system and by 
the movement of expatriates to GCC countries with higher wage levels such as the UAE and 
Qatar, forcing Omani employers to raise compensation levels.
–  Public sector wages increased signiﬁ  cantly in Gulf countries in recent years, as governments were 
under pressure to distribute part of the windfall oil revenues to citizens and compensate for rising 
costs of living. For example, a 70% wage increase is budgeted for federal employees in the UAE in 
2008, public sector pay rises of 20-30% were announced in the UAE in 2007 and of 15% in Bahrain 
and Oman. 2006 saw a 20-40% public sector wage increase in Qatar, and in 2005 signiﬁ  cant pay 
rises were recorded in Saudi Arabia and the UAE in addition to lump sum payments in Kuwait and 
Bahrain. The degree to which such pay rises spill over to the private sector depends on the number 
of new public sector jobs created and whether the private sector relies on nationals, which is mainly 
the case in Oman and Bahrain, but less so in the other GCC countries. 
Table 4 Major components in GCC countries’ CPI baskets
Weight of selected items Kuwait Qatar Oman Saudi Arabia UAE 
Food  19.0 18.1 30.4  26 14.4
Rents/housing  26.7 20.7 21.4  18 36.1
Transport/telecommunications  16.1 23.4 22.2  16 14.9
Sources: National sources.
Notes: The composition of the selected items may vary between countries, e.g. food may comprise beverages and tobacco in some cases. 
No data available for Bahrain.24
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At the same time, some factors have been 
keeping inﬂ   ation in check. Most notably, the 
availability of expatriate labour at competitive 
prices together with the ﬂ  exibility of the labour 
market in the private sector has helped to 
alleviate inﬂ   ationary pressures. Indeed, GCC 
countries have seen a large inﬂ  ux of expatriate 
labour in response to the recent economic boom. 
Although the inﬂ   ow of expatriate labour has 
mitigated inﬂ   ationary pressure in general, it 
has also contributed to price pressures in some 
areas, in particular, residential rents. GCC 
countries’ open trade systems also help to keep 
inﬂ  ation in check, in particular, the increasing 
share of imports from low cost countries in 
Asia, especially China. Finally, some progress 
has been made on enhancing competition in 
the services sector, e.g. via privatisation in the 
telecommunications sector or greater foreign 
participation in the banking and ﬁ  nancial sector.
The role of monetary policy in containing 
inﬂ   ationary pressure has been limited as a 
result of prevailing exchange rate regimes. 
GCC countries have a long-standing common 
orientation of exchange rate policies towards 
the US dollar (Chart 12). Five of the six GCC 
currencies have been de facto – and since 2003 
pursuant to an agreement in the context of the 
GCC’s monetary integration process also de 
jure – pegged to the US dollar for decades, with 
the last major adjustment of parities taking place 
in 1986.
Only Kuwait operated a peg to an (undisclosed) 
currency basket until 2003, which was 
nevertheless dominated by the US dollar, and 
ﬂ   uctuations vis-à-vis the US currency were 
rather limited. Unlike the other GCC countries, 
since 2003 Kuwait has also retained some 
exchange rate ﬂ  exibility when pegging to the 
US dollar within a ﬂ  uctuation band of +/-3.5%. 
In May 2007 Kuwait returned to a basket, 
the composition of which is undisclosed, but 
perceived to be similar to the one that was in 
place prior to 2003 and thus also dominated by 
the US dollar. Kuwait’s decision of May 2007 
was taken against the background of rising 
inﬂ  ationary pressure, although inﬂ  ation remains 
more contained than, for example, in Qatar and 
the UAE. Fluctuations vis-à-vis the US dollar 
since May 2007 have been limited, with an 
overall appreciation of 5.6% from 20 May 2007 
to mid-February 2008.
The preference for an external anchor and 
orientation towards the US dollar can be 
explained by the fact that oil revenues, which 
constitute the main income ﬂ  ow from exports in 
GCC countries, are priced in US dollars. The 
pegs to the US dollar thus serve the aim of 
stabilising export as well as ﬁ  scal  revenues, 
given the prominent role of oil revenues in the 
government budget. Furthermore, a large part of 
GCC countries’ considerable foreign assets is 
reported to be denominated in US dollars and 
thus exchange rate stability vis-à-vis the US 
dollar shields the value of these assets from 
exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations.26 Overall, the US 
dollar pegs are seen as having served GCC 
economies well, acting as a linchpin of stability 
and contributing to low inﬂ  ation when viewed 
over a longer time horizon.27 However, debate 
about the appropriateness of such exchange rate 
See IIF (2007b), Setser and Ziemba (2007b), sub-section 1.3.4  26 
and Part 2 on GCC countries’ foreign assets.
See, for example, Abed, Erbas and Guerami (2003) and Jadresic  27 
(2002). For a different view see Setser (2007b).
Chart 12 Exchange rates of GCC countries’ 
national currencies against the US dollar
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regimes in the future has recently intensiﬁ  ed in 
GCC countries. 
One consequence of these exchange rate regimes 
is that the GCC countries’ terms of trade are 
exposed to ﬂ  uctuations in the US dollar vis-à-
vis other major currencies, notably the euro, 
given that a signiﬁ  cant share of imports comes 
from the euro area, even though a large share 
also originates in countries whose currencies are 
pegged or tightly managed to the US dollar 
(notably in Asia) and to a lesser extent in the 
United States.28 Furthermore, the pegs imply – 
given GCC countries’ relatively liberal capital 
accounts – that interest rates closely follow US 
interest rates (Chart 13), even though the 
business cycles of the United States and the 
GCC countries might diverge. 
As a result, GCC central banks have been 
constrained in their ability to use domestic 
interest rates to control inﬂ   ation. Indeed, US 
interest rates in 2003 and 2004 were relatively 
low, when the oil price-induced boom in GCC 
economies set in. The lowering of US interest 
rates since September 2007 by a cumulative 
225 basis points in the wake of the sub-prime 
crisis at a time of mounting inﬂ  ationary pressure 
in GCC countries further illustrates the policy 
challenge that may result from the US dollar 
pegs. Indeed, GCC central banks were forced 
to cut interest rates (Chart 14) to maintain 
their parity with the US dollar and fend off 
appreciation pressure stemming from speculative 
capital inﬂ  ows. This challenge might increase 
to the extent that the US economy is slowing 
down while global growth – driven increasingly 
by emerging markets – remains robust, thereby 
keeping oil prices high and fuelling the boom in 
GCC economies. It is also notable that in recent 
years market interest rates in GCC countries 
have tended to be below the comparable US 
interest rate, while before 2004 they generally 
exceeded US rates. This reﬂ  ects high liquidity 
in GCC countries resulting from high oil prices 
and the ensuing economic boom, in addition 
to the aforementioned appreciation pressure. 
Real interest rates in the GCC have declined in 
view of rising inﬂ  ation and have even become 
negative in several countries, most notably in 
Qatar and the UAE.
Given the constraints on monetary policy to 
counteract inﬂ   ationary pressures, some GCC 
countries have resorted to administrative and 
prudential measures to curb inﬂ  ation. For example, 
See Parts 2 and 3 for more details. 28 
Chart 13 Market interest rates
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caps on rent increases have been introduced in the 
UAE (7% in the emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai, 0% for three years in Sharjah), in Qatar 
(10%) and Oman (15%), with the aim of limiting 
rent increases, which have been a main driver of 
inﬂ  ation.29 In the same vein, in December 2007 
Saudi Arabia announced the introduction of new 
subsidies on some food items. Furthermore, 
several central banks increased reserve 
requirements and tightened loan-deposit ratios in 
order to rein in fast credit growth, the latter with 
the additional aim of limiting speculation in view 
of the soaring stock markets prior to 2006. The 
effectiveness of such measures in curbing inﬂ  ation 
remains to be seen and potential negative side 
effects in terms of resource allocation need to be 
taken into account, e.g. the impact of rent caps on 
long-term housing supply if the caps are retained 
rather than bridging short periods until new 
supplies come into the market. 
The depreciation of the US dollar over recent 
years has added to inﬂ  ationary pressure via import 
prices, particularly in those countries where a large 
share of imports come from the euro area. In fact, 
all GCC countries have seen a depreciation of their 
nominal effective exchange rate since 2002 (Chart 
15). Several GCC countries have also experienced 
a depreciation of their real effective exchange rate 
since 2002, which may have been conducive to 
the development of their nascent non-oil sectors. 
Exceptions are Qatar and the UAE, where high 
inﬂ  ation led to an appreciation, while in Kuwait 
the somewhat higher exchange rate ﬂ  exibility 
prevented a stronger depreciation (Chart 16).
In short, as a result of the US dollar pegs, in recent 
years monetary conditions in GCC countries can be 
considered as having been relatively loose in view 
of cyclical developments. Fiscal policy remains 
the key macroeconomic tool in the hands of GCC 
policymakers to control inﬂ  ation. Fiscal expansion 
needs to take into account the absorptive capacity 
of the respective economies and to avoid creating 
or exacerbating supply bottlenecks in parts of 
the economy, which in turn add to inﬂ  ationary 
pressure (see next sub-section).
1.3.3 FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES
The rise in oil prices and the associated increase 
in government revenues has led to a sharp 
increase in GCC countries’ budget surpluses 
(Chart 17). The highest surpluses in the past 
two years were recorded in Kuwait and the 
UAE, at above and somewhat below 30% of 
GDP, respectively. These countries’ revenues 
are augmented by signiﬁ  cant investment income 
from particularly large amounts of foreign 
Information as of September 2007, see Gulf Talent (2007). 29 
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assets (see also sub-section 1.3.4). The lower 
surpluses in Bahrain and Oman are explained by 
the relatively weaker hydrocarbon resource-base 
of the two countries, while in Qatar particularly 
large expenditure increases – related mainly to 
public investment – prevented higher surpluses. 
The budget surplus of Saudi Arabia, which 
peaked at 25% of GDP in 2006, is projected 
to decrease to 20% of GDP in 2008. This 
reﬂ   ects mainly the signiﬁ   cant increase in 
capital expenditure, in particular, on physical 
infrastructure (e.g. power generation, 
desalination, housing, roads, railway) and 
social infrastructure (e.g. education and health), 
addressing the needs of a growing population, 
and in oil production capacity. Indeed, in 2007 
real gross ﬁ  xed capital formation was projected 
to rise in Saudi Arabia by 56% year on year.30 
The increase in public expenditure focused 
on capital spending is also in line with the 
strategy devised in the framework of the IMF’s 
multilateral consultation on global imbalances, 
in which Saudi Arabia participated.31 
This trend is common to other GCC countries 
and most other oil-exporting countries, 
which following the oil price increase, have 
been relatively cautious in expanding public 
expenditure. This may be owing to the 
experience in the second half of the 1980s, 
when, after a fall in oil prices, countries found 
it difﬁ   cult to rein in expenditure, which had 
sharply increased when oil prices were high 
in the 1970s/early 1980s. Moreover, there was 
uncertainty as to whether the higher oil prices 
of recent years are of a temporary or permanent 
nature. The recent relaxation of the ﬁ  scal 
stance may reﬂ  ect: (i) that authorities now see 
the increase in oil prices since 2003 as more 
of a permanent than a temporary nature; and 
(ii) mounting social and political pressure to 
distribute the windfall proﬁ  ts of recent years to 
wider parts of the population. Indications of the 
latter include the increase in public sector wages 
in GCC countries (see Box 1) or the Emiri grant 
in Kuwait.32 
The recent ﬁ  scal expansion is also reﬂ  ected in 
the non-oil balance/non-oil GDP ratio, which 
insulates budget balances from ﬂ  uctuations in 
oil prices and production, and is often seen as a 
better indicator of the underlying ﬁ  scal stance in 
oil-exporting countries than the overall budget 
balance.33 The IMF estimates that the non-oil 
deﬁ  cit/non-oil GDP ratio (which traditionally is 
high in oil-centred economies given the small 
share of non-oil revenues and the large share of 
oil GDP) increased between 2003 and 2006 
from -47% to -54% in Saudi Arabia, from -45% 
to -52% in Kuwait, from -41% to -50% in Qatar 
and from -58% to -60% in Oman. By contrast, 
this ratio declined in the same period from -29% 
to -15% in the UAE, while it remained broadly 
constant at around -33% in Bahrain.
Public debt is no longer an issue in GCC 
countries and has converged at low levels. 
Major investment projects in Saudi Arabia relate to the  30 
establishment of six “economic cities” each of which is intended 
to focus on speciﬁ   c economic activities and industries. The 
economic cities are seen as key to fostering diversiﬁ  cation and 
re-balancing growth between the country’s regions. Unlike in the 
smaller GCC countries, regional disparities are an issue in Saudi 
Arabia. The cities are primarily to be established in regions which 
have not beneﬁ  ted from the buoyant activity of recent years.
See IMF (2007c). See also Part 2 on public spending in GCC  31 
countries in the context of the debate about global imbalances.
A lump sum of 200 Kuwaiti dinars (approximately USD 700)  32 
was paid to every Kuwaiti citizen in 2006.
See Barnett and Ossowski (2002) on this indicator for ﬁ  scal  33 
policy in oil-producing countries.
Chart 17 General government balances
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Saudi Arabia and Qatar accumulated signiﬁ  cant 
public debt during the 1990s, which stood at 
around 100% and 70% of GDP, respectively, 
at the end of the previous decade (Chart 18).34 
Saudi Arabia’s debt was domestic, held mainly 
by social security institutions and domestic 
banks, and increased when oil prices and real 
GDP growth were relatively low. Qatar’s debt 
was mainly external and was accumulated in 
the context of the country’s massive investment 
in gas production capacity and infrastructure. 
Both countries used the recent period of high oil 
prices to signiﬁ  cantly reduce their public debt. 
For 2007, public debt in GCC countries was 
projected not to have exceeded 25% of GDP in 
any of the member states. Given their net creditor 
status and large foreign assets, GCC countries 
could easily repay public debt completely. They 
may refrain from doing so in order to keep a 
stock of government securities, which may be 
used for monetary policy purposes or serve as 
a benchmark for corporate bond issuance in 
the context of ﬁ   nancial market development 
(sub-section 1.3.5).
The overall ﬁ   scal strength of GCC countries 
is also reﬂ   ected in their sovereign ratings, 
which all countries received in recent years 
(Table 5). Geopolitical risks, the developing 
state of institutions and volatility of economic 
performance owing to hydrocarbon dependency 
are quoted as the main factors preventing even 
higher ratings in view of high surpluses and low 
debt, which indeed outperform some countries 
with triple-A ratings. 
Notwithstanding the overall very favourable 
ﬁ  scal situation, GCC countries face a number of 
ﬁ  scal policy challenges, which are common to 
most oil-centred economies:35 (i) to avoid pro-
cyclical policies, which have characterised the 
conduct of ﬁ  scal policy in many oil-exporting 
countries in the past, and which in periods of 
high oil prices contribute to inﬂ  ationary pressure 
in view of bottlenecks and limited absorptive 
capacity of the economies; (ii) to ensure the 
quality of public spending, given limited 
administrative capacities to oversee spending 
and project development; (iii) to balance 
expenditure expansion with intergenerational 
considerations and thus the need to accumulate 
ﬁ   nancial assets with a view to declining oil 
reserves; and (iv) in the long-run, to reduce the 
reliance on hydrocarbon revenues by developing 
other sources of revenue, in particular, tax 
revenue.36 Appropriate ﬁ   scal rules and 
institutions would be helpful in addressing these 
Kuwait accumulated a large public debt of above 100% of GDP  34 
in the early 1990s to ﬁ  nance the reconstruction after the Iraqi 
invasion in 1990-1991, but rapidly reduced it within a few years, 
drawing on its high foreign assets.
See Sturm and Gurtner (2007) and Sturm and Siegfried (2005)  35 
for a more detailed analysis of ﬁ  scal policy challenges in oil-
exporting countries.
Currently GCC countries do not levy personal income taxes  36 
or general consumption taxes. The introduction of a VAT, 
coordinated among GCC countries, is under discussion.
Chart 18 General government debt
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challenges.37 All GCC countries with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia have set up oil 
stabilisation and savings funds in this context, 
which manage considerable foreign assets.38
1.3.4 EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS
GCC countries have accumulated large current 
account surpluses since 2003, peaking at around 
26% of GDP in 2005-06 on average (Chart 19). 
The sharp rise observable over recent years 
is the result of both higher oil prices and oil 
production. Since 2004, Kuwait has had the 
highest current account surpluses, while Oman 
has had a relatively small surplus, reﬂ  ecting its 
lower endowment with hydrocarbon resources 
combined with large investments. 
The current account of GCC countries is 
typically – with some country-speciﬁ  c variations 
– characterised by a very high trade surplus given 
the role of hydrocarbon exports. Most countries 
have a deﬁ  cit in the services balances as a result 
of high services imports, e.g. related to project 
development, with the exception of Bahrain, 
which has a surplus in the services balance in 
view of the country’s role as a ﬁ  nancial  hub. 
GCC countries also have a deﬁ  cit in net current 
transfers, which reﬂ   ects high remittances 
outﬂ  ows by expatriate labour and, in some cases, 
signiﬁ  cant  ofﬁ   cial development assistance, 
while most countries have positive and rising net 
factor income, reﬂ  ecting the return on large and 
increasing foreign assets (see below).
The current account surplus of the GCC was 
projected to decline in 2007 from its peak 
(in terms of GDP) of previous years and is 
expected to fall somewhat further in 2008, 
mainly driven by developments in Saudi Arabia. 
However, current accounts are expected to remain 
comfortably in surplus over the medium term. 
The decline from the extraordinary high levels 
of 2005-06 stems from increased imports, which 
mainly reﬂ   ects an acceleration in investment 
spending, in particular, on infrastructure 
projects, but also higher private consumption 
and, to a lesser extent, slightly lower export 
revenues owing to lower production in view 
of OPEC decisions in 2006 to reduce output 
(this is mainly relevant for Saudi Arabia). 
Import growth in GCC countries has been 
buoyant with double-digit rates every year since 
2004. In absolute terms, imports of goods and 
services in the six GCC countries more than 
tripled from USD 114 billion in 2000 to USD 345 
billion in 2007 (IMF projection). Saudi Arabia 
See Sturm and Siegfried (2005) for a discussion of ﬁ  scal rules in  37 
GCC countries.
See Davies, Ossowski, Daniel and Barnett (2001) on oil  38 
stabilisation and savings funds, which are also referred to as 
sovereign wealth funds. See also sub-section 1.3.4 and Part 2.
Chart 19 Current account balances
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(USD +90 billion) and the UAE (USD +80 
billion) account for almost three-quarters of the 
additional imports over this period. As a share 
of GDP, since 2000 imports have increased on 
average by 10 percentage points, from 33% to 
43%, notwithstanding the rapid expansion of 
nominal GDP in GCC countries (Chart 20). 
Looking at overall absorption, the growth of 
real domestic demand has exceeded real GDP 
growth in the GCC every year since 2004, and is 
projected to continue to do so in 2008.
Against the background of large current account 
surpluses, GCC countries have recorded large 
capital outﬂ   ows in recent years, which have 
mainly taken the form of reserve accumulation 
and portfolio investment. 39 The foreign exchange 
reserves of GCC countries’ central banks, 
as reported in IMF data on foreign exchange 
developments, have increased only moderately 
in recent years, given the magnitude of current 
account surpluses, from USD 35 billion in June 
2000 to USD 88 billion in June 2007 (Chart 21). 
The central banks of the UAE and Saudi Arabia 
are the biggest holders of foreign exchange 
reserves in the GCC.
These  ﬁ   gures, however, give an incomplete 
picture of ofﬁ  cial foreign assets held by GCC 
countries, as SWFs, not central banks, are the 
main accumulators of foreign assets in most 
GCC countries.40 The SWFs of GCC countries do 
not disclose information about the total amount 
of assets under management or the composition 
of assets. Private sector estimates, which are 
surrounded by a high degree of uncertainty, point 
to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) as 
managing the largest amount, which is estimated 
at USD 250-500 billion, ahead of the Kuwait 
Investment Authority (KIA), with an estimated 
USD 160-250 billion under management. 41 Qatar, 
Oman, Dubai and Bahrain have also set up SWFs, 
but assets under management are estimated to be 
signiﬁ  cantly lower. 
Saudi Arabia is an exception with regard to 
foreign asset accumulation in the GCC insofar as 
it has not set up a SWF. Foreign assets are mainly 
accumulated by the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA), which holds net foreign assets 
worth USD 259 billion (September 2007), up 
from USD 43 billion in January 2001.42 Formally, 
the bulk of these assets are not classiﬁ  ed  as 
foreign exchange reserves as reported to the IMF 
in Chart 21. Saudi Arabia’s foreign assets have 
not increased to the extent that could be expected 
given the size of the country’s oil revenues, as in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, it exhibited sometimes 
large  ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cits and used the windfall 
revenues of recent years to repay the previously 
high public debt.
GCC countries have seen a sharp increase in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂ  ows  since 
2003 (Table 6). Until a few years ago, the UAE 
attracted the highest inﬂ  ows in absolute terms, 
See Part 2 for a more detailed discussion of GCC countries’  39 
capital exports and their role in global ﬁ  nance.
See Part 2 for more detailed information on the GCC’s sovereign  40 
wealth funds and related policy issues.
See also ECB (2007c). Some estimates put ADIA’s assets even  41 
higher at up to USD 900 billion. KIA is managing the General 
Reserve Fund (stabilisation purpose) and the Fund for Future 
Generations (savings purpose). Kuwait’s ﬁ  nance minister stated 
that the assets managed by these two funds amounted to USD 
213 billion (as of March 2007).
Some foreign assets are also held by the Public Investment  42 
Fund (PIF), which is not a classical SWF, as the main focus of 
its activity is providing loans to and holding stakes in domestic 
companies for development purposes, and by social security 
institutions, which generate large surpluses.
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Source: IMF.
Notes: Semi-annual aggregated data. Data for Bahrain available 
up to February 2005.31
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reﬂ   ecting its outward-oriented development 
strategy and more diversiﬁ   ed economy. Its 
FDI inﬂ   ows tend to be less focused on the 
hydrocarbon sector compared with other GCC 
countries. The sharp increase in FDI inﬂ  ows 
to Saudi Arabia in 2005-06 is notable. It points 
to the gradual opening up of the economy to 
foreign investment, which has inter alia been 
fostered by the country’s accession to the World 
Trade Organisation in 2005, of which all other 
GCC countries were already members. Thus, 
of the GCC countries, recently Saudi Arabia 
has been absorbing the most FDI inﬂ  ows  in 
absolute terms, which can be considered as a 
normalisation given the size of its economy.
In relative terms, a way to measure FDI 
performance is to compare a country’s share 
in world FDI inﬂ  ows with its share in world 
GDP. In this regard, the GCC’s performance 
since 2003 contrasts with the previous decade 
(Chart 22). While prior to 2003 the GCC’s 
share in FDI inﬂ  ows was below what could be 
expected given the size of the economies, this 
trend has since reversed. Furthermore, before 
2003 the GCC countries in relative terms 
attracted less than the Middle Eastern and 
Mediterranean region as a whole, while since 
then they have overtaken this benchmark. The 
rise in FDI since 2003 may be attributable to 
a combination of (i) higher oil prices, which 
made investment in the hydrocarbon sector 
more proﬁ   table; and (ii) ongoing structural 
reforms, which have opened more sectors for 
foreign investment and have tended to improve 
the business environment. In relative terms, 
Bahrain, which already recorded high inﬂ  ows 
over the last decade, and the UAE by far 
attract the most FDI. By contrast, it is notable 
that Kuwait has had very low FDI inﬂ  ows. 
Although FDI outﬂ   ows from GCC countries 
have been considerable in view of high oil 
revenues over recent years, most of them 
have been net recipients. Kuwait is recording 
signiﬁ  cant net outﬂ  ows, which reﬂ  ects the low 
level of inﬂ  ows and the country’s particularly 
high current account surpluses.
1.3.5 FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS
The  ﬁ   nancial sector in the GCC countries is 
bank-based, with instruments geared towards 
short-term maturities. Banking systems are 
dominated by domestic banks (depending on the 
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Sources: UNCTAD, IMF and ECB staff calculations.
Note: Averages weighted by GDP in PPP terms.
1) The values indicate a countries' share in global (gross) FDI 
inﬂ  ows divided by its share in global GDP.
Table 6 FDI inflows in GCC countries
(USD millions)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Bahrain 80 217 517 865 1,049 2,915
Kuwait -111 3 -67 24 250 110
Oman 5 109 494 229 900 952
Qatar 296 624 625 1,199 1,152 1,786
Saudi Arabia 504 453 778 1,942 12,097 18,293
United Arab Emirates 1,184 1,307 4,256 10,004 10,900 8,386
GCC total 1,959 2,713 6,603 14,263 26,348 32,442
Source: UNCTAD.32
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country, private or public), but foreign 
participation and competition in the sector is on 
the rise, with banks from both other GCC 
countries and from outside the region entering 
the market or applying for licences. GCC banks 
in general are well-capitalised and proﬁ  table, 
and banking systems in the region are among 
the most developed in the Arab world.43 
Financial markets tend to be underdeveloped. 
While stock markets have signiﬁ  cantly advanced 
over recent years, bond markets remain in their 
infancy. Insurance and mortgage lending are 
also in the early stages of ﬁ  nancial development 
in the GCC countries.
The ratios of total bank assets to GDP are still 
relatively low, e.g. compared with the euro 
area, indicating substantial room for further 
expansion (Chart 23). At the end of 2006, 
the UAE and Bahrain (including the offshore 
sector) had the largest banking sectors, with 
total assets standing at over 100% of GDP. By 
contrast, in Oman, with the smallest banking 
sector, total assets accounted only for around 
50% of GDP, and Saudi Arabia’s banking sector 
is also relatively small in the regional context.
Banks in the GCC countries are the main source 
of corporate ﬁ  nancing – a fact that reﬂ  ects the 
nascent stage of the region’s capital markets. 
Companies still rely on bank borrowing, 
whether bilateral or syndicated. Moreover, the 
credit facilities in the region are mostly short 
term, for example in 2006, 56% of all credit 
in Saudi Arabia had a maturity of shorter than 
one year.
In recent years, GCC countries have seen rapid 
credit growth to the private sector (Chart 24). 
Credit growth was particularly buoyant in Qatar 
and the UAE, the two fastest growing economies 
in terms of GDP, but expansion of credit to 
the private sector was also strong in the other 
countries. In several countries, in particular, 
in Saudi Arabia, credit growth slowed down 
in 2006 following the stock market correction 
(see below). This may be an indication that bank 
loans were used for speculation in the stock 
market boom prior to 2006.
Personal loans, especially those for consumption 
purposes, are generally the part of banks’ assets 
that are increasing most dynamically. For 
example, between 2003 and 2005, in Saudi 
Arabia consumer loans, including credit card 
debt, grew at an annual rate exceeding 55%, 
 See Creane, Goyal, Mobarak and Sab (2003). 43 
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while total credit in the same period only 
grew by 35% per annum. The boom in retail 
banking is driven by favourable demographics, 
previously low levels of consumer credit and 
relatively high returns, but it also provides a 
means of revenue diversiﬁ  cation for the ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. Although still somewhat focused on 
wealthier customers, it is expected to become 
widely available.
Personal lending at the GCC level increased from 
23% of total lending in 2000 to 33% in 2006. 
This reﬂ  ects a catching-up process, but also the 
recent strong economic growth and the increasing 
maturity and sophistication of the markets. The 
GCC-wide ﬁ  gure, however, conceals a variety 
of country positions. In Saudi Arabia, personal 
lending increased from 15.5% of all credit in 
2000 to 37.8% in 2006. In other GCC countries, 
the increases were less pronounced, for example 
in Kuwait, where personal credit increased from 
36.1% of total credit in 2000 to 40.5% in 2006. 
The UAE is on the other end of the scale, where 
personal loans as a fraction of all credit stayed 
virtually constant, representing 23% of all credit 
in 2000 and 25.1% in 2006.
The share of claims on the government in total 
bank assets has declined substantially in the last 
three years, with Qatar and Saudi Arabia leading 
the trend (with declines from 33% to 14% and 
from 32% to 18%, respectively, between 2003 
and 2006). This reﬂ  ects the repayment of public 
debt in these two countries (see sub-section 1.3.3) 
and dynamic growth in credit to the private 
sector. Other GCC countries have had shares of 
claims on the government in total bank assets of 
below 10% throughout the whole period.
On the liability side, GCC banks’ balance sheets 
are dominated by deposits. Since religious 
considerations prevent many customers from 
accepting interest payments on their deposits, 
GCC banks have access to substantial amounts 
of non-interest-bearing deposits, which in 
2004 were estimated at 35-40% of all customer 
deposits. However, deposits are mostly short-
term, i.e. in order to participate in the proﬁ  table 
ﬁ  nancing of long-term projects without engaging 
in maturity mismatches, banks need to raise 
longer-term funds (see below on bond markets). 
In 2006, the ratio of capital to risk-weighted 
assets (capital adequacy) in the GCC ranged 
from 16.7% in the UAE to 21.9% in Saudi 
Arabia.  44 This is considerably more than the 
level required by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) regulation, but it may well 
reﬂ   ect the higher economic and geopolitical 
uncertainties of the region. Despite this prudent 
approach, the GCC banks show healthy 
proﬁ  tability, also partially owing to favourable 
tax regimes and a low share of non-performing 
loans (NPL) in total loans. A potential risk for 
banks in GCC countries could be the exposure 
to the real estate sector, in the event that this 
sector experienced a serious correction and a 
decline in credit quality in view of the rapid 
credit growth in recent years. In this context, it 
should be borne in mind that NPL-ratios tend 
to be a lagging indicator, which falls during 
periods of rapid credit extension and favourable 
macroeconomic backdrop, but increases in 
economic downturns.
The share of public banks in GCC countries’ 
ﬁ  nancial sectors varies from country to country. 
It is highest in the UAE, with over 60% of total 
bank assets being held by public banks (2006 
data). In Saudi Arabia, this ratio stands at 23%, 
while in Bahrain and Kuwait, less than 5% of 
total bank assets are held by public banks (2003 
data). However, in Bahrain, which has a 
signiﬁ   cant offshore banking sector, this ratio 
increases to about one-third, if only onshore 
bank assets are taken into account.  45
Foreign participation is still relatively low in 
GCC countries’ banking sectors, reﬂ  ecting 
institutional restrictions, but has been increasing 
over recent years, as countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait have started to open up their 
From the annual reports of the national monetary authorities.  44 
The ratio for Qatar is based on 2005 data.
Even if the role of the state is not reﬂ  ected in bank ownership, in  45 
the past, strong government support for banks has been virtually 
a norm. Both liquidity support and additional capital to reﬁ  nance 
non-performing loans have been provided in most of the GCC 
countries.34
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banking sectors.  46 The share of foreign banks’ 
assets in total assets is by far highest in Bahrain 
at almost 60%, reﬂ  ecting foreign involvement 
in the country’s offshore banking sector. In the 
UAE, which hosts some thirty foreign banks, 
often using the country as a hub for activities 
in other GCC countries, and in Saudi Arabia, 
this ratio stands at around 20% while it is 
signiﬁ  cantly lower in Qatar and Kuwait at 11% 
and 4%, respectively.  47 
Banking sectors in the GCC have the potential 
to consolidate, given the high number of banks 
in most countries and their relatively small 
size by international standards. A trigger for 
consolidation could be increasing competition 
from foreign banks and the ﬁ  nancing of mega 
projects in the Gulf region. In this promising 
business segment, local banks face tough 
competition from international banks, whereby 
being on a larger scale would put them in a 
more favourable position.  48 
With regard to ﬁ   nancial markets, from 2003 
GCC stock markets developed very dynamically, 
which resulted in a major stock market 
correction in 2006 (Chart 25). With oil revenues 
skyrocketing and exchange rate pegs preventing 
interest rates from rising, excess liquidity 
poured into stock markets, where it met a 
limited number of stocks, notwithstanding new 
issues through IPOs. Fast growth in private 
sector credit (and personal lending in particular) 
has helped to fuel the growth in equity (and real 
estate markets). Furthermore, the GCC stock 
markets are dominated by retail investors, who 
tend to be prone to less sophisticated investment 
behaviour than institutional investors. The 
dominance of domestic retail investors in GCC 
markets reﬂ   ects restrictions on foreign 
participation in GCC stock markets.  49 
The 2006 market corrections were most 
substantial in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Dubai, 
which had previously seen the sharpest rise in 
valuations. Kuwait experienced only a relatively 
small correction of its stock market despite a 
considerable hydrocarbon-driven economic 
boom. This may be on account of tighter 
prudential regulation, which limited credit 
growth, for example via loan-deposit ratios. 
Bahrain and Oman with lower hydrocarbon 
resources were outliers in the region, as they 
experienced neither the sharp rise nor the 
correction of stock market valuations seen in 
other GCC countries. 
The 2006 stock market correction was not 
caused by a real economy crisis and did not 
impact negatively on economic activity 
in an environment of high oil prices and 
ongoing investment. In 2007, the GCC stock 
markets stabilised and partially recovered, 
and the number of listed companies, market 
For example, starting in 2003, Saudi Arabia has granted ten  46 
licences to foreign banks (ﬁ   ve to GCC banks and ﬁ  ve  to 
international banks), allowing them to open branches in the 
country. Before, based on a decision of 1976, all banks operating 
in the country had to have majority Saudi shareholdings. The 
opening up of the banking sector has been fostered by WTO 
accession and the GCC economic integration process.
2006 data for the UAE, 2005 data for Bahrain and Qatar, 2003  47 
data for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
The merger between the Emirates Bank and the National Bank  48 
of Dubai (both UAE-based banks) in 2007 to form the largest 
bank in GCC countries is an example of consolidation. However, 
some constraints appear to have prevented consolidation in the 
GCC banking sector so far, such as limited shareholder activism, 
conﬂ  icts of interest and regulatory impediments.
Opening stock markets to more foreign (non-GCC) participation  49 
seems to be under discussion in several GCC countries. Saudi 
Arabia, for example, in 2006 allowed foreign residents of the 
country to directly buy stocks at the Tadawul stock exchange. 
For non-residents, participation in the Saudi stock market is so 
far only possible indirectly via mutual funds.
Chart 25 Stock market developments in GCC 
countries

















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BHSE All Share Index, Bahrain
Stock Exchange Index, Kuwait
MSM 30 Index, Oman
DSM 20 Index, Qatar
TAS Index, Saudi Arabia
Securities Market General Index, Abu Dhabi
Financial Market General Index, Dubai
Sources: Bloomberg and ECB staff calculations.
Note: Bahrain: 5 July 2004 = 100.35
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008




capitalisation and turnover increased. The 
impact on the banking sector has also been 
limited against the background of favourable 
macroeconomic development. Sound 
economic fundamentals – as well as the 
absence of signiﬁ  cant exposure – also shielded 
the region from the fallout of the US subprime 
crisis in 2007.  50 However, the impact of the 
ﬁ   nancial turmoil in mature credit markets 
on the ﬁ   nancing conditions of international 
banks, e.g. syndicated loans for projects in the 
corporate sector of the region, remains to be 
seen. Corporate bond spreads are reported to 
have been 40-80 basis points higher on average 
at the end of 2007 than earlier in the year.  51 
GCC bond markets are still relatively 
underdeveloped, but have seen a rapid increase 
in issuance – albeit from low levels – in the 
past two years. While bond markets in the 
region have so far remained relatively illiquid, 
with limited activity in secondary markets, the 
corporate bond market in particular appears to 
have vast potential for development in view of 
the high number of large projects to be ﬁ  nanced 
over the next years (see sub-section 1.3.1).
Total bond issuance in GCC countries reached 
USD 47.8 billion in 2007, compared with an 
issuance of less than USD 15 billion two years 
earlier.  52 The most signiﬁ   cant increase was 
observed for corporate bonds. In 2007 there 
was a record corporate bond issuance in the 
GCC region amounting to USD 23.7 billion. 
Thus, corporate bond issuance represented 
about half of total issuance in 2007, up from 
36% in 2006, while it was still negligible 
in 2005. Sovereign bond issuance, which, 
besides  ﬁ   nancial institutions’ issuance, was 
the major element of the nascent bond market 
prior to 2007 and originated mainly in Qatar 
and Bahrain, is on the decline owing to the 
favourable  ﬁ   scal situation in GCC countries 
(see sub-section 1.3.3). Nevertheless, in 2007 
the emirate of Abu Dhabi for example – while 
obviously not requiring any funds – obtained 
a sovereign rating (Aa2) and issued a bond. 
In doing so, it aimed to foster capital market 
development by creating a local benchmark. 
Indeed, the increase in corporate bond issuance 
in the GCC in 2007 corresponded to a sharp 
rise in rated relative to unrated issuance: close 
to 54% of total issuance was rated in 2007, as 
opposed to 28% in 2006.
Corporate bond issuance is still dominated by 
government-related issuers, which represent 
more than 80% of the total newly issued bonds 
in both 2006 and 2007. 53 Moreover, the absolute 
number of companies issuing bonds is relatively 
small: in 2007, a total of 18 corporates tapped 
into the capital markets (compared with 13 in 
2006). Geographically, the UAE (and Dubai in 
particular) remained the main player in the 
GCC, accounting for 65% of corporate bond 
issuance. However, regional diversity seems to 
be on the rise, with the share of Saudi Arabia 
increasing from 7% in 2006 to 31% in 2007. 
Funds raised via corporate bond issuance have 
mainly been used to ﬁ  nance inward investment 
in infrastructure projects in a wider sense and to 
some extent mergers and acquisitions. 
Sukuks (“Islamic bonds”) play an increasingly 
important role in bond issuance in the GCC, 
given the dynamic growth – albeit from a 
relatively low basis – of Islamic ﬁ  nance in the 
region and increasing demand for Shariah-
compliant investment products worldwide 
(see Box 2 on Islamic ﬁ  nance). In 2007, about 
half of the almost USD 24 billion corporate 
bonds issued in the Gulf countries were sukuks, 
The absence of exposure may possibly reﬂ  ect  attractive  50 
investment opportunities in the region, which may have mitigated 
the pressure “to search for yield” in US subprime-related assets.
Moody’s (2008). 51 
See Moody’s (2008) for data on GCC bond markets. 52 
Government-related issuers, an important feature of the GCC  53 
countries’ corporate sector, are commercial companies that are 
government-owned or undertake key strategic responsibilities on 
behalf of the government, e.g. in developing local infrastructure 
or diversifying the economy. Dubai’s real estate sector, for 
example, is dominated by such companies. Closeness to the 
government tends to give government-related issuers quasi-
sovereign status, which facilitates the obtaining of a high 
credit rating and issuing bonds. For companies in the region in 
general, factors which complicate obtaining a rating and issuing 
bonds are corporate governance and ﬁ  nancial  transparency, 
notwithstanding progress in these areas.36
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and the GCC, in particular, the UAE, has 
become the major source of international sukuk 
issuance (sukuks primarily denominated in US 
dollar and governed by English or US law).  54
Key ingredients for deepening ﬁ  nancial markets 
will be the strengthening of the regulation 
and supervision of security markets and the 
broadening of the investor base. Reforms in 
this regard are ongoing. For example, most 
GCC countries have established special 
authorities for the regulation and supervision 
of security markets in recent years, and are 
in the process of developing or reforming 
related legislation. 
Deutsche Bank (2007). 54 
Box 2
ISLAMIC FINANCE
Islamic  ﬁ  nance is based on the principle of 
compliance with Shariah law. In addition to the 
well-known rejection of interest (riba), there 
are also restrictions on contractual uncertainty 
(gharar), such as in derivatives, betting and 
gambling (maisir), and several prohibited 
industries (haram), including pork products, 
pornography, ﬁ  rearms, tobacco and alcoholic 
beverages.
In order to interpret the Shariah and other 
rulings, Islamic banks often appoint boards 
of scholars, a practice that aims at ensuring 
compliance and promoting consistency among Islamic banks in terms of services and products 
offered. Conventional banks wishing to offer Islamic products must ensure that the Islamic funds 
are strictly separated from the non-Islamic investments (“Islamic windows”). In operational 
terms, this means separate funds, accounts and reporting systems, as well as compliance with 
speciﬁ  c accounting and auditing standards. 
In efforts to introduce clear accounting, auditing and regulatory standards, two multilateral bodies 
have been set up – the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI), and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) – but the industry-wide standards 
are still far from established. There is some competition between Malaysia, Bahrain and Dubai 
for the position of global centre of Islamic ﬁ  nance. 
Islamic banking is a still small, but fast-growing segment of the ﬁ  nancial industry. In 2007, the 
reported amount of global Shariah-compliant assets reached USD 500 billion. Although this is 
only some 0.7% out of the USD 74,232 billion assets of the top 1000 global banks, it represents 
an increase of 30% on the ﬁ  gure for 2006.  1 Since many banks do not report Islamic assets, the 
true ﬁ  gure is probably considerably higher.  2 
1 All  ﬁ  gures in this box are based on the survey on Islamic banking in The Banker (2007).
2  Only some 44% of the 525 ﬁ  nancial institutions involved in Islamic banking worldwide reported their Shariah-compliant assets in 
2007.
Shariah-compliant assets by country




1. Iran  154.6  100.0 
2. Saudi Arabia  69.4  31.6 
3. Malaysia  65.1  25.1 
4. Kuwait  37.7  37.3 
5. UAE  35.4  29.2 
6. Brunei  31.5  100.0
7. Bahrain 26.3  31.1
8. Pakistan 15.9  25.5
9. Lebanon 14.3  75.1
10. United Kingdom 10.4  0.1
Source: The Banker 2007.37
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Furthermore, it is likely that the process of 
regional cooperation and integration within the 
GCC will be conducive to further ﬁ  nancial 
market development. After establishing a free 
trade area in 1983 and a customs union in 2003, 
in December 2007 GCC Heads of State agreed 
to launch a common market starting from 
1 January 2008. The common market is based 
on the principle of equal treatment of all GCC 
citizens regarding economic activities in GCC 
countries. It is expected to facilitate, in 
particular, the movement of persons (conﬁ  ned 
to nationals of GCC member states) and of 
capital. For example, citizens of the GCC 
countries should now be able to buy stocks in 
listed companies in other member states under 
the same conditions as nationals and to purchase 
property and land anywhere in the region. The 
GCC monetary union planned for 2010 may also 
spur on ﬁ   nancial market development and 
integration.  55
1.4 CONCLUSIONS
GCC countries share a number of speciﬁ  c 
structural economic features, while also 
displaying some signiﬁ   cant differences. Key 
common features are a high dependency on 
hydrocarbons as expressed in the share of oil 
(and gas) revenues in total ﬁ   scal and export 
revenues and the share of the hydrocarbon 
sector in GDP; a young and rapidly growing 
national labour force; and the heavy reliance 
on expatriate labour in the private sector. 
These features also pose common structural 
policy challenges to GCC economies, notably 
economic diversiﬁ  cation to reduce dependency 
on the hydrocarbon sector and to develop the 
private non-oil sector. Both are necessary to 
create employment opportunities for young 
nationals, given that the hydrocarbon sector is 
not labour-intensive and that further increasing 
public sector employment is not sustainable. In 
order to enhance the employability of nationals, 
efforts to reduce the educational mismatch 
between nationals’ qualiﬁ   cations and private 
sector needs are key.
GCC member states are moving towards 
economic diversiﬁ   cation at a different pace 
and in different directions, with Bahrain and 
the UAE being most advanced in the process. 
This is also driven by the fact that hydrocarbon 
reserves are projected to be depleted in some 
countries (Bahrain and Oman) relatively soon, 
while in others they will last for a considerable 
period of time. As a result, GCC economies 
might become more heterogeneous over time 
and thus be more prone to asymmetric shocks 
in the future. Economic diversiﬁ  cation needs to 
be supported by structural reforms, in particular 
privatisation and market liberalisation, areas 
in which most GCC countries have made 
signiﬁ  cant progress in recent years.
The macroeconomic developments of recent 
years have provided a favourable backdrop 
for implementing reforms and addressing the 
structural challenges, particularly in providing 
GCC economies with the ﬁ  nancial  means, 
for example, to further develop physical and 
social infrastructure as a basis for private sector 
development. In the wake of high oil prices, 
See Sturm and Siegfried (2005) on regional monetary integration  55 
in the GCC.
The GCC countries and the non-GCC Middle East and North Africa each represent some 
35% of global Shariah-compliant assets, followed by Asia with 24%. Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Malaysia are the three most important countries in terms of overall Islamic assets (see Table). 
There is considerable variation in the share of the Shariah-compliant assets in the total assets 
of banking sectors. Iran has a 100% share of Shariah-compliant assets in total assets, which 
explains its top position in absolute terms. Similarly, Brunei, Sudan and some other countries 
report 100% of Shariah-compliant assets, but the size of their ﬁ  nancial sectors is relatively 
small. GCC countries, on the other hand, have considerable conventional ﬁ  nancial sectors; 
Shariah-compliant assets form only 32% of total assets, for example in Saudi Arabia. 38
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real GDP growth has been buoyant. Non-oil 
GDP growth has been impressive and has even 
exceeded oil GDP growth, even if the dynamics 
of the non-oil sector remain largely driven 
by government expenditure, which in turn 
depends on oil revenues. GCC countries have 
accumulated large ﬁ   scal and current account 
surpluses in recent years. The use of higher 
oil revenues has been prudent overall, with 
expenditure increases setting in only after it had 
become evident that the rise in oil prices might 
not be a temporary phenomenon and focusing 
on infrastructure development.
Inﬂ  ationary pressure has emerged in all GCC 
countries in the wake of strong domestic 
demand accompanied by dynamic monetary 
and credit growth. The increase in headline 
CPI inﬂ   ation, which may not reﬂ   ect the full 
extent of inﬂ   ationary pressure, has been 
particularly pronounced in Qatar and the UAE. 
In these two countries, where, in particular, 
developments in the real estate sector have 
fuelled inﬂ  ation, it may present a challenge to 
anchor inﬂ  ation expectations and avoid a rent-
wage-price spiral. The contribution of monetary 
policy to containing inﬂ   ationary pressure has 
been very limited in view of the exchange 
rate pegs to the US dollar, and some GCC 
countries have resorted to administrative and 
prudential measures to curb inﬂ  ation. Against 
this background, a key role in maintaining or 
restoring price stability falls to ﬁ  scal  policy, 
which needs to be balanced between cyclical and 
intergenerational considerations and the need for 
spending on physical and social infrastructure, 
taking account of bottlenecks and the absorptive 
capacity of the economies. 
The economic outlook for GCC economies is 
generally positive as hydrocarbon prices are 
likely to remain at elevated levels and as the 
large investments currently undertaken may 
set the stage for a more self-sustained growth 
process. Key risks to this generally positive 
outlook, which is shared by most observers 
of the region in the private and public sector, 
appear to be a – seemingly unlikely – sharp 
fall in hydrocarbon prices, adverse geopolitical 
developments, to which the region is exposed 
to a signiﬁ  cant extent, and complacency as a 
result of the currently favourable economic 
environment, which could impede further 
structural reforms. 39
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2   THE ROLE OF THE 
GCC COUNTRIES 






2  THE ROLE OF THE GCC COUNTRIES IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: OIL REVENUE 
RECYCLING AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 56
2.I INTRODUCTION 
Part 2 reviews the role and extent of oil revenue 
recycling and its implications for global 
ﬁ   nancial stability. It identiﬁ   es a number of 
policy issues relevant to the international debate 
on current issues in money and ﬁ  nance relating 
to the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). 
One of the distinctive features of the world 
economy in recent years has been the ongoing 
and marked increase in oil prices. The nominal 
price of Brent crude oil reached a historical 
peak in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2008, while its real 
price has roughly quadrupled since early 2002, 
exceeding the record level reached in 1974, 
though still falling short of its maximum in 
1979. Hence, the scale of the present price hike 
is in many respects comparable to the oil price 
shocks of the 1970s, even if it is taking much 
longer to unfold. Moreover, the hike in oil prices 
coincided with a rise in global oil production by 
9.6% and an increase in global oil consumption 
by 7.7% from 2002 to 2006.57 As a result, oil-
exporting countries have experienced substantial 
windfall gains. It is important to note that the 
main beneﬁ  ciaries of these windfall gains are 
just a handful of countries, among them the six 
economies of the GCC, which together hold 
roughly 22% of world crude oil production. 
The way in which oil revenues are recycled 
attracted much attention in the aftermath of the 
oil price crises of the 1970s. After all, the two 
crises caused many oil-importing countries to 
slide into a major recession. Furthermore, most 
observers believe that the ﬁ  nancial petrodollar 
recycling at that time was at the root of the 
international debt crisis of the 1980s. In the 
1970s, many petrodollars were deposited with a 
small number of large international banks, 
which lent on the funds to developing countries 
at relatively cheap rates. Latin American 
countries, in particular, were close to default 
when the global economy headed into a 
recession in the early 1980s, warranting a 
massive debt restructuring. At the current 
juncture, however, the world economy has 
shown remarkable resilience to the steady rise 
in oil prices.58 Global GDP growth has been 
above its long-term average since 2003. 
Although the global economic expansion began 
to moderate in 2007, a large part of the slowdown 
is attributable to challenges related to the recent 
ﬁ  nancial market turbulence rather than high and 
rising oil prices. On the ﬁ  nancial side too, oil 
revenue recycling has given rise to notable 
changes. They will be addressed in this part.
Section 2.2 ﬁ  rst outlines the scale of oil revenue 
recycling. It then explores the two basic 
channels of petrodollar deployment, namely the 
trade channel and the capital account channel, 
and the extent to which both are used by GCC 
countries. Section 2.3 focuses on ﬁ  nancial 
stability issues, ﬁ  rst discussing the role GCC 
economies play in today’s debate on global 
imbalances before moving on to the impact of 
oil revenue recycling on asset prices and the 
ﬁ   nancial system in general. Finally, special 
issues related to sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
are presented. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2  OIL REVENUE RECYCLING
2.2.1 THE EXTENT OF OIL REVENUE RECYCLING
In line with oil prices, oil-related revenues have 
risen substantially. According to IMF estimates, 
oil and gas exports by the Middle East and 
Central Asian oil-exporting countries will 
amount to about USD 650 billion in 2007.59 This 
represents an almost fourfold increase on annual 
levels at the start of the decade. Moreover, with 
oil prices close to a record high and a continuing 
By Petra Adolf (Deutsche Bundesbank). 56 
See BP (2007). 57 
Numerous reasons have been put forward as to why oil seems  58 
to have lost the capacity to shock. See, for example, IMF (2006) 
and Walton (2006).
Of the entire crude oil exports of the Middle East and Central Asian  59 
region, almost 60% can be attributed to the GCC economies.40
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increase in global oil demand – as forecasted 
by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
OPEC – the outlook for the region’s future 
export revenues remains favourable.60 
Taking cumulative current account surpluses as 
a rough benchmark for measuring the pool of 
petrodollars available for (ﬁ  nancial  market) 
recycling is common practice. The upswing in 
these balances has been remarkable. Whereas 
many GCC countries exhibited current account 
deﬁ   cits during the 1990s, sizeable current 
account surpluses have been recorded 
since 2003, ranging from an estimated 7.1% of 
GDP in Oman to 35.7% in Qatar in 2008.61 The 
total current account surplus of the GCC region 
is expected to increase from USD 25.5 billion
in 2002 to USD 207.3 billion in 2008.
Taking a broader perspective, the rapid rise
in oil-exporting countries’ current account 
balances is even more impressive. The joint 
current account surplus of Norway, Russia
and the OPEC member states 62 is forecast
to surge from USD 88.2 billion in 2002 to 
USD 412.5 billion in 2008.
The  ﬂ   ip side of these huge current account 
surpluses is a signiﬁ   cant redistribution of 
income from oil importers to oil exporters. This 
has contributed to the current conﬁ  guration 
of global current account imbalances. As 
depicted in Chart 26, external positions have 
widened on an unprecedented scale in recent 
years, with world deﬁ  cits mainly concentrated 
in the United States (estimate for 2008: USD 
788.3 billion) and world surpluses spread across 
a larger number of economies, including many 
emerging market countries. In particular, within 
less than a decade, oil-exporting countries have 
emerged as a major net supplier of capital, even 
outpacing the overall current account surplus 
growth posted by emerging Asian countries 
(including China) from 2004 to 2006. In the 
medium term, however, oil exporters are not 
expected to keep up with the rapidly growing 
Chinese position – as already corroborated by 
the 2007 and 2008 forecasts. 
2.2.2 RECYCLING PETRODOLLARS VIA THE TRADE 
AND THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT CHANNELS
Basically, if oil exporters want to deploy their 
oil revenues, they have two options: oil revenues 
can be used either for the import of goods and 
services (trade channel or absorption channel) or 
for the purchase of foreign assets in international 
capital markets (capital account channel).63 
In the ﬁ  rst case, some of the oil revenues are 
re-directed towards goods and services markets 
in other (often oil-importing) countries, which 
lowers the GCC countries’ current account 
surpluses and reduces the negative effects that 
higher oil prices have on purchasing power 
(and thus growth) in oil-importing countries. 
Natural gas is also an important resource in several GCC member  60 
states (see Part 3). For the sake of simplicity, however, this text 
does not differentiate between the two commodities and speaks 
of “oil” only. 
Figures are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook  61 
Databases October 2007. 
OPEC member states include Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran,  62 
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Venezuela. Bahrain and Oman are not member 
states of OPEC.
A third alternative is the reduction of public debt, which is  63 
usually subsumed under the capital account channel. As laid out 
in Part 1, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have used a signiﬁ  cant part of 
their recent oil revenues to repay the bulk of their public debt. 
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In the case of the capital account channel, 
those negative effects on growth will also be 
dampened as capital exports from oil-exporting 
countries help to sustain consumption and 
investment spending in oil-importing countries. 
It goes without saying that the destinations 
of oil exports on the one hand and oil revenue 
deployment on the other are independent of one 
another, so that some oil-importing countries 
will beneﬁ  t more from recycling than others.
Owing to a lack of precise data on oil revenues 
and absorption, Chart 27 shows on a more 
general scale that the overall imports of the 
GCC region absorb a considerable part of its 
overall exports, the latter serving as a proxy 
for oil revenues. In fact, the imports to exports 
ratio, which averages 52% in the period 
2002-2006, is broadly in line with several 
research estimates, according to which about 
half of the oil revenues in GCC countries 
has been used to fund imports.64 Chart 27 
also reveals that the GCC region’s imports 
lag behind its exports. Since 1970, almost 
every episode of rising oil prices has been 
accompanied by a contraction of the imports 
to exports ratio. Whilst this pattern has not 
changed in principle, recent declines have 
been less pronounced than those of the 1970s
(see sub-section 2.3.2 for details). 
All in all, this balance of payments data 
evidence suggests that GCC countries currently 
invest roughly half of their oil revenues in 
ﬁ   nancial assets. Traditionally, ﬁ  nancial 
investment has been channelled through central 
banks and monetary authorities. Particularly in 
recent years, however, the fairly stable 
increases in the ofﬁ   cial foreign exchange 
reserves of the GCC region, whose stock 
totalled USD 76 billion in 2006, have not kept 
pace with the surge in its current account 
surpluses (Chart 28). Instead, there has been a 
proliferation of SWFs.65 These funds are 
nothing new – one of the world’s ﬁ  rst SWFs 
was founded in Kuwait as early as 1953 – but 
only in recent years has their rapidly growing 
size attracted public attention. None of the 
GCC region’s SWFs disclose detailed ﬁ  gures 
on their assets under management, but rough 
market estimates corroborate that their assumed 
overall size already forms a multiple of 
recorded foreign exchange reserves, from
USD 750 billion to USD 1,500 billion. It 
should be noted, however, that the lines of 
See, for instance, Ruiz and Vilarubia (2007) und Higgins,  64 
Klitgaard and Lerman (2006).
There is no generally accepted deﬁ  nition of a SWF. However,  65 
the term usually refers to state-owned entities that manage the 
government’s foreign currency assets separately from ofﬁ  cial 
foreign exchange reserves.
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demarcation between investment by a SWF 
and a central bank may be blurred – as in the 
case of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA).66 As of 31 December 2007, SAMA 
reported USD 335 billion in non-reserve 
holdings of international assets on and off its 
balance sheet. Consequently, in its recent 
Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF 
included these assets in its analysis of SWFs.67 
When analysing ﬁ  nancial petrodollar investment 
it is essential to keep in mind the governments’ 
motives. Although the GCC countries disclose 
very little on that issue, three possible 
motivations can be identiﬁ  ed. First, traditional 
foreign exchange reserves, which are generally 
managed by a central bank. The management 
is required to focus on highly liquid assets and 
to follow a relatively conservative investment 
policy. Second, stabilisation funds, the purpose 
of which is to smooth government expenditure 
and decouple it from the short-term volatility 
of oil revenues so as to avoid boom-and-
bust cycles. Though stabilisation funds have 
a medium-term horizon, considerations of 
liquidity and low risk remain important because 
the funds may be drawn upon at relatively short 
notice. Last, petrodollars are “genuinely” saved, 
i.e. handed on to future generations. These funds 
are particularly relevant in countries where the 
lifespan of the known oil resources is relatively 
short, i.e. namely in Bahrain and Oman. Their 
long-term horizon means that savings funds 
can afford to invest in a much broader range of 
assets and to take on more risk. Basically, both 
stabilisation and savings funds can be managed 
by central banks or SWFs, but they are usually 
associated with the latter.
2.2.3 TRACKING PETRODOLLAR-RELATED CAPITAL 
FLOWS
Analysing  ﬁ   nancial petrodollar recycling in 
detail is much trickier than assessing trade 
aspects, because the related disaggregated 
capital ﬂ  ows are reported only sketchily by the 
GCC countries’ central banks, monetary 
authorities and SWFs.68 As a consequence, the 
analysis mainly relies on counterparty 
information – which is rather thin on the ground 
owing to the limitations of ofﬁ  cial  statistics. 
Taking the cumulative current account surpluses 
of the GCC region as a rough benchmark for 
ﬁ  nancial petrodollar recycling, only about half 
of the available ﬁ  nancial resources (as identiﬁ  ed 
by this benchmark) can be tracked (Chart 29). It 
is particularly difﬁ   cult to obtain information 
about the riskier asset classes such as non-US 
securities and innovative ﬁ  nancial instruments, 
which might thus constitute a signiﬁ  cant part of 
the untracked petrodollars. 
The BIS locational banking statistics are an 
important source of counterparty information. 
These report (inter alia) on international 
commercial banks’ net liabilities vis-à-vis 
individual countries. The GCC countries’ net 
Saudi Arabia is the only GCC country which has not set up a  66 
formal sovereign wealth fund. Instead, its monetary agency 
manages foreign assets on behalf of various government 
agencies.
See IMF (2007d). 67 
GCC countries reveal only the minimum amount of information  68 
about their assets, so that little is known about the composition 
of ofﬁ  cial currency reserves and even less (or close to nothing) 
about SWFs, which are not subject to reporting requirements 
of any kind. In Kuwait and Qatar, for instance, it is argued that 
public disclosure of operations and ﬁ   nancial positions of oil 
funds will only add to public spending pressures.
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claims against the international banking sector, 
worth USD 65 billion in the third quarter 
of 2007, amount to only half of their historical 
peak in 1990. Moreover, against the benchmark 
of the region’s cumulative current account 
surplus, it becomes evident that the GCC 
economies’ claims reported to the BIS represent 
a rapidly declining percentage of their overall 
ﬁ   nancial resources invested abroad – or, in 
other words, that the recent additional oil export 
revenues have mostly been invested in other 
asset classes. Further evidence provided by the 
BIS shows that of the roughly USD 450 billion 
stock of gross deposits made by OPEC member 
states in the fourth quarter of 2006 (63% of 
which can be attributed to the GCC region), 
11% was placed in BIS reporting banks in the 
United States, 20% in offshore centres and the 
lion’s share in Europe (with the United Kingdom 
being the main recipient). These ﬁ  gures hint at 
oil exporters having a geographical preference 
for London as an international ﬁ  nancial centre. 
It can also be deduced from the data that 
geographical preferences seem to be unrelated 
to considerations of currency composition, 
since OPEC member states hold 70% (65%) of 
their European (offshore centre) deposits in US 
dollar accounts. Nevertheless, there is evidence 
that the currency composition of OPEC deposits 
in BIS reporting banks has recently been more 
sensitive to changes in interest rate differentials 
than in the past.69 
A second source of publicly available counterparty 
information is the US Treasury International 
Capital (TIC) data, which provide a geographical 
breakdown of foreign portfolio holdings of US 
securities.70 The GCC region’s investment in US 
securities has risen noticeably in past years 
(Chart 29). In a worldwide comparison, the 
holdings of GCC countries showed the most rapid 
growth during the period from June 2005 to 
June 2006 on a percentage growth basis, 
increasing by just over 50% from USD 161 billion 
to USD 243 billion. Thus, a considerable part of 
the recent additional oil export revenues has been 
invested in the US ﬁ   nancial market. A more 
in-depth look at the breakdown of the TIC data 
suggests that GCC countries have diversiﬁ  ed 
their reported assets over the full range of US 
securities. Since 2002, the share of US equities 
has hovered at around 50% of the GCC region’s 
US securities portfolio, while its demand for 
short-term US government debt (both Treasury 
and Agency bonds) has – most notably – 
increased from 4.4% to 14.5% during the same 
period (Chart 30). But an important caveat must 
be added: the TIC statistics do not track the 
original source of funds entering a country so that 
third-party purchases (e.g. from the United 
Kingdom or offshore centres – which both play 
an increasing role according to BIS data) cannot 
be identiﬁ  ed. In view of the enormous size of 
recent UK purchases of long-term US securities 
and the apparent correlation between these 
purchases and the oil price (Chart 31), it may be 
assumed that securities purchases via the United 
Kingdom represent a key channel for petrodollar 
investment. As a consequence, the true extent of 
See BIS (2005), BIS (2007a) and BIS (2007b). 69 
The TIC statistics provide only aggregate data for Middle  70 
East oil-exporting countries, i.e. the GCC economies plus Iraq 
and Iran. Apart from the TIC data, an additional source of 
information is the data provided by France, Germany, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, to name some of 
the world’s largest economies, on the geographical breakdown 
of their international investment positions. From this data, 
net securities purchases and foreign direct investment by oil 
exporters can be deduced. However, the results are incomplete 
and time-consuming to extract.
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oil exporters’ investment in the United States 
may be signiﬁ  cantly understated in the ofﬁ  cial 
statistics.
A third source of counterparty information is the 
Zephyr database, distributed by the Bureau van 
Dijk, which contains ﬂ  ow data on M&A, IPO 
and venture capital deals on an international 
basis. Reliable data are only available from 
2003 onwards, but it can still be seen that the 
GCC countries’ appetite for these transactions is 
strong and picked up considerably in 2006 and 
2007 (clearly exceeding the worldwide growth 
rates of M&A activity), with total (known) deal 
values amounting to USD 37 billion in 2006 and 
USD 51 billion in 2007.
Piecing together the information obtained from 
these three sources leads to the following 
conclusions. First, GCC countries have 
diversiﬁ   ed their international investment 
portfolios. In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, 
the importance of international bank deposits 
has declined. Instead, US securities and M&A 
make up a more signiﬁ  cant share of the GCC 
region’s identiﬁ  ed net foreign assets. This rise 
in risk propensity is corroborated by anecdotal 
evidence. According to this, the region’s SWFs 
make use of their more progressive investment 
mandates and of today’s broader investment 
opportunities in order to hold instruments 
ranging from ﬁ   xed income, shares and real 
estate to hedge funds, private equity and other 
high-yield product classes. It is also felt that 
GCC countries currently tend to invest in a 
more proﬁ   t-oriented way than other major 
oil-exporting countries, such as Nigeria, 
Norway, Russia and Venezuela. Second, as 
indicated by both the TIC data and the currency 
decomposition of the BIS data, the United States 
is still the main recipient of GCC countries’ 
funds. Third, and in contrast to the previous 
episodes of higher oil prices, growing risk 
appetite seems to be resulting in an increasing 
role for emerging market investment – which is 
not captured in the above mentioned third-party 
statistics.  71 The dynamic development of many 
Middle Eastern and North African stock and 
real estate markets – especially in the GCC 
region, but also elsewhere – and future earning 
prospects as well as improved fundamentals of 
emerging market economies in general have 
rendered such investments more attractive. The 
emergence of a regional bias will, however, 
eventually be limited by the absorption capacity 
of local goods, services and ﬁ  nancial markets. A 
case in point is the major correction of the GCC 
countries’ stock markets in 2006, which drew 
attention to the vulnerability of the ﬁ  nancial 
boom in the region.72
2.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY
2.3.1 GLOBAL IMBALANCES, CAPITAL FLOWS AND 
THEIR SUSTAINABILITY
Global imbalances have widened since the 
mid-1990s, but it is only since 2003 that they 
have been treated as a major cause for concern on 
the international policy agenda. Various theories 
and, accordingly, various determinants of 
global imbalances have been identiﬁ  ed over the 
In a 2006 interview with Euromoney, an ofﬁ   cial from the  71 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, which is alleged to manage 
the world’s largest SWF, claimed that investments in emerging 
markets equities are “far greater than what the biggest US 
pension fund would have”.
See Part 1 for details. 72 
Chart 31 UK net purchases of long-term US 
securities and the price of oil
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past years. Whereas discussions initially focused 
on conditions in the United States, the perspective 
has broadened to cover developments in Asia 
and, more recently, oil-producing countries. At 
the current juncture, signiﬁ  cantly more than half 
of the US current account deﬁ  cit is ﬁ  nanced not 
by private agents, but by governments. Thereof, 
the overwhelming majority is identiﬁ  ed as Asian 
(which includes the Middle East). Even if this 
means that both East Asian and oil-exporting 
countries are frequently mentioned in the same 
breath, their investment motives differ decisively. 
With regard to East Asian governments, they 
are often perceived to have a vested interest 
in export competitiveness. Accordingly, 
one explanation for global imbalances, the 
Bretton Woods II view,73 postulates that 
countries such as Japan and China accumulate 
USD-denominated assets in order to avoid a 
substantial appreciation of their currencies and 
to sustain export-led growth. 
Oil-exporting countries, by contrast, might feel 
less inclined to subordinate their investment 
objectives to the maintenance of such an 
informal international exchange rate system. 
Given the limited lifespan of known oil 
resources, some of the region’s main economic 
challenges include accumulating ﬁ  nancial 
assets, spurring broad-based non-oil private 
sector growth and creating employment 
opportunities for the rapidly growing local 
labour force.74 On account of this need for 
comprehensive structural reforms, one might 
expect GCC countries to look for the most 
proﬁ  table deployment of petrodollars – both in 
terms of ﬁ  nancial returns and, more generally, 
to ensure the welfare of future generations.
A comparison of East Asian and GCC countries’ 
assets – as reported in the BIS and TIC 
statistics – underlines that the GCC region has
a stronger proﬁ  t orientation, because the latter’s 
portfolio is more diversiﬁ  ed than that of its East 
Asian counterparts (Chart 32). With this in 
mind, sub-section 2.3.3 discusses whether the 
speciﬁ   c characteristics of GCC countries as 
global investors have an impact on the 
sustainability of capital ﬂ  ows into certain asset 
classes, countries and currencies. 
As for the overall level of the currently immense 
capital outﬂ  ows from GCC economies, it can 
be assumed to be sustainable in the medium 
term, not least because, with oil prices at 
historical highs, ﬁ  nancial petrodollar recycling 
will remain important in absolute terms.
2.3.2 GLOBAL IMBALANCES, POLICY PLANS AND 
THEIR FEASIBILITY
In the third quarter of 2007, the US current 
account deﬁ   cit amounted to less than USD 
200 billion for the fourth time in a row. In view 
of the slowdown in the US economy, the 
ongoing price adjustments in the US housing 
market and the depreciation of the US dollar, 
the US current account deﬁ  cit is likely to shrink 
further. Nonetheless, warnings about a sudden 
and disorderly unwinding of global imbalances 
have not subsided. Such a scenario could result 
in a pronounced revaluation of currencies, a 
severe drop in economic growth and heightened 
risk aversion in capital markets. To avoid this, 
the international community has agreed on a 
four-pronged approach that asks key players 
See Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) for details. 73 
See Part 1 for more details. 74 
Chart 32 Identified net foreign assets by 
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such as the United States, Europe and Japan, 
emerging Asia and oil-exporting countries to 
address global imbalances in a multilateral 
process.75 Respective policy plans for 
oil-exporting countries focus on the absorption 
channel and in some cases also entail enhanced 
exchange rate ﬂ  exibility. Though these plans 
are essential, it is important to highlight that 
the GCC economies are only part of the 
solution. Even if oil exporters have become 
integral participants in the adjustment process, 
the risk of a disorderly unwinding of global 
imbalances requires concerted action by both 
current account surplus and current account 
deﬁ  cit countries. 
THE ABSORPTION CHANNEL AND FISCAL POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
One of the policy goals of the international 
agenda postulates that oil-exporting 
countries accelerate investment in oil 
production capacity and strengthen economic 
diversiﬁ  cation. Apart from stabilising global 
oil markets, the logic behind this is that if 
oil exporters spend their oil revenue, part of 
the petrodollar inﬂ  ows will ﬂ  ow out again to 
pay for imports from oil-importing countries, 
thus mitigating global imbalances. At the 
same time, less excess savings would ﬂ  ow 
into international ﬁ   nancial markets, thereby 
reducing pressure on global interest rates. As 
a result, domestic demand in current account 
deﬁ   cit countries, especially in the United 
States, would be curbed. The international 
agenda’s policy plan largely coincides with 
the GCC economies’ structural reform 
plans. As is explained in greater detail in 
Part 1, the region’s strong macroeconomic 
performance of the past few years and the still 
favourable external environment provide a 
golden opportunity to exploit the petrodollar 
windfall to further diversify the oil-dependent 
economies and improve the functioning of the 
local labour and product markets.
The impact of the GCC countries’ trade 
channel on global imbalances is determined 
not only by the scale of their investment, but 
also by the speed with which petrodollars are 
recycled into imports. In that respect, there is 
an ongoing empirical debate on the question 
of whether the speed of petrodollar recycling 
has picked up or, in other words, whether 
the pattern of import lags in oil-exporting 
countries during episodes of rising oil prices 
has changed. The IMF (2006), on the one hand, 
estimates marginal propensities to import, as 
well as import functions for GCC countries for 
the period 1970-2005. It ﬁ  nds that oil revenue 
recycling has become more conservative in 
recent years – a statement which is in line with 
reports on the GCC countries’ initially cautious 
spending behaviour, but which raises doubts in 
view of the recent pick-up in investment. On 
the other hand, for instance, the OECD (2005) 
argues that in the period from 1997 to 2004 
the re-spending of petrodollars was broadly 
on track and was thus not becoming more 
conservative. This is corroborated by a simple 
error-correction equation according to which 
between 60-65% of extra export revenue is 
spent in the Africa and Middle East region. 
Although the pattern of import lags in the GCC 
region is open to some dispute, the existence of 
such lags is recognised as a fact. In part, they 
reﬂ  ect the fact that economies only adapt slowly 
to income shocks, be it because of “habit 
persistence” or more practical concerns, such as 
planning and implementation lags associated 
with new investment projects. Additionally, 
import lags can be explained by uncertainty 
associated with the volatility in oil prices as a 
result of which the GCC region has only 
gradually been adjusting its initially rather 
conservative pricing assumptions in ﬁ  scal 
budgets.76 Conversely, the argument of import 
lags should not be overstated. By deﬁ  nition, 
import lags carry less weight over the medium 
term as investment builds up progressively. 
Moreover, the gradual diversiﬁ   cation of the 
See, for instance, annex on global imbalances to the statement  75 
by the G7 ﬁ   nance ministers and central bank governors of 
21 April 2006, and the ﬁ  rst multilateral consultation on global 
imbalances launched by the IMF.
On the other hand, the slow upward revision of oil price  76 
assumptions in ﬁ   scal spending programmes contributes to 
smoothing ﬁ  scal expenditure against the background of volatile 
oil price movements. 47
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GCC region’s economies has allowed for 
broader investment opportunities and opened up 
sectors where investment lags are relatively 
short compared with the capital-intensive oil 
business. These developments are still ongoing 
and the massive medium-term investment plans 
in the GCC region – if successful – will 
contribute to boosting demand for goods and 
services from industrialised countries.77 
Therefore, the GCC region’s absorption capacity 
and with it the speed of petrodollar recycling 
could potentially increase further in the medium 
to long term. 
In the context of global imbalances, oil revenue 
recycling through imports has mitigated the 
negative impact of the ongoing oil price hike 
on the purchasing power of oil-importing 
countries. However, several caveats must 
be added. First, the import lag in the GCC 
countries translates into an impact lag in the 
oil-importing countries; hence the full effect 
of rising oil-related imports has probably 
not yet come to bear. Second, though time 
lags have shortened in recent years (as seen 
in Chart 27), the gap between exports and 
imports has been growing considerably in 
absolute terms, adding weight to the delayed 
effects in oil-importing countries. Third, even 
if the absorption channel gains in importance 
in the GCC region, the amount of petrodollars 
saved will remain substantial. Fourth, and most 
importantly, the geographical distribution of 
the GCC region’s imports favours some parts 
of the world more than others. In 2006, 35.1% 
of the GCC economies’ imports originated 
from Asia (7.2% thereof from Japan), 31.4% 
from the EU and merely 11.4% from the United 
States. Possible explanations for this regional 
distribution are geographical proximity and a 
matching assortment of products. In particular, 
Asian countries (excluding Japan) seem to have 
beneﬁ   ted from petrodollar recycling via the 
absorption channel. Between 2000 and 2006 
they succeeded in expanding their share of the 
GCC import markets by 6.7 percentage points. 
By contrast, the EU’s share slightly decreased 
by 0.8 percentage point – thus remaining at 
elevated levels – the United States’ share fell 
by 1.7 percentage points and Japan’s share 
by 3.0 percentage points. As a result of these 
developments, the absorption channel is much 
more likely to partly compensate for the oil 
price induced cost-push shocks in Asia and 
Europe than in the United States. 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Exchange rates are another issue discussed in the 
context of global imbalances. Nominal exchange 
rate stability is a policy choice broadly adopted 
by nearly all Middle Eastern and North African 
countries. The GCC currencies, in particular, 
have maintained a remarkable degree of nominal 
stability vis-à-vis the US dollar since the 
mid-1980s and have been de jure pegged to the 
US dollar as part of the region’s road map for the 
introduction of a common currency. Recently, 
however, the advantages of the currency 
peg are increasingly being overshadowed by 
adverse domestic developments (see Part 1 
for details). As a consequence of the oil price 
hike, the ensuing buoyant economic growth 
and rise in import prices as a result of the US 
dollar peg, average inﬂ  ation in GCC economies 
has grown from below 1% in 2002 to above 
4% in 2006 and 2007 and real interest rates 
have in turn become very low and in some 
cases negative. Against this backdrop, Kuwait 
revalued its currency against the US dollar and, 
in May 2007, opted out of the US dollar peg 
in favour of a currency basket of undeclared 
composition. Subsequently, calls for gradual 
changes to the exchange rate regimes in the 
entire GCC region have been gaining ground 
(see Box 3 on the impact of a revaluation of 
oil-exporting countries’ currencies on domestic 
inﬂ  ation). Nonetheless, as the region’s largest 
nation, Saudi Arabia has frequently reafﬁ  rmed 
its desire to maintain its current US dollar peg 
unchanged.
In a global context, changes in the currency 
regimes of the GCC countries might be 
considered supportive of a more rapid and 
efﬁ   cient adjustment to global imbalances. 
See Part 1 for details. 77 48
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Therefore, the situation in the GCC region 
seems, on the surface, to bear some similarities to 
that in China. However, while the international 
community’s calls for greater exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility in countries with large current account 
surpluses are usually targeted at China, such 
recommendations have not been made explicitly 
with reference to the GCC economies. The 
reasons for this lie in the trade and the capital 
account channel.
With regard to the trade channel, as oil exports 
are priced in US dollars, both a revaluation and 
a repegging of the GCC countries’ currencies 
is currently expected to result in a cut in the 
region’s oil export volumes – although probably 
to a limited extent only. On the import side, 
the impact of a gradual change in exchange 
rate regimes is likely to be stronger. However, 
as shown above, the majority of additional 
imports related to a rise in purchasing power 
are likely to originate in the EU and Asia, so 
that no marked pressure would be taken off 
the US current account deﬁ  cit. Another reason 
for the relatively weak interest in the exchange 
rate regimes of the GCC region might relate to 
the fact that export goods and services from 
oil-producing countries – contrary to those 
from Asia – hardly compete with goods and 
services produced in the industrialised world, 
making it less likely that protectionist fears 
are raised.
Moving on to the capital account channel, it is 
often argued that the GCC region’s US dollar 
peg creates a strong incentive to invest 
petrodollars into USD-denominated assets. 
Thereby, the argument goes, GCC economies 
support consumer spending and investment in 
the United States, e.g. by lowering US interest 
rates, and consequently contribute to deferring 
adjustment to global imbalances. However, 
there are several counter-arguments against this 
line of argumentation. First, the discussion in 
sub-section 2.3.3 shows that it is hard to ﬁ  nd 
empirical evidence that petrodollar recycling 
has an impact on the level of long-term US 
interest rates. Second, GCC economies will 
continue to invest in US markets for reasons 
other than a US dollar peg, particularly because 
of the United States’ deep capital markets, its 
status as a safe haven and, to some extent, the 
fact that oil revenues are traditionally 
denominated in US dollars. Third, indirect oil 
revenue recycling must also be taken into 
account. Even if GCC countries increased their 
share of ﬁ   nancial investment in emerging 
markets to the detriment of ﬁ  nancial investment 
in the United States, the negative effect on the 
United States would be dampened if part of 
these redirected petrodollars crowded out 
domestic saving in emerging market countries 
and made them turn to US assets instead.78
See Higgins, Klitgaard and Lerman (2006). 78 
Box 3
IMPACT OF A REVALUATION OF OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES’ CURRENCIES ON DOMESTIC PRICES
Nominal exchange rate stability has long been considered a reasonable policy choice for 
oil-exporting countries. The main reasons for this policy orientation include the desire to:
(a) import credibility to domestic currencies; (b) stabilise oil revenues (priced in US dollars) 
and, in turn, government revenues, with a view to their prominent role in ﬁ  scal budgets 1; and 
(c) to avoid Dutch disease symptoms by pegging to the currency of a country that does not 
export oil. Currently, however, importing an interest rate policy that is set for the slowing-
down US economy poses a serious challenge to the booming GCC countries. In the light of 
1  Obviously, pegging a currency to the US dollar can only guard against exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations, not against the volatility of oil 
prices.49
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the mounting domestic inﬂ  ationary pressures in the Gulf region, the exchange rate issue has 
gained in importance.
Against this background, the global macromodel of the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, NiGEM, is used to discuss what effect a one-off nominal appreciation of oil-exporting 
countries’ currencies would have on inﬂ  ation and output. NiGEM is a large, empirically-estimated 
model covering OECD countries, with the rest of the world included in regional blocks. 
Therefore, GCC countries are not modelled separately, but instead the focus is on the OPEC 
block.2 NiGEM uses a new-Keynesian framework in that agents are forward-looking, but where 
nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to external events. Countries within the model 
are mainly linked through the effects of trade and competitiveness.3
To assess whether a formal revaluation of the GCC countries’ currencies against the US dollar 
helps to alleviate price pressures in their economies, a macroeconomic reference scenario 
is chosen that somehow reﬂ  ects current global conditions and possible risks. It assumes a 
housing-market-induced slowdown in the US economy (simulated by an exogenous permanent 
decrease in US housing prices by 10% and an endogenous reduction in housing investment by 
3% at a time over four consecutive quarters), combined with an exogenous permanent oil price 
hike by 10% in each of these quarters. Table A presents the effects that this scenario would have 
on consumer prices in OPEC member states. As can be seen, the combination of an oil price hike 
and a slowdown in the US economy leads to a surge in domestic inﬂ  ation. The basic model can 
be extended by adding a policy reaction in line with the international agenda that consists of an 
increase in the OPEC bloc’s domestic demand by 1% at a time over eight quarters. However, 
faster petrodollar recycling through imports only slightly reduces the inﬂ  ationary effects by 
curbing output ﬂ  uctuations.
The second scenario complements the ﬁ  rst scenario with a formal one-off nominal revaluation 
of the OPEC bloc’s currency against the US dollar by 10%. Under these assumptions, the price 
effects of the ﬁ  rst scenario turn, in the short run, deﬂ  ationary (thus even alleviating some of the 
inﬂ  ationary pressures of the baseline scenario). It is interesting to note that, following the currency 
revaluation, the OPEC bloc experiences only slight losses in real GDP (see Table B) . Transferring 
these results to the GCC economies, it thus seems possible to dissolve price and inﬂ  ationary 
pressures resulting from the assumed income and demand shocks by a sufﬁ  ciently large nominal 
2  As a further caveat, within NiGEM, the currency of the OPEC bloc is pegged to a currency basket, in which the US dollar has a weight 
of almost 51%, followed by the Japanese yen with 35%, the euro with 8% and the Canadian dollar with 7%. As model parameters can 
be modiﬁ  ed within NiGEM, it is possible to create a model alternative with a 100% US dollar peg. However, the resulting impact on 
the price level and output effects in OPEC countries is not signiﬁ  cant.
3  Apart from trade and competitiveness, countries are also linked via ﬁ  nancial markets and asset stocks, i.e. the structure and composition 
of wealth. Wealth effects, however, relate to consumption only.
Table A Inflation effects of an appreciation of the OPEC countries’ currencies against the 
US dollar by 10%  1)
plus: nominal appreciation 
basic model  faster recycling  basic model  faster recycling 
year 1  1.07 0.99  -2.32  -2.39 
year 2  6.18 5.35  -3.00  -3.64 
year 3  14.87 12.64  0.55 -1.18 
Source: NiGEM model simulations.
1) Difference from baseline in percentage points.50
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2.3.3 OIL EXPORTERS AS NEW BIG PLAYERS IN 
WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS
The massive size of oil exporting countries’ 
recent investments puts their role as players 
on international ﬁ  nancial markets into a new 
perspective. As stated above, in GCC countries, 
the bulk of ﬁ  nancial petrodollar investment is 
made by SWFs, which tend to enjoy greater 
investment  ﬂ   exibility and less reputational 
risk and may thus invest more progressively 
than central banks and monetary authorities. 
Sometimes, the overlapping view is taken of 
seeing SWFs (of any geographical origin) as a 
new class of investors, as opposed to traditional 
institutional investors, hedge funds and others. 
Tentative market estimates indicate that 
SWFs manage between USD 1.9 trillion and
USD 2.9 trillion on a worldwide scale, with the 
IMF expecting their overall assets to grow to 
USD 12 trillion by 2012, not least because of 
anticipated massive transfers of foreign assets 
from traditional central bank reserve portfolios 
into SWFs. These ﬁ   gures contrast with an 
estimated USD 1-2 trillion currently managed 
by hedge funds and USD 6 trillion of total 
foreign exchange holdings reported to the IMF 
in the third quarter of 2007. While currently 
about two thirds of today’s SWF assets stem 
from oil-related funds, it is believed that non-
oil funds will catch up soon. As a consequence, 
a large part of the international attention 
focuses not so much on the well-established 
SWFs of the GCC region (currently estimated 
at USD 0.75 trillion to USD 1.5 trillion,
see sub-section 2.2.2), but on the rapidly
growing, often newly-founded funds, in 
particular on the China Investment Corporation 
and Russia’s National Wealth Fund.
The following discussion will consider all 
external investment activities by the GCC 
governments ranging from the impact of 
petrodollar recycling on asset prices, exchange 
rates and ﬁ  nancial stability in general to some 
speciﬁ  c issues on SWFs. It will show, however, 
that data constraints make it impossible to derive 
precise ﬁ  nancial market implications.
FINANCIAL SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS
The sheer size of capital ﬂ  ows, especially into 
the US economy, has suggested that part of the 
globally low real interest rates of the past few 
years can be explained by exogenous factors, 
among them Bernanke’s “global saving glut”. 
Indeed, it seems plausible that the GCC 
countries’ sizeable build-up of ﬁ  nancial assets – 
a signiﬁ  cant part of which has ﬂ  own into long-
term US government securities – has exerted 
some downward pressure on US long-term 
interest rates 79. The extent of that inﬂ  uence, 
however, is debatable. Empirical evidence 
mostly concentrates on the overall impact of 
long-term US government securities purchases 
by foreign central banks of any origin on bond 
Meanwhile, some ﬁ   nancial market analysts have already  79 
subscribed to the opposite story. As East Asian countries, 
in particular, are starting to rebalance their so far relatively 
conservative investment portfolios, there are likely to be sizeable 
portfolio shifts from US government securities into riskier assets. 
All things being equal, US bond yields would consequently face 
upward pressure.
appreciation. Nonetheless, it goes without saying that such a one-off adjustment will not solve all 
the problems associated with a 100% US dollar peg in most of the GCC region.
Table B Output effects of an appreciation of the OPEC countries’ currencies against the 
US dollar by 10%  1)
basic model  faster recycling 
plus: nominal appreciation
basic model  faster recycling
year 1  1.76 0.99 1.54 0.88
year 2  5.52 4.00 4.97 3.59
year 3  6.74 6.26 6.32 5.78
Source: NiGEM model simulations.
1) Difference from baseline in percentage points.51
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yields, which is usually estimated to range 
between 20 and 100 basis points. However, so 
far it has not been possible to single out a distinct 
inﬂ  uence from petrodollar investment (see Box 4 
for more details).
Another phenomenon related to increasing 
ﬁ  nancial globalisation, which could be observed 
until the recent global ﬁ  nancial market turmoil, is 
the decline in the credit spreads of emerging market 
bonds and the surge in emerging economies’ 
equity markets. Part of the past decrease in risk 
premia can be attributed to a general change in 
risk aversion owing to a global search for yield 
in combination with improved fundamentals of 
many emerging market countries. But in addition 
to that, it is often assumed that petrodollar 
investment has also had a benign inﬂ  uence on 
the cost of capital of these economies. This is not 
only because GCC countries show a keen interest 
in emerging market investments, but also owing 
to an indirect effect of lower risk-free rates in the 
United States which might have intensiﬁ  ed the 
search for yield in emerging markets. That is to 
say that the impact of petrodollar recycling on 
US Treasury bond yields – if existent – also has 
second-round effects on the price of emerging 
market yields. 
Box 4 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT OF PETRODOLLAR RECYCLING ON ASSET PRICES
Empirical evidence of the effect of oil revenue recycling on US Treasury bond yields is hard 
to detect. The IMF, following Warnock and Warnock (2006), opts for a relatively broad 
approach, regressing monthly yields of long-term US government securities on foreign capital 
inﬂ  ows and control variables over the period 1987-2005. Although it ﬁ  nds evidence that the 
combined foreign capital ﬂ  ows to the United States put downward pressure on US interest 
rates, the model suggests that this effect is mostly attributable to capital inﬂ  ows from East 
Asia. By contrast, a signiﬁ  cant role of petrodollar-related inﬂ  ows cannot be singled out. One 
explanation for this result might be the magnitude of petrodollar ﬂ  ows. According to TIC data, 
recent net purchases of long-term US Treasury bonds and notes by Emerging Asia and Japan 
far exceed those from the GCC region (see Chart). For instance, in the period from June 2004 
to June 2006, i.e. during the time of Greenspan’s interest rate conundrum, net transactions 
amounted to USD 76.5 billion for emerging Asia, USD 38.3 billion for Japan and USD 
18.3 billion only for the GCC economies. 
However, the difference in dimension should not come as a surprise. At least three caveats must 
be taken into account. First, instead of investing the oil-related windfall gains in international 
ﬁ  nancial markets, several GCC economies used a signiﬁ  cant part of their petrodollars to repay 
the bulk of their public debt in the ﬁ  rst years of the recent oil price boom. Second, given the 
relatively broad diversiﬁ   cation of petrodollar investments, one might conclude that it is 
precisely because of this asset diversiﬁ  cation that GCC countries exert only a relatively small 
inﬂ  uence on individual asset markets. Third, TIC data cannot identify third-party purchases 
of US securities and might therefore be substantially biased (see also sub-section 2.2.3). This 
becomes evident when looking at net purchases of long-term US Treasury bonds and notes by 
UK-based investors. During the above mentioned period, the United Kingdom’s investment 
added up to USD 233.5 billion, i.e. more than the combined inﬂ  ows from emerging Asia, Japan 
and the GCC region. As the true extent of investment by GCC countries remains uncertain, the 
IMF’s analysis should not be taken as proof of the negligibility of the petrodollar effect on US 
long-term interest rates. 52
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Moving on to ﬁ   nancial stability issues, it 
appears useful to revisit the GCC countries’ 
savings motives. It seems a reasonable 
assumption that the bulk of petrodollars does 
not ﬂ  ow into ofﬁ  cial currency reserves, but into 
medium-term oriented stabilisation funds and 
long-term oriented savings funds. Furthermore, 
with oil prices and subsequently oil revenues 
having attained ever-new historical highs 
in the past ﬁ   ve years, it seems increasingly 
unlikely that the entire assets of stabilisation 
funds will be run down in the foreseeable 
future. Hence, the savings motive, and with it 
long-term investments that, in principle, allow 
for taking on more risk should have been 
gaining in importance. 
This suggests that, overall, the emergence of 
oil-exporting countries in general and of GCC 
countries in particular as new big players on 
international ﬁ  nancial markets has had a positive 
impact on ﬁ  nancial stability. First, GCC economies 
manage a vast and growing pool of capital. 
Second, they have a tendency to favour long-term 
investments. Third, and contrary to hedge funds 
and private equity companies, the large SWFs, in 
particular, are presumed to be reluctant to engage 
strongly in highly-leveraged positions, because 
this might run counter to the GCC region’s 
savings motives. Fourth, petrodollar investments 
are believed to be diversiﬁ  ed and thus to cover a 
broad range of ﬁ  nancial instruments, countries and 
currencies. Fifth, being major oil producers in the 
Middle East, GCC countries make their investment 
decisions against a different backdrop in terms of 
the current macroeconomic environment than 
institutional investors of industrialised countries. 
All these distinct characteristics improve market 
liquidity and render the global investor base more 
heterogeneous and asset allocation more efﬁ  cient. 
Provided that the GCC region’s SWFs act 
according to risk and return considerations, they 
thus contribute to dampening asset price volatility 
and lowering liquidity risk premia. In particular, 
the rise in global investor heterogeneity makes a 
sudden stop or reversal of overall capital ﬂ  ows less 
likely – at least in the absence of herd behaviour. 
Moreover, there have been several recent examples 
As for the effect of petrodollar recycling on 
emerging market yields, the IMF, following 
Warnock and Warnock (2006), also fails to 
supply sufﬁ  cient statistical evidence. Based on 
a  ﬁ  xed-effects panel regression of emerging 
market bond spreads that controls for 
variables related to US ﬁ  nancial markets and 
for the impact of country-speciﬁ  c and global 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the IMF shows 
that any link between oil prices and emerging 
market bond spreads becomes statistically 
insigniﬁ  cant once world industrial production 
is included into the regression. This is the case 
as the parallel movement of oil prices, world 
industrial production and the global economic 
cycle makes it difﬁ   cult to disentangle an 
independent inﬂ   uence of any one of these 
variables. However, the explanatory power 
of the regression should not be overstated. 
After all, the use of oil prices as a proxy for 
petrodollar investment in emerging market countries might be justiﬁ  ed by the lack of identiﬁ  able 
transaction data; nevertheless, it adds a considerable amount of vagueness to the analysis. 
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Source: US Department of the Treasury.
Notes: Data on GCC countries include Iran and Iraq. Emerging 
Asia includes China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.53
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where globally active ﬁ   nancial institutions, e.g. 
banks and stock exchanges, were pleased to tap 
the ﬁ  nancial resources of the GCC region in order 
to receive liquidity injections and maintain their 
ﬁ  nancial independence at times when capital from 
western investors was in short supply.
However, the sheer size of ﬁ  nancial petrodollar 
recycling and the lack of transparency about the 
related investment portfolios and objectives has 
also intensiﬁ  ed unease in ﬁ  nancial markets and 
tempts analysts to form a critical, often biased 
view on ﬁ   nancial stability issues. One such 
example is the discussion on the quality and 
sophistication of risk management techniques 
put in place by central banks and SWFs. 
Requirements in terms of risk management 
are on the rise as the share of more diversiﬁ  ed 
and riskier assets under management increases. 
Indeed, anecdotal evidence on the management 
of the GCC region’s SWFs is encouraging. 
Nevertheless, the issue will remain on the 
agenda as the GCC economies’ central banks, 
monetary authorities and SWFs are typically 
unregulated and less subject to market 
discipline.
Another potential source of global ﬁ  nancial 
system vulnerabilities are abrupt and sizeable 
portfolio adjustments.80 In this respect, interest 
currently focuses on the dependence of the 
United States on international capital inﬂ  ows. 
However, current statistical evidence 
demonstrates that the GCC region has so far 
shown no signs of abandoning the US dollar. 
In particular, the TIC data indicate that, in the 
second half of 2007, i.e. in the aftermath
of the global ﬁ   nancial market turmoil, GCC
countries – instead of disinvesting long-term 
US securities – merely shifted their portfolios 
towards riskier asset classes within the universe 
of US securities. Plausible reasons for the
GCC region’s adherence to the US dollar can 
be found. First, in view of the long-term 
orientation of a large part of its savings, the 
reasons mentioned in sub-section 2.3.2 (and, in 
particular, the status of the United States as a 
safe haven) render it unlikely that the GCC 
region will all of a sudden substantially reduce 
the high US dollar share in its portfolios – even 
if certain readjustments might occur over the 
medium term. Second, with the United States 
still commanding the deepest markets in most 
asset classes, GCC economies are able to move 
up the risk curve without having to turn away 
from the US dollar. Third, a massive sell-off of 
the US dollar would not be in the region’s own 
interest given its large US dollar exposures and 
its US dollar peg. 
However, from a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective, 
a certain element of risk is based on the 
observation that not only actual capital ﬂ  ows 
can cause volatility on international foreign 
exchange markets, but that market rumours 
may sufﬁ  ce, as previous speculation about an 
increased currency diversiﬁ   cation by central 
banks has shown. Such market rumours may, in 
a worst case scenario, amplify herd behaviour, 
with a potentially destabilising impact on the 
global ﬁ  nancial system. In the case of the GCC 
countries, it is often argued that such rumours 
are nurtured by the scarce information available 
on their petrodollar investment policies and by 
mounting speculation about the sustainability 
of their exchange rate pegs. Thus, to sum up, 
the predominantly positive effects of ﬁ  nancial 
petrodollar recycling may turn negative, 
mainly, because in adverse situations the sheer 
size of overall petrodollar ﬂ  ows, as well as the 
very limited knowledge market participants 
have on petrodollar investments, might give 
rise to market rumours and, possibly, ﬁ  nancial 
market tensions. 
SPECIAL ISSUES CONCERNING SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS
As stated above, it is not the existence of 
SWFs that is new, but their profusion, scale 
and diversity. As a consequence, ofﬁ  cial 
capital  ﬂ  ows from emerging market countries 
are increasingly attracting the attention of 
ﬁ  nancial market participants and policymakers 
from industrialised countries. Apart from the 
It is important to keep in mind that ﬁ  nancial stability analysis  80 
aims at identifying the major downside risks to the ﬁ  nancial 
system. As a consequence, the issues discussed do not represent 
the most likely risk scenario.54
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abovementioned  ﬁ   nancial stability concerns, 
two issues are currently being debated. The ﬁ  rst 
is related to the investment targets of SWFs.
As many of the countries under discussion have 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves in excess 
of their immediate needs, SWFs are increasingly 
striving to generate higher returns on these 
“excess” assets. As shown by Summers (2007), 
emerging market countries could increase their 
return on excess reserves by 5 percentage points 
if they pursued an investment strategy similar to 
that of pension funds. 
But even if a more proﬁ  t-driven  investment 
attitude seems legitimate in general, the fact that 
SWFs both from the GCC region and elsewhere 
have recently bought stakes in what might be 
considered to be strategically or nationally 
important companies abroad has raised fears of 
politically or strategically motivated investments, 
a reversal of privatisations in recipient countries 
and a subsequent distortion of international 
competition. Admittedly, such fears are mostly 
hypothetical at the current juncture and do not 
coincide with SWFs’ presumably diversiﬁ  ed and 
commercially-motivated  ﬁ  nancial  investments. 
Nonetheless, such fears may fuel protectionism, 
potentially dampening the global economy. 
Initial indications of a change in sentiment are 
indeed visible in recent political initiatives in 
Europe and the United States, which, among 
other things, call for the establishment of an 
internationally agreed set of best practices 
to guide the management of government 
cross-border investments. While the question 
of how to strike a balance between maintaining 
the freedom of capital movement, enhancing 
transparency of SWFs and respecting the 
national security concerns of recipient countries 
is a difﬁ  cult issue, it will be essential to separate 
the wheat from the chaff, i.e. to abstain from 
measures that unduly restrict the free movement 
of capital on a global basis. 
Another SWF-related issue is whether oil funds 
actually enhance a country’s effectiveness in 
managing oil-related windfall gains or, in other 
words, whether the existence of oil funds makes 
sense from a theoretical perspective. While many 
oil funds were founded as early as the 1970s, 
when domestic absorption was far too low to 
counteract the spike in oil revenues, it is still
a contentious issue whether oil funds improve 
the conduct of ﬁ  scal policy and if they entail 
certain risks, such as fragmenting ﬁ  scal policy, 
creating a dual budget and reducing transparency 
and accountability. 
Leaving aside individual negative examples 
of operational mismanagement, such as 
Venezuela (in the 1970s) and Nigeria
(in the early 1990s), where oil funds were 
poorly integrated with the ﬁ  scal budget and used 
for macroeconomically inefﬁ  cient  purposes, 
Davis et al. (2001) show that both econometric 
evidence and country experience generally 
cast doubt on the effectiveness of oil funds. In 
particular, in countries where oil funds seem 
to have enhanced ﬁ   scal prudence, the effect 
might simply be ascribed to self-selection 
effects. Thus, the mere establishment of SWFs 
is no substitute for an appropriate ﬁ  scal rule in 
oil-producing countries. 
In the same vein, it is currently argued that 
the sheer size of professionally-managed 
SWFs might prompt funds to lose sight of 
their original mandates, which are part of the 
general  ﬁ   scal policy framework, and, in the 
extreme, become self-perpetuating investment 
entities. Such a change in purpose would 
undeniably defer the necessary structural 
adjustment in the region. This view, however, 
overlooks not only the currently growing public 
pressure in oil-producing countries aimed at 
accelerating government spending, but also 
non-ﬁ   scal effects. According to Shabsigh 
and Ilahi (2007), the question whether oil 
funds reduce macroeconomic volatility within 
oil-producing countries also has to be taken 
into account. Based on a panel data set of
15 oil-exporting countries (including Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Oman), the results indicate a robust 
negative relationship between the presence of an 
oil fund on the one hand and domestic inﬂ  ation, 
the volatility of prices and the volatility of broad 
money on the other. This relationship may be 
attributed to the fact that SWFs tend to be used 55
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
2   THE ROLE OF THE 
GCC COUNTRIES 






as a tool for neutralising the monetary impact of 
oil-related capital inﬂ  ows. Hence, concentrating 
state-backed investment within a SWF may 
indeed prove beneﬁ  cial, provided that the fund 
is integrated into a general policy framework 
with a special focus on ﬁ  scal discipline.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
GCC economies have been experiencing 
substantial revenue increases following the 
prolonged and marked hike in oil prices this 
decade. There are indications that about half 
of the GCC region’s oil revenues are currently 
absorbed through the trade channel, with the 
imports to exports ratio having picked up 
compared with the 1970s. The other half of GCC 
countries’ petrodollar inﬂ   ows are invested in 
ﬁ  nancial assets, resulting in a sizeable build-up 
of traditional foreign exchange reserves and, 
increasingly, stabilisation and savings funds. As 
only about half of these ﬁ  nancial resources can 
be tracked with the help of international statistics, 
a large part of the GCC countries’ investment 
activities is opaque to international ﬁ  nancial 
market participants. Based on the available 
evidence, however, two tentative conclusions 
can be drawn. First, diversiﬁ   cation in asset 
classes, countries and currencies seems to play 
an important role for GCC economies. Second, 
the United States has nonetheless remained a 
main recipient of oil-related ﬁ  nancial funds.
In view of the remarkable upswing in its combined 
current account surplus during the recent episode 
of rising oil prices, the GCC region has emerged 
as a major net supplier of capital on a global scale, 
second only to East Asian countries. As a result, 
GCC economies form part of the international 
community’s four-pronged approach, which aims 
at avoiding a sudden and disorderly unwinding 
of global imbalances. There is general consensus 
that concerted action by both current account 
surplus and current account deﬁ  cit countries is 
required in order to combat global imbalances 
effectively. As far as GCC countries are 
concerned, the respective policy plans, above 
all an acceleration of domestic absorption, have 
only a limited effect on global imbalances. Given 
the structure of the GCC region’s external trade, 
the absorption channel is much more likely to 
beneﬁ  t the EU and Asia than the country with 
the world’s largest current account deﬁ  cit, i.e. 
the United States. Enhancing exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility, a recommendation usually made with 
reference to China rather than the GCC region, 
might also support the adjustment process to 
a limited extent only. Nevertheless, a gradual 
nominal appreciation of the GCC countries’ 
currencies against the US dollar might be in 
their own interest given the region’s domestic 
macroeconomic conditions. In particular, it 
could dissolve inﬂ   ationary pressures resulting 
from domestic absorption of high and rising oil 
revenues.
As a consequence of the sheer size of ﬁ  nancial 
petrodollar recycling, oil-exporting countries in 
general and GCC countries in particular have 
emerged as new big players in world ﬁ  nancial 
markets. As such, they are alleged to exert some 
inﬂ   uence on asset prices, especially on US 
long-term interest rates, emerging market 
yields and the US dollar exchange rate. 
However, empirical studies fail to identify a 
signiﬁ  cant impact of oil revenue investments, 
in part because of data constraints, but also 
because the relatively broad diversiﬁ  cation of 
investment portfolios reduces their inﬂ  uence 
on individual asset markets. Moreover, the 
strength of the impact is likely to vary with the 
size of the respective market. On a more general 
scale, the effects of petrodollar recycling on 
global  ﬁ   nancial stability may be summarised 
as being positive, mainly because the 
longer-term orientation and the presumed 
reluctance of GCC countries to engage 
excessively in highly-leveraged positions 
contribute to diversifying the global investor 
base and its asset allocation. However, in adverse 
situations, the overall size of oil-related ﬂ  ows, 
as well as the very limited knowledge market 
participants have about petrodollar investments, 
may give rise to market rumours and, possibly, 
ﬁ  nancial instabilities.
In recent years, SWFs from both oil-exporting 
and other countries have proliferated as well 56
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as gained in scale and diversity of activity. 
Not least as a result of their opacity, these 
funds have raised fears of politically or 
strategically motivated investments, which – 
though hypothetical at the current juncture – 
might ultimately fuel protectionism. Instead, 
however, the proliferation of SWFs should be 
viewed in the context of a general trend towards 
deeper ﬁ  nancial globalisation. In this respect, 
it is essential that the international community 
abstains from measures that unduly restrict the 
free movement of capital on a global basis – 
all the more so as empirical evidence and 
country experience suggest that concentrating 
state-backed investment within an oil fund 
might prove beneﬁ  cial to the domestic economy, 
provided that promoting ﬁ   scal discipline is 
one of the fund’s dominant characteristics. 
On the other hand, in the light of the very 
limited knowledge market participants have 
about SWFs, a certain wariness regarding their 
activities is likely to persist. Thus, enhancing 
transparency in respect of the management and 
operation of these funds, along the lines of the 
work done by the IMF and the World Bank, 
would be welcome. 57
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
3   THE ROLE OF THE 
GCC COUNTRIES IN 
THE REGIONAL AND 
GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
ENERGY AND TRADE
3  THE ROLE OF THE GCC COUNTRIES IN THE 
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ECONOMY: ENERGY 
AND TRADE  81
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries  have 
seen impressive economic development in recent 
years, making the region one of the most 
prosperous in the world. Based on surging 
hydrocarbon revenues, these countries as a group 
have nearly doubled their nominal GDP since 
2003 to an estimated USD 791 billion in 2007 
(IMF, 2007f). The tripling of oil prices over this 
period has further strengthened the already 
prominent role played by the hydrocarbon sector, 
which accounted for nearly half of the aggregate 
GDP in GCC countries in 2006. The main export 
good is oil, representing, on average,82 70% of 
GCC countries’ total exports over the period 
2003-2007 (IMF, 2007g). In 2006 the GCC 
region accounted for more than one ﬁ  fth of world 
oil production. Moreover, 40% of proven world 
oil reserves and about 23% of proven world gas 
reserves are located in the GCC area (BP, 2007). 
Three GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
the UAE) are among the top ten countries in 
terms of proven oil reserves. On current 
production levels, Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are 
expected to last for 77 years (see Chart 33). 
Part 3 focuses on GCC countries’ role as energy 
suppliers and trading partners from a global 
and regional perspective. It provides facts and 
ﬁ  gures on issues related to energy and trade and 
complements Part 1, which deals with economic 
structures and developments in the GCC region 
and Part 2 on current issues in money and 
ﬁ  nance. Section 3.2 sheds some light on global 
energy supply and demand, as well as the current 
and likely future role of GCC countries in 
providing the global economy with oil and gas. 
Section 3.3 describes the GCC countries’ role 
in international trade, with special emphasis on 
their global and regional trade patterns, as well 
as their progress in terms of trade integration 
and trade facilitation. Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2  GCC COUNTRIES’ ROLE IN WORLD ENERGY 
MARKETS
3.2.1 TRENDS IN WORLD ENERGY MARKETS 
Oil and gas are the main sources of world 
primary energy supply (see Chart 34). Fossil 
fuels (coal, oil and gas) were the dominant 
source of energy in 2005, accounting for 81% 
of world primary energy supply. While oil as a 
percentage of primary energy resources declined 
from 43% in 1980 to 35% in 2005, the share of 
gas increased from 17% to 21%. Oil and gas 
together therefore still satisfy more than half 
of total global primary energy consumption. At 
the same time, coal accounted for 25%, nuclear 
energy for 6%, and hydro, biomass and waste 
and other renewables together for 13% of world 
primary energy supply (IEA, 2007). 
The IEA expects this world energy mix to 
remain fairly constant over the next 25 years. In 
terms of fossil fuels, the share of coal and gas in 
primary energy is expected to increase by 3 and 
1½ percentage points, respectively, whereas the 
share of oil should decline by 3½ percentage 
points. While the aggregate share of hydro, 
biomass and waste and other renewables 
should remain nearly constant, nuclear energy 
is expected to lose 1½ percentage points 
By Dominik Peschel (Deutsche Bundesbank). 81 
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(IEA, 2007). The remainder of Part 3 is based on 
the assumption that there will be no signiﬁ  cant 
changes in the primary energy mix in the 
foreseeable future.
Global oil production grew by 17% between 
1996 and 2006, with Middle Eastern oil 
producers, including GCC countries as a group, 
contributing signiﬁ   cantly to this increase 
(BP, 2007).83 In 2006, a total of nearly 82 million 
barrels of oil were produced per day, up from 
70 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 1996. The 
increase in Middle Eastern oil production 
somewhat outpaced that in the rest of the world 
(rising from about 20½ mb/d to about 
25½ mb/d). As a result, the region’s share in 
world production rose by 2 percentage points to 
about 31% (see Chart 35). GCC countries as a 
group still provide the lion’s share of crude oil 
production in the Middle East, even though – as 
a percentage of aggregate Middle Eastern 
production – their share declined slightly from 
74% in 1996 to 72% in 2006.
Looking forward, world oil production is 
expected to rise by another 41% (to 116 mb/d) 
until 2030 (Chart 36), driven by increases in 
the Middle East, Russia and Latin America 
(IEA, 2007). The increase is expected to be 
most pronounced in the OPEC countries of the 
Middle East. GCC countries’ production alone 
is set to rise from about 18½ mb/d to 27½ mb/d 
(IEA, 2006, 2007 and BP, 2007). Furthermore, 
Brazil and Russia should expand their oil 
According to the BP (2007) classiﬁ  cation, the six regional groups  83 
include – inter alia – the following major oil producing countries 
(with a share in world oil production of at least 1%): Middle East 
(Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE); Europe 
& Eurasia (Kazakhstan, Norway, Russia, United Kingdom); 
South & Central America (Brazil, Venezuela); Africa (Algeria, 
Angola, Libya, Nigeria); Asia-Paciﬁ  c (China, India, Indonesia); 
North America (United States, Canada, Mexico).
Chart 34 World primary energy mix 
1980-2030
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Source: IEA (2007).
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production, together adding some 3½ mb/d to 
global production (IEA, 2007). By contrast, 
production is expected to fall in North America 
and Western Europe, as oil ﬁ  elds mature. In the 
United States and Canada, conventional crude 
oil production is forecast to drop from 6½ mb/d 
in 2005 to below 5 mb/d in 2030. Even more 
pronounced, crude oil production in Europe (in 
particular, Norway and the United Kingdom) 
should decline from nearly 5 mb/d in 2005 to 
1½ mb/d in 2030 (IEA, 2006).
Looking at recent oil consumption, global oil 
demand grew strongly between 1996 and 2006, 
in particular, in North America, the Middle 
East and the Asia-Paciﬁ  c region. The strongest 
increase (+36%) was recorded in the Middle 
East, with consumption reaching nearly 6 mb/d 
in 2006. At the same time, oil consumption 
in the EU has remained constantly below 
15 mb/d over the past decade. Besides regional 
differences in economic growth, taxation and 
subsidies have an important effect on overall 
energy demand, energy efﬁ  ciency and the use 
of alternative energy sources. While taxation 
is high in many industrialised countries (in 
particular, in Europe), providing an incentive 
to raise energy efﬁ  ciency, subsidies on fuel and 
other oil derivatives are a prominent feature 
in many emerging market and developing 
countries, including oil producing countries. 
Looking forward, primary oil demand in the 
Middle East is forecast by the IEA (2007) to 
rise by 58% to 9½ mb/d in 2030 (see Chart 37), 
while it should remain constant in the EU at 
about 14 mb/d. North America’s primary oil 
demand is forecast to grow to 30 mb/d in 2030 
(+20%). Consumption by developing Asia will 
double by 2030, by which time it should exceed 
North America’s primary oil demand by nearly 
2 mb/d.
GCC countries’ primary energy demand, 
consisting of oil and increasingly of gas, is 
expected to more than double by 2030,84 given 
fast population growth and progress in 
diversifying GCC countries’ economies 
(see Box 6). Energy requirements for water 
desalination and power generation are expected 
to rise one-and-a-half-fold. In addition, energy 
demand for transport, as well as for industrial 
Compared with 2003, as included in IEA (2005). Data excludes  84 
Bahrain and Oman.
Chart 36 World oil supply 1980-2030























Sources: Calculations based on IEA (2006, 2007) and BP 
(2007). 
Note: Oil other than crude includes natural gas liquids, non-
conventional oil and processing gains. 
Chart 37 World primary oil demand 1980-2030






















Sources: IEA (2007) and BP (2007). 
Note: Oil demand as deﬁ  ned by the IEA includes crude oil, 
natural gas liquids, non-conventional oil and processing gains.60
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use will approximately double, the latter also 
reﬂ   ecting rising energy consumption by the 
newly established energy-intense aluminium 
industry in some GCC countries (IEA, 2005). 
Dependency on oil imports is high in the EU, the 
United States and China, and is projected to rise 
even further (IEA, 2006). In 2004, the oil 
dependency rate  85 of the EU was 79%. Oil, 
including oil derivatives, and gas accounted for 
37% and 24% of energy consumption in the EU, 
respectively, followed by coal (18%), nuclear 
energy (15%), and renewable energy (6%) 
(Destatis, 2006). The EU’s oil-import dependency 
rate is expected to reach 92% in 2030, mainly 
reﬂ   ecting the depletion of oil reserves in the 
North Sea, while demand is expected to remain 
virtually constant. In the United States, 64% of 
oil consumption was imported (net) in 2004; in 
2030, this share is expected to rise to 74%, 
reﬂ   ecting both increased demand and lower 
domestic production. IEA estimates also suggest 
that China’s oil import dependency rate will 
climb to 77% in 2030, up from 46% in 2004. As 
in other dynamic emerging market economies, 
the increase in China’s dependency on oil 
imports is mainly caused by a strong increase in 
fuel consumption.
The tripling of crude oil prices since the 
beginning of 2003 may necessitate a reassessment 
of demand and supply projections. In early 2008, 
the oil price hit USD 100 per barrel, bringing it 
close to its all-time high of 1979 in real terms. 
While OPEC’s oil supply assessment is based 
on an implicit price target in the range of USD 
60-70 (IMF, 2007g), most observers expect that 
the price of oil and oil derivatives will remain at 
an elevated level and may increase even further 
both in nominal and real terms. This could lead to 
signiﬁ  cant changes in future demand and supply 
patterns. At the same time, experience suggests 
that the price of oil, like the price of other 
commodities and raw materials, has a strong 
cyclical component. Moreover, the oil price has 
frequently been subject to various shocks on the 
supply side, including natural disasters, political 
developments in major oil-producing countries 
and geopolitical tensions.
To sum up: Available projections indicate that 
oil is likely to remain key in meeting increasing 
world energy demand, mainly driven by 
emerging market economies and oil producers, 
including the GCC countries themselves. Middle 
Eastern countries in general and the GCC 
region in particular are likely to remain pivotal 
to providing the world economy with oil in the 
future, as oil import dependency is expected 
to increase in mature and emerging market 
economies as a result of rising consumption and/
or the exhaustion of domestic deposits. This 
second factor is particularly relevant to Europe, 
where oil import dependency is likely to rise 
signiﬁ  cantly despite stagnating oil consumption.
3.2.2 OIL SUBSTITUTION AND GAINS IN 
EFFICIENCY
High oil prices create incentives for the 
production of oil substitutes and for advancing 
energy efﬁ   ciency. The increasing scarcity of 
easy-to-exploit crude oil and the correspondingly 
higher prices will drive innovation and new 
technology towards generating crude oil 
substitutes, as well as the exploitation of 
previously unattainable reserves. In this context, 
a number of substitutes for crude oil have 
received increasing attention. These include both 
alternative fossil sources (Canadian oil sands 
and synthetic oil generated from gas or coal) 
and renewable sources (biofuels). If available 
on a signiﬁ  cant scale at competitive prices, these 
substitutes could supplement conventional oil 
supply, thereby mitigating the upward pressure 
on oil prices. In addition, further technological 
innovations in energy efﬁ   ciency have the 
potential to generate signiﬁ  cant energy savings 
in the future. Increasing energy efﬁ  ciency – in 
particular, in developing countries, transition 
economies, as well as in North America – is 
a potentially important factor for containing 
energy demand. For example, in its projections 
the IEA (2007) assumes that there will be a 
decline in global energy intensity – i.e. higher 
energy efﬁ  ciency – of about 1.8% per year over 
the period 2005-2030. 
Net oil imports including oil derivatives as a percentage of  85 
consumption.61
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However, the impact of synthetic oil generated 
from coal or gas, as well as oil stemming from 
oil sands is likely to be modest in the foreseeable 
future. The overall market share of these 
non-conventional oils is estimated to represent 
about 8% of world oil supplies in 2030, up from 
slightly more than 2% in 2006 (IEA, 2007). 
Production costs for the exploitation of oil sand or 
synthetic oil are currently high. For the integrated 
mining of Canadian oil sand, the current costs of 
producing synthetic crude are about USD 33 per 
barrel (IEA, 2006). Without further technological 
progress, it seems unlikely that oil derived 
from oil sand will reach a volume which could 
compensate for crude oil to a signiﬁ  cant degree. 
The output stemming from Canadian oil sands 
is estimated by the IEA (2006) to be close to 
5 mb/d in 2030. For the time being, the impact 
of synthetic oil obtained from natural gas or coal 
via Gas-To-Liquids (GTLs) or Coal-To-Liquids 
(CTLs) processes on overall oil supply also 
appears to be limited. Non-OPEC production 
of oil from CTLs and GTLs is only expected to 
reach 1.5 mb/d and 0.5 mb/d, respectively, by 
2030, with most of the supply coming from the 
United States and China (OPEC, 2007). 
Biofuels currently replace only a small fraction 
of gasoline derived from oil, and options for 
signiﬁ  cantly increasing biofuel production are 
limited. Biofuels – bioethanol and biodiesel – 
are deﬁ  ned as raw biomass processed into a 
more convenient form, which can be used as 
fuel. World production of biofuels was about 
0.7 mb/d in 2005 and is based predominantly 
on grain, sugar or oil crops. In 2006, Brazil and 
the United States produced more than 80% of 
world output in bioethanol (and had nearly the 
same share of world consumption), while at the 
same time 88% of world biodiesel output was 
produced in Europe (OPEC, 2007). Biofuel is 
not a complete substitute for fuels since it must 
be mixed with conventional petrol. Moreover, 
since technologies for processing crops for 
biofuel production are well established, further 
process optimisation in this area is currently 
not in sight. In addition, the expansion of 
biofuel production – implying a large scale 
replacement of food production – has a 
potentially serious humanitarian impact. There 
have already been calls for a moratorium on 
biofuel production in order to reduce food 
shortages caused by the substitution of 
farmland with land dedicated to grow crops 
with biofuel.86 
As a result, further technical progress in energy 
efﬁ  ciency remains key to reducing the use of 
crude oil, in particular, in the automotive sector. 
Unlike energy consumption for industrial 
purposes, energy demand in the transport sector 
is still nearly exclusively (94%) covered by oil 
(IEA, 2007). The IEA (2007) estimates that 
oil demand for transportation purposes will 
grow at an annual rate of 1.7% over the period 
2005-2030. Since oil demand grows with higher 
rates of motorisation, the IEA (2007) expects 
nearly half of the increase in oil demand for 
transport purposes to come from China and 
India, where rates of motorisation are still 
relatively low. 
E.g. Jean Ziegler, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food,  86 
as quoted in FAZ, 17 October 2007.
Box 5
OIL QUALITIES, REFINERY CAPACITIES AND OIL PRICES
Oil characteristics are crucial for the reﬁ  nery process since heavy and sour crude oils require 
more complex and costly reﬁ  ning. Oil can be deﬁ  ned by its degree of sulphur content and by 
its gravity. Heavy oil refers to crude that has a high gravity per volumetric metre; sour oil has 
relatively high sulphur content per unit. Oil is classiﬁ  ed by the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) as heavy if the so-called API gravity is below 30 degrees and intermediate if it is between 62
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To sum up: While there is potential to raise oil 
production derived from crude oil substitutes 
(oil sand, synthetic oil, biofuels) and gain 
further efﬁ   ciency in oil usage, without any 
major technological breakthrough in energy 
production and energy saving (which cannot 
be ruled out), crude oil and oil derivatives can 
be expected to play a dominant role in meeting 
rising energy demand in the foreseeable future.
3.2.3 GCC COUNTRIES’ POTENTIAL TO 
ACCOMMODATE INCREASING 
ENERGY DEMAND
Existing oil reserves place GCC countries in a 
unique position in terms of covering future oil 
demand. According to BP (2007), proven oil 
reserves comprised 1.2 trillion barrels worldwide 
in 2006, of which the Middle East holds 61% 
(see  Chart 38). Two-thirds of Middle Eastern 
reserves are located in GCC countries. Hence, 
the GCC countries own approximately 40% of 
the world’s oil reserves. In addition, Qatar holds 
14% of world proven gas reserves (see Box 6 
for details). While oil reserves, as well as their 
projected depletion rates, differ signiﬁ  cantly 
among GCC economies, GCC countries as a group 
have by far the largest share of the world’s proven 
oil reserves. However, these oil reserves are of 
lower quality (heavier and more sour; see Box 5) 
and are therefore more costly to process.
Despite higher processing costs for lower 
quality crude oil, the cost of exploiting 
oil reserves in GCC countries is relatively 
low compared with other oil rich regions. 
Exploration and exploitation costs are rising 
globally, as easy to explore and easy to deploy 
oil ﬁ  elds are becoming scarce and the rates of 
return for existing ﬁ  elds are declining. In the 
GCC region, however, oil extraction costs 
per barrel are still low, ranging from below 
USD 2 in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to USD 
12 in Oman (Ibrahim, 2007). In addition, oil 
ﬁ  nding costs in Saudi Arabia are estimated to 
be among the lowest worldwide. On balance, 
GCC oil producing countries are likely to 
remain highly competitive in providing oil 
and oil derivatives.
GCC countries’ investments in the exploration 
and development of oil are estimated to grow 
signiﬁ  cantly. The IEA (2005) projects an increase 
in GCC oil producing countries’ investment 
from USD 39 billion for the period 2004-2010 
to USD 90 billion between 2010 and 2020, 
climbing to USD 131 billion between 2020 and 
2030. However, the comparatively low costs of 
oil exploration and development mean that the 
GCC countries’ total investments will represent 
less than one-tenth of global investment over the 
period 2004-2030 (IEA, 2006).
30 and 40 degrees. Heavy, sour crude oil requires additional and more complex distillation to 
turn it into light, low-sulphur products. However, currently only 18% of global reﬁ  ning capacity 
can handle complex reﬁ  ning (IMF, 2007g).
Heavier and sourer oil is predominant in the Middle East and Russia where most of the future 
production increase will take place (IEA, 2006). At present, heavy or sour crude oil represents 
54%, intermediate crude 26% and light crude 20% of world production (IMF, 2007g). The 
world’s crude oil production is going to become heavier and more sour as North American and 
European oil ﬁ  elds, where light crude is prevalent, mature. 
A shortage of overall reﬁ  nery capacity, as well as a mismatch between the structure of reﬁ  ning 
plants and the rising demand for light petroleum products has contributed to the recent oil 
price increase (Fattouh, 2006). The price differential between light sweet crude oil (e.g. WTI) 
and heavy sour crude oils (e.g. Dubai’s Fateh) is substantial, reaching a maximum of almost 
USD 16 per barrel for WTI at the end of 2004. Since 2005, the spread has noticeably diminished 
to values of USD 9 per barrel at the very maximum. Although they ﬂ  uctuate widely, a signiﬁ  cant 
fall in spreads indicates an improvement in reﬁ  nery capacity for heavier and sourer crude oil.63
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As a result, GCC countries’ share in global oil 
supply should increase to 24% (or 27½ mb/d) 
by 2030. Approximately one-ﬁ   fth of GCC 
countries’ oil production in 2030 is expected 
to come from ﬁ   elds currently awaiting 
development; about another ﬁ   fth is projected 
to come from reserve additions and new 
discoveries (IEA, 2005). The aggregate market 
share of the Middle Eastern oil producers is 
estimated to increase to 39% (IEA, 2007). This 
results partly from an expected strong increase 
in Iraq’s oil production (IEA, 2006). 
Saudi Arabia – and to a lesser degree the UAE 
and Kuwait – are among the few countries in 
the world which hold spare capacity in crude oil 
production on a signiﬁ  cant scale. According to 
the IEA (2008), OPEC effective spare capacity 
was 2.2 mb/d in December 2007, of which 80% 
was held by Saudi Arabia. Even though Saudi 
Arabia ofﬁ  cially relinquished its role as OPEC’s 
swing producer in the middle of the 1980s, it 
accommodates oil demand in periods of tight 
world supply through higher oil production. 
According to some observers, Saudi Arabia 
still seems to be willing and should be able to 
maintain a volume of spare capacity of 2-3 mb/d 
(Fattouh, 2006). 
On a global scale, there is currently a signiﬁ  cant 
lack of reﬁ   nery capacity. Increasing reﬁ  nery 
capacities are pivotal to meeting the growing 
demand for gasoline and other oil derivatives. 
In addition, existing reﬁ  ning capacities must be 
upgraded in order to meet demand for higher 
quality oil derivatives as China and India – 
among other countries – are progressively 
tightening their fuel quality standards and 
adopting Euro-standards for transport fuels 
(OPEC, 2007). Furthermore, as noted above 
(see Box 5), available crude oil is becoming 
heavier and more sour, while demand for light 
and middle distillates is on the increase. At 
the same time, current reﬁ  nery  bottlenecks 
are likely to remain in place for some time 
to come:
• Expanding distillation capacity takes 
time and is uncertain. The lead time for a 
reﬁ  nery project is from four to ﬁ  ve years. 
Chart 38 Proven oil reserves in 2006, worldwide and in the GCC countries
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Note: GCC data reﬂ  ect reserve levels of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.64
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Additionally, not every announced capacity 
expansion actually takes place (OPEC, 
2007). The Middle East is seen by OPEC 
(2007) to account for 2.6 mb/d out of 
7.4 mb/d in distillation capacity additions 
over the period 2006-2012. These overall 
additions equate to one-tenth of current 
global distillation capacity (IEA, 2008).
•  Implementation of planned projects to 
alleviate reﬁ   nery shortages is subject to 
some degree of uncertainty. A lack of 
skilled labour and rising material costs 
could delay projects, while environmental 
concerns can raise investment costs 
signiﬁ  cantly. Moreover, uncertainty about 
future returns can discourage investors 
as margins in the reﬁ   nery business have 
been low in recent decades and have only 
recently been improving (IMF, 2007g).
•  The US reﬁ   nery bottleneck is expected 
to continue. In the United States, no 
new reﬁ   neries have been built since the 
late 1970s, reﬂ  ecting  environmental 
restrictions, while local demand is growing 
(IMF, 2007g). 
GCC countries continue to invest in reﬁ  nery 
capacity. In 2030, GCC countries’ reﬁ  nery 
capacity should reach 7.3 mb/d,  87 which will 
then represent about 6% of world capacity 
(117.8 mb/d). Saudi Arabia’s total reﬁ  nery 
capacity alone should more than double by 
2030, reaching 4.5 mb/d (IEA, 2005). The aim 
of the capacity expansions in the oil producing 
GCC countries is to increase the processing of 
domestic heavy crude oils, which have been 
most difﬁ  cult to place on the market in recent 
years owing to limited availability of the 
necessary complex reﬁ  nery capacity, as well 
as the demand for light products (OPEC, 
2007). Signiﬁ  cant reﬁ  nery capacity increases 
will also take place in neighbouring MENA 
countries  88 where capacity will reach 16 mb/d 
in 2030 (IEA, 2005). By comparison, the EU’s 
reﬁ  nery capacity was about 15 mb/d in 2006 
(BP, 2007). 
Growing oil demand increases the need for 
higher oil transport capacity. Leaving aside oil 
pipelines, long distance oil transport is projected 
to require a total tanker ﬂ  eet with a deadweight 
tonnage of 460 million by 2020, which is 
100 million deadweight tons more than at the 
end of 2006 (OPEC, 2007). Since 2001, there 
has been an increase in new tanker deliveries 
and order books are ﬁ  lled until 2009. Therefore, 
reﬁ  nery capacity – and not transport capacity – 
most likely remains the limiting factor. 
To sum up: Substantial oil reserves – 40% of 
the world total – place the GCC countries in a 
unique position to cover future oil demand at 
competitive production costs. Moreover, they 
are among the few countries with spare capacity 
in oil production. Exploration and exploitation 
costs, though rising globally, are relatively 
low in GCC countries, which are expected 
to signiﬁ   cantly raise investment spending 
on oil exploration and the development 
of new oil ﬁ   elds. GCC countries will also 
contribute to mitigating the current shortage of 
reﬁ  nery capacity. 
Data excludes Oman and Bahrain. 87 
According to the IEA deﬁ   nition, the MENA region includes  88 
Middle Eastern countries (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen) 
and North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
Tunisia).65
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3.3   TRADE AND TRADE POLICY IN THE GCC 
COUNTRIES
3.3.1 TRADE PATTERNS
As oil revenues increased, GCC countries’ trade 
in goods more than doubled between 2003 and 
2006. During the same period, GCC countries’ 
share in world trade rose from 1.9% to 2.7% 
(IMF, DOTS database). In 1990, total exports in 
goods were USD 86 billion, at the end of the 
1990s they reached USD 110 billion and grew 
to USD 422 billion in 2006. Imports amounted 
to USD 48 billion back in 1990, reaching 
USD 82 billion at the end of the 1990s and 
USD 238 billion in 2006. In 2006, the gap 
between exports and imports reached USD 
184 billion.89 As already mentioned, oil 
accounted for 70% of total exports over the 
period 2003-2007. At the same time, GCC 
countries mainly import machinery and 
mechanical appliances, vehicles and parts as 
well as electrical machinery and equipment 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 2005). 
Studying the GCC countries’ global trade 
patterns, Asia is the predominant destination for 
GCC countries’ exports in goods, while the EU 
accounts for nearly one-third of GCC imports. 
In 2006, nearly 60% of GCC economies’ exports 
were shipped to Asia, while the EU (and the 
United States) accounted for only a small part 
(see Chart 39). Japan alone accounted for 21% 
of GCC economies’ aggregate exports. GCC 
economies’ exports to South Korea were nearly 
twice as high as exports to China and exceeded 
those shipped to the EU. With 81% of its oil 
imports stemming from the GCC countries 
No appropriate statistics are available for services. 89 
Box 6
GCC COUNTRIES’ CONTRIBUTION TO MEETING WORLD GAS DEMAND
While the GCC countries as a group own about 23% of global gas reserves, their gas production 
is signiﬁ  cantly less than one-tenth of current global production (BP, 2007). Qatar is the only 
GCC country with signiﬁ  cant gas reserves on a global scale, accounting for 14% of the world’s 
natural gas reserves.1 Saudi Arabia has a share of 3.9% of global gas reserves, the UAE account 
for another 3.3%. Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait together have a share of less than 2%. Annual 
growth in world gas production is projected to be 2.1% between 2005 and 2030, reaching nearly 
4.8 trillion cubic metres (tcm) in 2030, up from less than 2.9 tcm in 2005 (IEA, 2007). Over 
the period 2004-2030, GCC countries are expected to invest around USD 120 billion in gas 
exploration and development, with Qatar being the main investor, contributing more than half of 
total GCC investments. Qatar is expected to be the only net gas exporter among GCC countries 
in 2030; net gas exports are estimated to increase from 19 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2003 to 
152 bcm in 2030, accounting for nearly 5% and 16% of world gas trade, respectively (IEA 2005, 
2006).2
Gas is expected to bear the brunt of the rise in primary energy demand within the GCC 
countries. This is partly caused by the GCC economies’ efforts at strengthening their position 
in the world aluminium market by taking advantage of their comparative cost advantage in the 
energy-intensive aluminium production business. While energy represents 38% of total costs 
for a smelter in China, the equivalent ﬁ  gure for Saudi Arabia is 7% given cheap domestic gas, 
which is mainly conveyed as a by-product (Saudi British Bank as reported in FT, Special Report, 
October 9, 2007). In addition, gas is used for domestic power generation and water desalination.
The world’s largest gas reserves are located in Russia (26.3%) and Iran (15.5%). 1 
For GCC countries (excluding Bahrain and Oman), the latest available data is for 2003 or 2004, as included in IEA (2005). 2 66
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(BP, 2007), Japan’s share in GCC countries’ 
exports was larger than those of the 
United States and the EU together. By contrast, 
Asia (including Japan) accounted for only 
one-third of GCC countries’ imports. 
The GCC is currently the EU’s ﬁ  fth largest export 
market and the EU is the main trading partner of 
the GCC countries. Focusing on bilateral 
EU-GCC trade in goods,90 the GCC countries’ 
exports to the EU added up to USD 42 billion or 
10% of total exports in 2006 (see Chart 40), mainly 
consisting of mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials (72%). At the same time, exports from 
the EU to GCC countries as a group amounted to 
Data on the EU-GCC trade structure is taken from Eurostat.  90 
Regarding trade in services, the EU in 2005 exported services 
(excluding government services) in the value of €13.2 billion to 
the GCC countries, which in turn exported services in the value of 
€7.4 billion to the EU, according to Eurostat data.
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USD 74 billion (4.6% of the EU’s total exports), 
as European exporters have been among the main 
beneﬁ   ciaries of GCC countries’ increasing oil 
revenues. Machinery and transport equipment 
accounted for more than half of the EU’s total 
exports to GCC countries, followed by 
manufactured goods, which accounted for roughly 
one quarter. On balance, the EU has been 
registering an increasing trade surplus with the 
GCC area (see Chart 40), partly because the entire 
Middle East, including GCC oil producing 
countries, accounted for only 24% of Europe’s oil 
imports in 2006, while the oil-producing countries 
of the former Soviet Union accounted for 44% and 
North Africa for another 14% (BP, 2007). 
Intraregional trade among the GCC economies 
is relatively limited at around 6% of total 
imports and exports. This is signiﬁ  cantly lower 
than in other regional trading blocs, such as the 
EU or NAFTA. The low degree of regional trade 
integration is mainly on account of the 
dominance of hydrocarbons in GCC countries’ 
external trade. Taking into account non-oil trade 
only, the share of intra-GCC trade rises to 
one-third (Jadresic, 2002) 91 and can be expected 
to increase in line with economic diversiﬁ  cation 
and regional integration in the GCC (Sturm and 
Siegfried, 2005).
To sum up: In US dollar terms, GCC countries’ 
exports and imports have been rising 
signiﬁ   cantly in recent years, reﬂ  ecting  the 
increase in global oil prices. While the bulk of 
exports consist of oil and oil derivatives, GCC 
countries’ imports are dominated by machinery 
and mechanical appliances, vehicles and parts, 
electrical machinery and equipment. Most of 
GCC countries’ imports originate in Europe, 
while exports are strongly oriented towards 
Japan and Emerging Asia. At the same time, 
the entire Middle East, including GCC oil 
producing countries, accounted for only 24% 
of Europe’s oil imports in 2006. As a result, 
the EU is the only major region in the world 
to have a trade surplus with the GCC countries 
as a group. Intra-GCC trade is still limited, but 
is expected to expand with further progress in 
diversifying GCC countries’ economies and 
regional integration.
3.3.2  INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
The GCC is expanding its role as a regional 
trading hub. In recent years, GCC countries have 
invested substantially in physical infrastructure, 
including roads, ports and airports. These 
investments are now increasingly bearing fruit. 
Improvements in physical infrastructure have 
been accompanied by remarkable efforts at 
trade facilitation. GCC countries have formed 
a customs union, which came into effect at 
the beginning of 2003.92 Furthermore, at the 
beginning of 2008, the GCC common market 
was launched, which allows, in particular, for 
the free movement of labour (for GCC countries’ 
citizens) and the free movement of capital. 
The GCC region’s role in regional and 
international trade could be further strengthened 
by improving trade facilitation. The GCC 
countries’ future role as a regional trading hub 
will depend not only on the quality of physical 
trade infrastructure, but also on a competitive 
legal and institutional framework. According 
to World Bank data, GCC countries are 
Jadresic’s calculation bases on data for the middle of the 1990s. 91 
This customs union has a common external tariff with three levels.  92 
A 5% tariff rate applies to most commodities, however a zero rate 
applies to 419 commodities including ﬁ  sh, meat, vegetables, fruit, 
sugar, and medical items. In addition, selected higher tariff rates 
apply to a number of restricted or protected products (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005).
Chart 40 EU-GCC bilateral trade 1990-2006
(USD billions)
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Source: IMF, DOTS database. 
Note: Imports (c.i.f.), exports (f.o.b.).68
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already highly competitive in terms of import 
and export costs (see Table 7). However, 
the number of documents needed for export 
and import transactions, while being lower 
than in neighbouring Middle Eastern and 
North African countries and in South Asia, is 
substantially higher than the OECD average. 
Moreover, import and export clearing is much 
more time-consuming than in OECD countries. 
By and large, trade indicators show that the 
GCC countries have an advantage over South 
Asian countries in terms of import and export 
facilitation, but still lag signiﬁ  cantly behind the 
OECD average. 
The GCC is currently negotiating a number 
of free trade agreements (FTAs). Negotiation 
partners include the EU, Japan, China, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Australia and India.93 In 
addition, a US-Middle East Free Trade Area 
(US-MEFTA) is currently under negotiation, 
which covers a broader range of Middle Eastern 
countries. In the case of US-MEFTA, the GCC 
countries are pursuing a “go alone” policy, 
whereby each country negotiates separately with 
the United States (Fiorentino et al., 2007). 
EU-GCC talks on a FTA have been underway 
for nearly 20 years. FTA negotiations started in 
1990, but came to a standstill following the 
decision of the GCC in 1999 to move towards a 
customs union. In March 2002, negotiations 
resumed and are still ongoing. In a recent press 
release, the EU pointed out that “[l]ike other EU 
FTAs under the Global Europe framework, an 
agreement with the GCC countries aims to build 
on WTO agreements and deepen progressive 
and reciprocal liberalisation of trade in goods 
and services. It aims to foster economic 
integration between the parties and develop 
rules on investment, intellectual property rights, 
rules of origin and public procurement. The 
agreement would also cover political issues such 
as human rights, illegal immigration and the 
ﬁ  ght against terrorism.”  94 
To sum up: GCC countries have made substantial 
investments to establish themselves as a regional 
trade hub. While the physical infrastructure has 
been upgraded, further progress is needed in the 
area of trade facilitation. In terms of institutional 
trade links and integration, all GCC countries 
have now become WTO members. Moreover, 
FTA agreements are currently being negotiated 
with several countries and regions, including 
with the EU, which might further contribute to 
the GCC countries’ integration into the world 
economy. 
See Australian Government, www.dfat.gov.au/trade/fta/gcc/ 93 
agcc-fta-study.html.
See EU press release http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/ 94 
january/tradoc_133087.pdf dated 12 January 2007.



























Kuwait 8 20 935 11 20 935 99
Oman 10 22 665 10 26 824 104
Saudi Arabia 5 19 1,008 5 20 758 33
UAE 7 13 462 8 13 462 24
Average GCC 7.5 18.5 767.5 8.5 19.75 744.75 ---
Middle East & 
North Africa 7.1 24.8 992.2 8 28.7 1,128.90  ---
OECD 4.5 9.8 905 5 10.4 986.1 ---
South Asia 8.6 32.5 1,179.90 9.1 32.1 1,417.90 ---
Source: World Bank, Doing Business database 2008.
Note: No rankings for Bahrain and Qatar; GCC average without Bahrain and Qatar.69
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GCC countries are major players in global oil 
markets in terms of current production and the 
availability of spare capacity. As they hold 
about 40% of global oil reserves, they are 
likely to remain pivotal to providing the world 
economy with oil in the future. To this end, 
they are raising investment spending on oil 
exploration and the development of new oil 
ﬁ  elds, as they beneﬁ  t from comparatively low 
costs in exploiting oil reserves, notwithstanding 
the lower quality of GCC countries’ crude oil. In 
addition, GCC countries are active in mitigating 
oil reﬁ  nery capacity bottlenecks. 
Global oil demand is being driven mainly 
by growth in emerging market economies. 
Moreover, in Europe, as well as in the United 
States, the depletion of reserves will increase oil 
import dependency, raising the importance of 
external providers, including GCC oil producing 
countries, in meeting domestic demand. Other 
sources of energy, including substitutes for crude 
oil, such as oil sand, synthetic oil and biofuels, 
as well as progress in raising energy efﬁ  ciency 
may dampen global demand for crude oil, in 
particular, in an environment of elevated oil 
prices. However, without major technological 
breakthroughs in energy production and/or 
energy savings, crude oil and oil derivatives will 
continue to play the dominant role in meeting 
rising global energy demand in the foreseeable 
future.
GCC countries’ trade has risen substantially in 
recent years, driven by higher oil prices, with 
exports and imports differing substantially in 
terms of the structure of goods traded and the 
geographical pattern of trade. While the bulk 
of GCC countries’ exports consist of oil and 
oil derivatives, their imports are dominated by 
machinery and mechanical appliances, vehicles 
and parts, electrical machinery and equipment. 
The EU is the GCC’s main trading partner, 
as most GCC countries’ imports originate in 
Europe. By contrast, GCC exports – mainly 
consisting of oil and oil derivatives – are 
strongly oriented towards Japan and emerging 
Asia, while Europe’s oil imports originate 
mainly from oil-producing countries in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and 
North Africa and only to a smaller degree from 
the Middle East, including GCC countries. As 
a result, the EU is the only major region in the 
world to have a trade surplus with the GCC 
countries as a group. 
GCC countries have made substantial 
investments to establish themselves as a regional 
trade hub. While the physical infrastructure has 
been upgraded, further progress is needed in the 
area of trade facilitation. In terms of institutional 
trade links and integration, all GCC countries 
have now become WTO members. Moreover, 
FTAs are currently being negotiated with several 
countries and regions, including with the EU, 
which might further contribute to the GCC 
countries’ integration into the world economy.70
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abed, G.T., S.N. Erbas, and B. Guerami (2003): “The GCC Monetary Union: some considerations 
for the exchange rate regime”, IMF Working Paper 03/66, Washington, D.C.
Ahrend, R., P. Catte and R. Price (2006): “Factors behind low long-term interest rates”, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, no. 490, Paris.
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2005): More than oil: Economic Developments 
in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, Canberra.
Auty, R. M. and A. H. Gelb (2001): “Political economy of resource-abundant states” in R. M. Auty 
(ed.), Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Bank for International Settlements (2005): “The international banking market”, in BIS Quarterly 
Review, December 2005.
Bank for International Settlements (2006): “The international banking market”, in BIS Quarterly 
Review, March 2006.
Bank for International Settlements (2007a): “The international banking market”, in: BIS Quarterly 
Review, June 2007.
Bank for International Settlements (2007b): “The international banking market”, in BIS Quarterly 
Review, September 2007.
Bank for International Settlements (2007c): “Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange 
and Derivatives Market Activity in April 2007 – Preliminary global results”, September 2007.
Barnett, S. and R. Ossowski (2002): “Operational aspects of ﬁ  scal policy in oil-producing countries”, 
IMF Working Paper WP/02/177, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C.
Barrel, R. and N. Pain (1997): “Foreign Direct Investment, Technological Change, and Economic 
Growth within Europe”, Economic Journal, vol. 107, pp. 1770-1786.
Barrell, R. and O. Pomerantz (2004): “Oil prices and the world economy”, in Focus on European 
Economic Integration, 1/2004, Oesterreichische Nationalbank.
BP (2007): Statistical Review of World Energy, London.
Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (2005): “Recent shifts in ﬁ  nancing the US current account deﬁ  cit”, 
CBO Economic and Budget Issue Brief, 12 July 2005.
Creane, S., R. Goyal, M. Mobarak and R. Sab (2003): “Financial development in the Middle East 
and North Africa”, IMF External Relations Department material, International Monetary Fund: 
Washington, D.C. 71
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Davies, J., J. Ossowski, J. Daniel and S. Barnett (2001): “Stabilisation and Savings Funds for 
Nonrenewable Resources: Experiences and Policy Implications”, IMF Occasional Paper, 
no. 205, Washington, D.C. 
Destatis (2006): In the Spotlight - Germany in the European Union 2006, Wiesbaden.
Deutsche Bank (2007): Bond Market Guide – Introduction to Sukuk, London, 30 August 2007.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2005): “Global and European setting”, in Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report, May 2005.
Dooley, M. P., D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber (2003): “An essay on the revived Bretton Woods 
System”, NBER Working Paper 9971, Cambridge, MA.
Euromoney (2006): “Money and mystery: ADIA unveils its secrets”, 1 April 2006.
European Central Bank (2005): “Economic and monetary developments”, in ECB Monthly Bulletin 
July 2005.
European Central Bank (2007a): “Economic and monetary developments”, in ECB Monthly 
Bulletin April 2007.
European Central Bank (2007b): “Oil-exporting countries: Key structural features, economic 
developments and oil revenue recycling”, in ECB Monthly Bulletin July 2007.
European Central Bank (2007c): Financial Stability Review, December, Frankfurt/M.
European Commission (2006): “Recycling of oil-exporting countries’ oil revenues: more beneﬁ  cial 
to the euro area than in the past”, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, vol. 5, no. 3/2006.
European Commission (2007): Migration to the EU: main determinants and economic impact, Note 
to the attention of the EPC, mimeo, Brussels.
Fasano, U. and Z. Iqbal (2003): “GCC Countries: From oil dependence to diversiﬁ  cation”, IMF 
External Relations Department material, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C.
Fattouh, B. (2006): “Spare capacity and oil price dynamics”, Middle East Economic Survey, 
vol. 49, no. 5.
Fiorentino, R.V., C. Toqueboeuf and L. Verdeja (2007): “The Changing Landscape of Regional 
Trade Agreements: 2006 Update”, WTO Discussion Paper, no. 12, Geneva.
GulfTalent (2005): Gulf Compensation Trends 2005, Dubai.
GulfTalent (2006a): Gulf Compensation Trends 2006, Dubai.
GulfTalent (2006b): Pay, Inﬂ  ation & Mobility in the Gulf, Dubai.
GulfTalent (2007): Gulf Compensation Trends 2007, Dubai.72
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
Hatton, T.J. and J.G. Williamson (2002): “What fundamentals drive world migration?”, NBER 
Working Paper 9159, Cambridge, MA.
Higgins, M., T. Klitgaard and R. Lerman (2006): “Recycling petrodollars”, in Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 12, no. 9, December 2006.
Ibrahim, Badr El Din A. (2007): Economic Cooperation in the Gulf, Issues in the economies of the 
Arab Gulf co-operation council states, Routledge: London and New York.
Institute of International Finance (2007a): GCC country reports, Washington, D.C.
Institute of International Finance (2007b): Tracking GCC Petrodollars: How and where they 
are invested around the world, Regional Brieﬁ   ng Gulf Cooperation Council, 31 May, 
Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund (2006): “Oil prices and global imbalances”, in World Economic 
Outlook, April 2006.
International Monetary Fund (2007a): “The role of ﬁ  scal institutions in managing the oil revenue 
boom”, 5 March 2007.
International Monetary Fund (2007b): “Changes in the international investor base and implications 
for ﬁ  nancial stability”, in Global Financial Stability Report, April 2007.
International Monetary Fund (2007c): Staff report on the multilateral consultation on global 
imbalances with China, the Euro Area, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, 29 June, 
Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund (2007d): “Assessing risks to global ﬁ  nancial stability”, in Global 
Financial Stability Report, September 2007.
International Monetary Fund (2007e): “IMF Executive Board concludes 2007 Article IV Consultation 
with Saudi Arabia”, Public Information Notice (PIN) No 07/131, 23 October 2007.
International Monetary Fund (2007f): Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, 
October, Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund (2007g): World Economic Outlook, autumn 2007, and database, 
Washington, D.C.
International Energy Agency (2005): World Energy Outlook 2005, Middle East and North Africa 
Insights, Paris.
International Energy Agency (2006): World Energy Outlook 2006, Paris.
International Energy Agency (2007): World Energy Outlook 2007, China and India Insights, Paris.
International Energy Agency (2008): Oil Market Report, January, Paris.73
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jadresic, E. (2002): On a common currency for GCC countries, IMF Policy Discussion Paper 02/12, 
Washington, D.C.
Jen, S. (2007): “How big could sovereign wealth funds be by 2015?”, Morgan Stanley Research 
Global, 3 May 2007.
Karl, T. (1997): The paradox of plenty: Oil-booms and petro-states, University of California Press: 
Berkeley.
Lubin, D. (2007): “Petrodollars, emerging markets and vulnerability”, Citigroup Economic and 
Market Analysis, 19 March 2007.
Magnus, G. (2006): “Petrodollars: Where are they and do they matter?”, UBS Investment Research – 
Economic Insights, 19 July 2006.
Malaeb, M. (2006): Diversiﬁ  cation of the GCC economies: Analysis of the preceding debate 
1993-2003, Gulf Research Centre: Dubai.
McCown, T. A., L. C. Plantier and J. Weeks (2006): “Petrodollars and global imbalances”, 
Department of Treasury Ofﬁ  ce of International Affairs Occasional Paper, no. 1, February 2006, 
Washington, D.C.
Moody’s (2008): “Arabian Gulf corporate bond market: 2007 review and 2008 outlook”, Moody’s 
global corporate ﬁ  nance – special comment.
O’Neill, J. (2007): “Sovereign wealth funds highlight the changing world – and the need for more”, 
Goldman Sachs Global Economics Weekly, Issue no. 07/38, 7 November 2007.
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2006): Annual Statistical Bulletin, Vienna.
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2007): World Oil Outlook 2007, Vienna.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005): OECD Economic Outlook 
no. 78, December 2005, Paris.
Rodríguez, F. and J. Sachs (1999): “Why do resource-abundant economies grow more slowly?”, 
Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 4, pp. 277-303.
Ruiz, J. and J. Vilarubia (2007): “International recycling of petrodollars”, Banco de España 
Occasional Paper, no. 0605/2006, Madrid.
Sachs, J. and A. Warner (1995): “Natural resource abundance and economic growth” NBER 
Working Paper 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research: Washington, D.C.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2007): 
„Beschränkung des Beteiligungserwerbs durch ausländische Investoren?“, in Jahresgutachten 
2007/2008.74
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
Setser, B. (2007a): “Oil and global adjustment”, 26 March 2007, http://www.iie.com/publications/
pb/pb07-4/setser.pdf.
Setser, B. (2007b): “The case for exchange rate ﬂ  exibility in oil-exporting economies”, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief November, Washington, D.C.
Setser, B. and R. Ziemba (2007a): “What do we know about the size and composition of oil 
investment funds?”, RGE monitor, April 2007, New York.
Setser, B. and R. Ziemba (2007b): “Understanding the new ﬁ  nancial superpower – The management 
of GCC ofﬁ  cial foreign assets”, RGE monitor, December 2007, Washington, D.C.
Shabsigh, G. and N. Ilahi (2007): “Looking beyond the ﬁ  scal: Do oil funds bring macroeconomic 
stability?”, IMF Working Paper no. 07/96, Washington, D.C.
Sturm, M. and N. Siegfried (2005): “Regional monetary integration in the member states of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council”, ECB Occasional Paper, no. 31, Frankfurt/M.
Sturm, M. and F. Gurtner (2007): “Fiscal policy in Mediterranean countries: Developments, 
structures and implications for monetary policy”, ECB Occasional Paper no. 69, Frankfurt/M.
Summers, L. H. (2007): “Opportunities in an era of large and growing ofﬁ  cial wealth”, in Sovereign 
wealth management, London.
The Banker (2007): “Top 500 Islamic ﬁ  nancial institutions”, Supplement November, London.
Toloui, R. (2007): “Petrodollars, asset prices, and the global ﬁ  nancial system”, Pimco Capital 
Perspectives, January 2007.
Truman, E. M. (2007): “Sovereign wealth funds: The need for greater transparency and 
accountability”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief August, 
Washington, D.C.
Walton, D. (2006): “Has oil lost the capacity to shock?”, speech given to the University of 
Warwick Graduates’ Association Senior Directors’ Forum at the Commonwealth Club, London, 
23 February 2006.
Warnock, F. E., and V. C. Warnock (2006): “International capital ﬂ  ows and US interest rates”, 
NBER Working Paper 12560, Cambridge, MA.75
ECB





EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SINCE 2007
55  “Globalisation and euro area trade: Interactions and challenges” by U. Baumann and F. di Mauro,
February 2007.
56 “Assessing  ﬁ  scal soundness: Theory and practice” by N. Giammarioli, C. Nickel, P. Rother, 
J.-P. Vidal, March 2007.
57  “Understanding price developments and consumer price indices in south-eastern Europe” by 
S. Herrmann and E. K. Polgar, March 2007.
58 “Long-Term Growth Prospects for the Russian Economy” by R. Beck, A. Kamps and 
E. Mileva, March 2007.
59  “The ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) a review after eight years’ experience”, by 
C. Bowles, R. Friz, V. Genre, G. Kenny, A. Meyler and T. Rautanen, April 2007.
60 “Commodity  price  ﬂ  uctuations and their impact on monetary and ﬁ  scal policies in Western and 
Central Africa” by U. Böwer, A. Geis and A. Winkler, April 2007.
61  “Determinants of growth in the central and eastern European EU Member States – A production 
function approach” by O. Arratibel, F. Heinz, R. Martin, M. Przybyla, L. Rawdanowicz, 
R. Seraﬁ  ni and T. Zumer, April 2007.
62 “Inﬂ  ation-linked bonds from a Central Bank perspective” by J. A. Garcia and A. van Rixtel, 
June 2007.
63 “Corporate  ﬁ  nance in the euro area – including background material”, Task Force of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks, June 2007.
64  “The use of portfolio credit risk models in central banks”, Task Force of the Market Operations 
Committee of the European System of Central Banks, July 2007.
65  “The performance of credit rating systems in the assessment of collateral used in Eurosystem 
monetary policy operations” by F. Coppens, F. González and G. Winkler, July 2007.
66  “Structural reforms in EMU and the role of monetary policy – a survey of the literature” by 
N. Leiner-Killinger, V. López Pérez, R. Stiegert and G. Vitale, July 2007.
67  “Towards harmonised balance of payments and international investment position statistics – 
the experience of the European compilers” by J.-M. Israël and C. Sánchez Muñoz, July 2007.
68  “The securities custody industry” by D. Chan, F. Fontan, S. Rosati and D. Russo, August 2007.
69  “Fiscal policy in Mediterranean countries – Developments, structures and implications for 
monetary policy” by M. Sturm and F. Gurtner, August 2007.76
ECB
Occasional Paper No 92
July 2008
70  “The search for Columbus’ egg: Finding a new formula to determine quotas at the IMF” 
by M. Skala, C. Thimann and R. Wölﬁ  nger, August 2007.
71  “The economic impact of the Single Euro Payments Area” by H. Schmiedel, August 2007.
72 “The role of ﬁ   nancial markets and innovation in productivity and growth in Europe” 
by P. Hartmann, F. Heider, E. Papaioannou and M. Lo Duca, September 2007.
73 “Reserve accumulation: objective or by-product?” by J. O. de Beaufort Wijnholds and 
L. Søndergaard, September 2007.
74  “Analysis of revisions to general economic statistics” by H. C. Dieden and A. Kanutin, 
October 2007.
75  “The role of other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries in monetary and credit developments in the euro area” 
edited by P. Moutot and coordinated by D. Gerdesmeier, A. Lojschová and J. von Landesberger,
October 2007.
76  “Prudential and oversight requirements for securities settlement a comparison of cpss-iosco” 
by D. Russo, G. Caviglia, C. Papathanassiou and S. Rosati, November 2007.
77 “Oil market structure, network effects and the choice of currency for oil invoicing” 
by E. Mileva and N. Siegfried, November 2007.
78  “A framework for assessing global imbalances” by T. Bracke, M. Bussière, M. Fidora and 
R. Straub, January 2008.
79  “The working of the eurosystem: monetary policy preparations and decision-making – selected 
issues” by P. Moutot, A. Jung and F. P. Mongelli, January 2008.
80  “China’s and India’s roles in global trade and ﬁ  nance: twin titans for the new millennium?” 
by M. Bussière and A. Mehl, January 2008.
81  “Measuring Financial Integration in New EU Member States” by M. Baltzer, L. Cappiello, 
R.A. De Santis, and S. Manganelli, January 2008.
82  “The Sustainability of China’s Exchange Rate Policy and Capital Account Liberalisation” 
by L. Cappiello and G. Ferrucci, February 2008.
83  “The predictability of monetary policy” by T. Blattner, M. Catenaro, M. Ehrmann, R. Strauch   
and J. Turunen, March 2008.
84  “Short-term forecasting of GDP using large monthly datasets: a pseudo real-time forecast 
evaluation exercise” by G. Rünstler, K. Barhoumi, R. Cristadoro, A. Den Reijer, A. Jakaitiene, 
P. Jelonek, A. Rua, K. Ruth, S. Benk and C. Van Nieuwenhuyze, May 2008.
85  “Benchmarking the Lisbon Strategy” by D. Ioannou, M. Ferdinandusse, M. Lo Duca, and 
W. Coussens, June 2008.77
ECB





86  “Real convergence and the determinants of growth in EU candidate and potential candidate 
countries: a panel data approach” by M. M. Borys, É. K. Polgár and A. Zlate, June 2008. 
87  “Labour supply and employment in the euro area countries: developments and challenges”, 
by a Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the European System Of Central Banks, 
June 2008.
88 “Real  convergence,  ﬁ  nancial markets, and the current account – Emerging Europe versus 
emerging Asia” by S. Herrmann and A. Winkler, June 2008.
89  “An analysis of youth unemployment in the euro area” by R. Gomez-Salvador and N. Leiner-Killinger, 
June 2008.
90  “Wage growth dispersion across the euro area countries: some stylised facts” by M. Anderson, 
A. Gieseck, B. Pierluigi and N. Vidalis, July 2008.
91 “The impact of sovereign wealth funds on global ﬁ   nancial markets” by R. Beck and
M. Fidora, July 2008.
92  “The Gulf Cooperation Council countries – economic structures, recent developments and role 
in the global economy” by M. Sturm, J. Strasky, P. Adolf and D. Peschel.by Michael Sturm, Jan Strasky,  
Petra Adolf and Dominik Peschel
OccasiOnal PaPer series
nO 92 / July 2008
The Gulf cOOPeraTiOn  
cOuncil cOunTries
ecOnOmic sTrucTures,  
recenT develOPmenTs  
and rOle in The GlObal  
ecOnOmy